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Abstract 
Starting with the 1990s, economies worldwide entered a knowledge-based phase of 
growth as part of the neoliberal project of development. In order to absorb the best well-
trained workforce internationally, Canada re-organized its immigration programs. One of 
the products of this re-organization was a prioritization, enlargement and increased focus 
placed on the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP).  
In my dissertation, I examine the effects and outcomes of the movement of highly 
skilled individuals on their origin developing and transition countries - Romania, in this 
case. Insofar as contextualizing Romania’s post-communist transition to a capitalist market, 
the thesis contributes to the understanding of the transnational dimensions of social 
reproduction through Romanian mothers’ investment in the migration of their children to 
Canada, as well as the gendered foundations of certain Canadian immigration policies that 
make such movements possible. While the existing feminist literature on social 
reproduction has not made visible enough how women’s paid and unpaid work in transition 
states enables the migration of young people, the “brain-drain” migration scholarship 
misses out completely the social reproductive work from developing countries that makes 
such movements possible. By analyzing Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker (FSWP) 
immigration program and Romanian mothers’ investment in the migration of their children 
to Canada (mobility enabled by such programs), my aim is to fill in such gaps in the current 
literature, in an attempt to expand both the brain-drain migration and social-reproduction 
literature. In asking these questions, I hope to bring forward arguments about how Canadian 
neoliberal projects of growth and development are indirectly subsidized by Romanian 
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women’s work, and how the overall processes accentuate and intensify inequalities in 
different parts of the world.
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Introduction 
 
The personal is political (Hanisch 1970) 
  
Women must fight for their freedom themselves and until they are able to tell their pains directly, 
any improvement of their fate will not be made.  
(Calypso Botez 1919)  
 
On a spring day, my family received the visit of an acquaintance who was on a short trip 
to Romania after migrating to Canada. Having left Romania for more than seven years at that point, 
this was his first trip back and he seemed eager to meet up with as many friends and relatives as 
possible. My family friend looked fabulous, dressed up in an elegant dark suit, wearing fashionable 
classic black shoes, and holding what looked like a brand-new suitcase. We cheered seeing him so 
dressed up and we were happy to notice him doing so well and looking so good after his stay in 
Canada. With what looked like a newly learned politeness and reserve, he accepted our 
compliments. We found out that, in contrast to Romania, it is very easy to be elegant in Canada. 
For example, one can walk to the office or to the local park during weekends and he does not have 
to wipe his shoes of dust for as long as a month. “Canadian streets are so clean, and so frequently 
wiped, and washed that there is hardly any dust anywhere”, he told us. My parents, hospitable 
folks, prepared a copious lunch for the guest, and while they were trying to serve him homemade 
pork sausages and pork chops with homemade French fries, we were informed that he no longer 
ate fatty foods. In Canada, he told us, people are more focused on healthy food options, with less 
fat and made of natural ingredients. He declined a glass of Fanta juice that my family bought, 
informing us that it might not even contain any natural orange juice. In Canada people drink only 
juices freshly extracted from fruits. By this point, I started to be annoyed by his rudeness and 
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insensitivity towards my family’s efforts to welcome him, but my parents kept on being nice and 
polite. Surprised by his stories, they were even asking for more details about life in Canada while 
making comparisons with Romania and blaming the corrupted Romanian politicians for not 
assuring the same good life that Canadians have. In this visit, we seemed to have found out that 
things are so transparent in the political life of Canada and people are so overwhelmingly and 
unflinchingly honest in their daily interactions that you do not have to count your change at any 
cashier. The change will always be the correct sum of money, and nothing less than that. 
Progressively amazed by what they were hearing, my Mum ended up asking, “how can you reach 
Canada?” What did you have to do, and what tests did you have to pass in order to reach what 
looked like a superior organization of social life from many points of view. To her question our 
family friend paused for a while and sighed, as an indication of the challenging probes and the 
difficulty of the process that one must pass through in order to reach such an advanced society. 
The long sighing was followed by a rather vague and short summary-reply of all the qualifications 
necessary to reach such a destination: “Ah, one must have a brain to reach Canada.”  
My exploration of brain drain, migration and women’s rights was sparked by this visit in 
early 2000s. Of course, one must have brain (“brain” understood as intelligence and smartness) to 
pursue anything in life. In the 1990s and 2000s, in the context of an agonizing and difficult post-
communist transition to the capitalist market, Romanians knew that Canada, Australia and United 
States were able to attract “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) and the most skilled 
workforce worldwide. The main assumption was that if you are smart and well educated, you 
cannot but succeed in these countries. For those aspiring Romanians who wanted to move to 
Canada, the focus was on getting more education, obtaining new certificates, training and 
acquiring new skills. Romanians invest all their efforts to prove that they are the efficient brains 
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that Canada wants them to be. Nonetheless, while young Romanians were trying to get the best 
out of their education and obtaining new credentials, another story was emerging in the 
background. The story was about the Romanian families’ efforts and, particularly, the Romanian 
mothers’ investments which were making it possible for their children to obtain their education 
and necessary qualifications in order to migrate to Canada. By Romanian women’s investments, I 
am considering both their waged work and their unwaged domestic, emotional and intellectual 
work invested in raising and educating their children. Nevertheless, the story of the Romanians’ 
highly-skilled migration would not be complete if it did not also bring to light the impact of their 
departure on the communities and families left behind that invested so much in them, only to see 
them go, in a context of challenging Eastern European post-communist transition to the capitalist 
market. 
Through a focus on Romania, my contribution to the current debates is multi-fold: first of 
all, my dissertation points out the limits and shortcomings of the classical brain-drain migration 
scholarship (Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, Hillel Rapoport 2001; J Bhagwati, K Hamada 1974; 
Carrington and Detragiache 1998; Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and Rapoport 2012), which cannot 
be separated from social reproduction and care economies; second, my analysis brings to light the 
need for the contextualization of the social-reproduction from a transition 1  and developing 
economy perspective and what this means for the Romanian mothers who invested so much paid 
and unpaid work in the education and creation of the highly skilled migrants to Canada. Third, I 
am looking at how Canada’s projects of neoliberal development and growth deeply rely on 
                                                 
1 The concept of transition economy refers to the countries of former Soviet Union, Eastern European bloc and 
China that in the late 1980s experienced a change on how their economies was organized: from a state and centrally 
planned economy under a communist rule to a market-based capitalist one (Burawoy 1999, Kornai 1992). The 
change meant a reduction of welfare structures, a privatization of formerly owned state resources and an economic 
liberalization of prices. The change also brought forward significant social costs in terms of massive job losses, 
lower incomes, increased inequality and greater poverty (Milanovic 1998).  
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transition and developing economies, in an equation of growth and marginalization that are co-
constituted; fourth, by listening to Romanian women’s voices my investigation uncovers not just 
the work that they do for their children, but also their critical awareness of the process as well as 
the possibilities of resistance to it through policy changes and transnational feminist solidarity 
action.  
In critically looking at the migration of the highly skilled to Canada and Romanian 
mothers’ private and public work that enables it, I hope to cover some of the existing gaps in both 
the literature of brain-drain migration as well as feminist political economy. Above all else, I am 
analyzing all this not from a “detached”, “impersonal”, “objective” position of a feminist outsider 
researcher on the topic, but from the position of a migrant to Canada, while acknowledging both 
waged and unwaged work that mothers such as mine invested in this outcome. 
While Canada’s immigration programs are focused on attracting the most skilled and 
talented workforce worldwide, there is much more that needs to be known concerning the question 
of whose efforts and through whose work these skills and talents are made possible. In the process 
of absorbing “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010), the issue of who has previously 
supported and funded the development of the desired skills, talents and “brains” of the individuals 
is frequently left out of the current scholarship on migration. In this context, my argument is that 
it is particularly women’s work that contributes to the creation of the highly skilled workers and 
professionals who migrate to Canada and that the current focus on migration policies of brain-
absorption does not sufficiently acknowledge the care and social reproductive work largely 
associated with women that goes into the formation and maintenance of such talents and skills.   
My choice for Romania’s post-communist case study (after 1990) was due to the fact that 
the year 1990 meant the end of more than 40 years of communist regime in Romania and the 
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beginning of the transition to a capitalist market. Through my analysis of Romanian women’s work 
toward the creation of highly skilled immigrants I hope to highlight a different story from the one 
that is usually trumpeted in immigrant programs of Canada. These programs which are meant to 
attract “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) and are promising a higher standard of 
living for those of the developing world not only do not always fulfill their promises, but also have 
damaging consequences for the origin countries. “Brain race” migration policies do not 
contextualize the costs that enter into the formation of highly skilled migrants, nor assess the 
effects that they have for the communities and families left behind. “Brain race” refers in this 
context to the effort of the governments or states’ institutions (such as universities) from the Global 
North to recruit and attract well-educated persons and build knowledge-based economies. The 
underground assumption is that, when countries compete vehemently for the best minds, the whole 
world benefits of talents and skills that reach their largest potential and best development 
(Wildawski 2010; Altbach, Postiglione: 2015). Nevertheless, these stories of talent migration costs 
and benefits, production and reproduction, and similarly of neoliberal growth and transition 
economies are always intertwined and never separated, challenging in this way both the 
scholarship on brain-drain migration as well that on social reproduction.  
In the introduction and first chapter of my dissertation, I analyze some of the aspects of the 
general brain gain vs. brain-drain migration literature. My analysis will include a feminist political 
economy critique of such processes (Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, Hillel Rapoport 2001; J 
Bhagwati, K Hamada 1974; Carrington and Detragiache 1998; Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2012). The feminist critique will underline how migration schemes concentrated on 
attracting “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) ultimately lead to hierarchical 
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gendered migration schemes. Such is the case of Canada’s prestigious Federal Skilled Workers2 
immigration program, focused on the absorption of specialized skills and talents from developing 
countries while not equally considering both the vital social reproductive labour that supported the 
creation of such skills, as well as the ongoing care needs in order for such programs to be 
sustainable. This fact is evident not only in making invisible and unaccounted for women’s waged 
and unwaged, social reproductive work in the formation of highly skilled migrants in transition 
Romania, but also in the way migration programs were structured in Canada.3 While the Federal 
Skilled Worker program had as its goals attracting and retaining worldwide talent, namely the top 
skills, education, language competencies and work experience needed for Canada’s modernization, 
performance and maximization of competitiveness, and while it raises the expectations for multiple 
rights such as skilled employment, benefits, and multicultural integration, the rest of the 
immigration programs focused on social reproductive needs did not. For example, the recently 
closed Live-in Caregivers program or the current Hire a Foreign In-Home Caregiver stream from 
the Temporary Foreign Worker program are feminized, directed at women, and deemed less 
important.4 Similarly, in Canada’s National Occupational Classification (NOC) the occupation of 
care providers is categorized as a skill level type C, and is not eligible for the country’s skilled 
immigrant (Express Entry) main program (CIC 2017). My focusing on Romanian migration to 
Canada after 1990 allows me to highlight how the “brain races” or the production of several 
                                                 
2 Please note that as of January 1, 2015 the Federal Skilled Worker (FSWP) applications are processed under the 
denomination of Express Entry Immigration Selection System  
3 Please note that the current analysis covers Canada’s immigration programs until the winter of 2017 (the year of 
finishing writing my doctoral thesis) and does not cover the latest CIC developments.  
4 See Citizenship and Immigration Canada: Report on Plans and Priorities 2014-2015. Please note that the 
comparison was used only to highlight the difference between various immigration programs. However, Canada’s 
immigration programs do not limit themselves to the three categories above-mentioned: while the Federal Skilled 
Worker (FSWP) program had the biggest quota in attracting migrants at the time of writing, Canada’s immigration 
program also included several other categories such as Provincial Nominees, or Refugees as well as some new 
additions such as Canadian Experience Class, Federal Skilled Trades Program, Start-Up Visa or Self-Employed 
Persons Program (Canadian Citizenship and Immigration 2014). 
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discourses and norms around such practices does not happen in a vacuum, and how women’s 
waged and social reproductive work in Romania’s transition economy primarily contributes to the 
growth and development of a certain neoliberal project of Canada. Nevertheless, such neoliberal 
projects of growth and development ultimately lead to new hierarchies and inequalities between 
different parts of the world. This analysis is relevant for feminist literatures as well as future policy-
making projects. 
My second chapter engages with research methodology and methods. It provides a brief 
description of the qualitative methods needed to understand and explain Romanian migration to 
Canada as well as an account of autobiography as a necessary accompanying feminist tool in the 
process of writing. My qualitative methods consisted in interviewing 25 Romanian mothers who 
had at least one child who migrated to Canada. I specifically wanted to find out how the migration 
of their children to Canada impacted them, and what their sacrifices and investments (from social 
reproductive work to direct financial support) were in the process of their children’s becoming 
highly skilled migrants. With that in mind, I wanted to analyze how big a role Romanian women’s 
waged and unwaged work plays in the formation of highly skilled migrants as well as the effect 
their outward migration has on developing sending countries and their own lives. However, I was 
doing the interviews while disclosing my own status as a highly skilled migrant to Canada, and 
politicizing my own position in the process, thus disclosing the essential component of 
autobiography in any methodology endeavour.   
My third and fourth chapters map the Romanian migration to Canada and describe 
Romanian women’s private and waged work in the creation of highly skilled Romanian migrants 
to Canada. While the account of Romanian women’s waged work is supported by a literature 
review and basic quantitative data, the full testimonies collected through interviews give voice to 
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what kind of work is needed domestically including the emotional and intellectual labour that goes 
into the formation and culmination of a subject as a highly skilled migrant. The chapters highlight 
the effects that the migration of the children has for Romanian mothers left behind in the context 
of post-communist transition, for women’s rights in general in transition economies and as brought 
to light by the lucid critical analysis of the Romanian women themselves. It also gives a glimpse 
of how women’s efforts and work in transition countries contribute to neoliberal projects of growth 
in Canada rather than to the development of their own home countries.  
The fifth chapter highlights how the processes of neoliberal development in Canada are 
intrinsically connected with the transition status of economies in Eastern Europe and proposes 
possibilities for raising awareness regarding both the costs and consequences of migration for the 
communities left behind. Furthermore, it envisions changes to the current “brain drain” and “brain 
gain” migration phenomena (as exemplified by the Romanian highly skilled migration to Canada) 
in the form of transnational feminist alliances and solidarity actions. Stimulated by feminist 
advocacy movements at local and transnational levels on similar women’s work-related issues, it 
also opens up the possibility of gender-based policy action at the government level to reverse the 
current patriarchal framing of immigration programs such as the Federal Skilled Worker Program 
(FSWP) as well as the harmful outcomes of such processes for the origin countries of migrants.  
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Chapter One: Theories and Analyses of Highly Skilled Migration and Social Reproduction 
Section A: Theories and Analysis of Highly Skilled Migration: Brain Gain vs. Brain Drain 
Arguments 
 
Some of the brain-drain vs. brain-gain debates in the migration literature argue that current 
economies’ main resource of growth and development is achieved by the migration of very 
knowledgeable and well-talented skilled workers. For example, they argue that in order to reach 
new levels of growth and development, governments of the already developed West and North 
design migration policies to attract a very educated and highly skilled professional from the East 
and South. While developing countries are drained of “brains” and a knowledgeable workforce, 
the already developed countries of the North and West gain them (Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2012). However, this does not take into account the gender component of this 
transnational circuit of migration in both the sending and receiving country. In this chapter, I 
grapple with this brain-drain vs. brain-gain debate in the migration literature and show how such 
theoretical understandings lack an analysis of the social reproductive work that supports and is 
vital to these movements. My scholarly contribution consists in mapping specifically these gaps 
in the highly skilled migration literature that looks at the brain race processes independently of the 
care economies and the social reproductive work that make it possible. Moreover, I show that such 
arguments are constituted by and re-enforced by patriarchal practices. The fact that there is a 
competition among developed countries worldwide to attract highly skilled migrants, but not a 
specific race to get the care and social reproductive resources they equally need for a sustainable 
future despite the internal demands speaks already of a hierarchy and differentiation. Of course, 
some of the same countries of the Global North do import domestic/ care labour. However, as I 
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will further exemplify through the case of Canada’s migration policies, the import of domestic/ 
care workers never reaches the quotes, importance and social prestige that the brain races migration 
policies aim to. Furthermore, they are always defined as either de-skilled or low skilled work, 
awarded much lower points, and considered less productive in the economy, reinforcing this way 
the patriarchal construction of women’s less valuable private household work and men’s more 
valuable public work (Abu-Laban 1998, Ahmad 2003, Yeates 2004).   
Speaking broadly about Canada’s immigration system, Yasmeen Abu-Laban (1998) and 
Sunera Thobani (2007) have already mentioned that the country’s government has enacted 
migration policies that historically have encouraged the work of men and made less of a priority 
the work largely associated with women. For example, Yasmeen Abu-Laban argues that Canada’s 
propensity for immigrants who are defined as able to provide economic contributions to the 
country has consistently advantaged some certain categories of immigrants to the detriment of 
others (1998: 76). Those categories are always differentiated in terms of class, gender, geographic 
location, ethnicity and race (Abu-Laban 1998). Similarly, Sunera Thobani argues that Canada’s 
state policies have always “exalted” some subjects and some national qualities at the expense of 
others. The “exalted”, glorified subjects distinguish themselves from “Others” or “Outsiders”, 
marked by gender, class, racial and ethnic exploitations, who always end up in positions of either 
marginalization, perpetual estrangement, or conditional inclusions (1998: 6).  
Worldwide migration policies of the developed countries focused on “brain gains” and 
attraction of highly skilled talents encourage work that is largely associated with male 
characteristics and values (rationality, intelligence, efficiency, and productivity). In this respect, 
work that is largely connected to male traits is favoured and prioritized, while the care work that 
goes into the sustenance of the highly skilled, and in the absence of which brains cannot even exist, 
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is de-prioritized and de-valued, as it is connected to women’s work. Nevertheless, such separations 
in the migration literature are artificial and patriarchal, and the case study of the post-communist 
highly skilled migration of Romanians to Canada will further exemplify the co-existence of equal 
importance and value of production and reproduction economies, brains and bodies. The case study 
will further highlight such premises by pointing out how the formation and creation of talented 
migrants is indebted to Romanian women’s waged and unwaged social reproductive work. 
The idea of growth and development via a knowledge-based economy has been put forward 
in the countries of the Global North since the 1990s and early 2000s. Connecting development to 
a knowledge-based economy emerges out of the assessment that previous economic visions of 
growth and development via accumulation of material assets are no longer viable and profit-
generating. While accumulating material resources and assets were the mainstream principles for 
economic progress and viability of the economy in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and the early 1990s, 
and continued the legacy of expropriating land and trading goods and services by leading colonial 
and financial powers of the nineteenth century (Piketty 2017), this insight was later replaced with 
new economic ideas of advancement that moved from the usual menial and blunt efforts to just 
amass wealth, to a more sophisticated alternative to generate surplus through knowledge 
economies. Peter Drucker coined the concept of “knowledge economy” in his book The Age of 
Discontinuity (1969). By “knowledge economy” the author means that societies’ future resources 
of development will lie in having and training very knowledgeable and well-talented skilled 
workers. Yet, the concept spread and became popular only three decades later. It was only in 2005 
that the US economist Tom Friedman picked up on Drucker's concept and expanded it, announcing 
that it was now the time of the "knowledge society" (Lingenfelter 2012). By that he meant that the 
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countries of the world’s main focus of growth and development would be attracting and training a 
knowledgeable and highly trained workforce.  
Without a doubt, during the 1990s and 2000s, the capacity to educate, use and produce 
knowledge as well as to have a well-trained and highly skilled workforce started to be considered 
as one of the most important engines in a country’s development, growth, innovation and 
performance. Knowledge-driven economies are now presumed to be critical in assuring a country’s 
competitive advantage on the global market (World Bank 2011).  
Coupled with the transfer of manufacturing jobs to the Global South, advancement of trade 
and the failing of expected profits in the 1990s and 2000s, governments of the Global North 
responded to these new visions of economic advancement and progress. The idea was that the 
amassing of intelligence and skills would push these same governments of the Global North to 
generate the developmental conditions they desired. Such ideas led governments to generate 
various policies in order to attract, assimilate and retain high level skills and knowledge-driven 
capacities. Speaking during that time and wanting to underline the importance of knowledge in 
assuring a competitive edge, the economist Edith Penrose mentions that “a firm’s rate of growth 
is limited by the growth of knowledge within it” (Penrose 1995: xvi-xvii). Coupled with the spread 
of technologies and improved communication systems, the expansion of trade and globalization 
patterns, it is not surprising that we find the governments of the most developed countries 
worldwide following these economic ideas, thereby pushing for importing knowledgeable 
workers.  
Of course, the recipe of knowledge-based growth as promoted by the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and other international institutions is more nuanced than this, 
revealing particularly an interest in the knowledge of finance capital, and the continued expansion 
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transnationally of financial schemes and interests, as well as of the transnational corporate capital 
of the Global North (Harvey 2005). Nevertheless, in order to realize such expansions and various 
aspects of it (such as the technological aspect), governments of the Global North marked as a 
priority the acquisition of “innovative”, “creative” skills. 5 
Taking into consideration that knowledge is not geographically bound and that skills are 
transferable, it did not take long for the governments of the developed world, such as, Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and the United States, to realize that they could not only train and educate 
local people in the best and most efficient way possible, but also increase the supply of local 
knowledge via immigration. Therefore, this knowledge-based phase of global economic 
development comes with policies that would attract highly skilled individuals from developing 
transition countries with economic insecurity through immigration programs. In this new scenario, 
it is exactly the young, highly educated, professional migrants who, through their talents and skills, 
are now perceived as adding value to the economy and increasing productivity rates. With the 
same impetus that developed governments used before to amass assets, they are now trying to 
attract a highly skilled workforce globally from the developing world. The highly trained skills are 
now perceived and framed in concrete terms as the most wanted economic resource that countries 
are in competition for internationally (Csedo 2009). Moreover, if governments fail to attract those 
high skills, World Bank warns, they will lose the global competition for economic advancement 
and will not be able to maintain the standards of living, comfort and well-being to which the 
population has been accustomed (World Bank 2011). Of course, World Bank is a global key 
promoter of a certain neoliberal capitalist policies and practices. For example, starting with the 
                                                 
5 While these assumptions stretch beyond the principal arguments of my current dissertation, further analytic inquiry 
is needed to describe exactly how the “knowledge-based” growth recipes and their immigration schemes focused on 
the acquisition of the highly skilled were promoted to actually support the expansion of the financial schemes of the 
Global North and the connecting transnational capital interests.  
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1980s and 1990s, World Bank representatives argued that poor and developing countries are in 
this situation due to their internal economic policies that impede market forces and an expansion 
of private capital (Standing 2000). Per World Bank’s representatives’ statements, the recipe and 
model for success for growth and development of all countries would consist in major 
transformations of institutions through elements such as: trade, financial and foreign capital 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, fiscal discipline and diminished public spending, 
labour market flexibility and decentralized labour relations, cutbacks in protective and collective 
regulations, among others, as well as new mechanisms to generate social capital: the import of 
knowledge workers (Standing 2000). Ironically, while these recommendations aim to improve the 
economic conditions of the developing countries, they do not include any redistributive policies. 
So, under this cover, they actually end up promoting the expansion of the financial schemes of the 
Global North, the opening up and privatization of developing markets for transnational capital 
interests, and the accumulation of skilled workers worldwide to assure these processes of capital 
advancement (Standing 2000).  
While the extent to which “knowledge” can assure these processes of capital advancement 
and economic growth of the Global North is probably difficult to quantify, and while there have 
certainly been critics of the premise of ‘knowledge based growth’, what is undeniable is the 
emphasis in migration policy, particularly since the 1990s and 2000s, on highly skilled workers, 
as well as the actual migration of those with high skills to countries such as Canada, Australia, and 
New Zealand  (Huws 2006, Stone 2013).   
 The scholarship on migration engaged at length with this idea of attracting highly skilled 
professionals through immigration policies. While acknowledging this phase of development as 
new, the scholarship on migration conceptualized it as “brain race” (when describing the 
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government policies to attract the highly skilled migrants), or “brain gain” (when connected to the 
destination locations). Furthermore, the literature within this field of study did not lose its critical 
grasp and did not fail to consider it as a process of “brain drain” as well (when related to the 
original home countries of the migrants) (Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, Hillel Rapoport 2001; 
J Bhagwati, K Hamada 1974; Carrington and Detragiache 1998). Most of the time the movement 
of highly skilled professionals channeled through different immigration policies is theorized 
comparatively as “brain drain” vs. “brain gain”. For example, one of the most recent resources on 
the topic is the book by Tito Boeri, Herbert Brücker, Frédéric Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport (2012) 
titled Brain Drain and Brain Gain: The Global Competition to Attract High-Skilled Migrants. 
These authors argue that there exists a worldwide race between powers to attract the most skilled 
and talented immigrants, all fascinated by new economic explanations that describe new future 
levels of development and growth based on an ever-increasing collection of the world’s highly 
educated skills and brain gains. Furthermore, in this competition, the same authors inform us that 
there is a worldwide victor at drawing in the most gifted universal workforce, and that is, the 
United States. The Unites States, the authors contend, is best for drawing in PhD graduates and 
experts from developing nations, as well as from the European Union. However, the so called 
“brain race” has been the focus of immigration strategies by an increasing number of various other 
developed countries of the Global North, for example, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Most 
of these immigration strategies have in place explicit criteria and standards in selecting the most 
talented immigration workforce, such as educational background, work experience, and language 
capacities of the candidates.  
Part of the Global North, Canada adhered fully to the knowledge-based economic visions 
and principles of development and growth, thereby developing similar immigration programs. 
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Most of Canada’s immigration programs have been based on gaining the necessary education and 
skills that will innovate and substantially improve the economy’s current trend and performance 
and will ultimately translate into financial gains. In this sense, Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
reiterates frequently in its policies the need to continue the efforts to maintain Canada’s ability “to 
compete globally for “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) by creating the optimal 
conditions to attract immigrants who can contribute fully to Canada’s prosperity. A well-managed 
and efficient immigration system is critical to achieving this objective” (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada: 2008).  
The programs and policies that are currently in force for the acquisition of highly skilled 
professionals are based on “the point system” (Skeldon 2009). Introduced in 1967, it awarded 
applicants various points for their educational attainment, work experience, and language abilities. 
Since then it has been used as the core mechanism to determine which individuals will gain access 
to the country as skilled migrants. Later on, the government of Canada will further label them as 
“economic migrants”, a separate category from the other 2 sets of migration streams, namely the 
“family” and “protected persons” category (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998). In 2015, for example, 
there were 170,384 individuals, respectively 62.6 per cent of the total, who were admitted in 
Canada under the category of economic migrants as either principal applicants or spouses and 
dependents (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2017), up from an average of around 50 per cent 
in early 1990s. Recently, in what was presented as an attempt to balance an aging demographics 
and a strengthening of the economy, the Canadian Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship 
released publicly a 3-year plan regarding immigration targets. According to the same ministry, 
Canada will gradually accept up to one million of newcomers in the next three years, 60 per cent 
of whom will be comprised of skilled economic class migrants. The projections for skilled and 
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economic migrants are higher than in the previous years and are as follows: 177,500 in 2018, 
191,600 in 2019 and 195,800 in 2020 (CBC News 2017). Moving forward, the government 
expressed the wish that immigration levels expand even further after 2020 with projected new 
targets for the next decade of up to 450,000 newcomers every year (CBC News 2017). These 
increased numbers in Canada are not a surprise especially when compared to earlier years. The 
“economic migrants” and their high percentage of desirability by the government are seen as such 
due to their potential to significantly contribute to the economy and amplify its growth. Without it 
being mentioned explicitly as such, the category was also created in contrast to the family 
reunification and protected refugee immigration programs, seen as “unprofitable” to the economy 
of Canada, in equations that render the persons that apply for such programs, namely women, aged 
populations, and asylum seekers, and their jobs as not similarly contributing directly to the 
economy. It was only the “economic migrant” class that was specifically geared to further 
“Canada’s social and economic interests” (CIC 2010: 24) while the family class of immigrants 
was meant to contribute to the reunification of families and the protected persons division was 
created to grant status on the basis of solid humanitarian and compassionate considerations. As my 
dissertation will point out, such divisions are problematic and never outside the economy and 
development of one’s country.  
Within the “economic stream,” the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) has been 
historically one of the main strategies for the attraction of highly skilled migrants to Canada. 
Established in 2002, the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) continued to some extent the 
initial “Point System” of immigration to Canada by assessing specific factors according to which 
immigrants can settle as permanent residents. What was different from the initially designated 
“point system” was the government’s preoccupation to increase the economic benefits and outputs 
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from the admission of newly immigrants. While parallelly, there have been some preoccupation 
with selecting immigrants based on occupational imbalances and labour shortage needs, the 
Federal Skilled Worker Program was launched with a focus to attract generally higher levels of 
human capital considered as fitting and meeting any market needs. The human capital model 
focused on characteristics (notably education) believed to lead to long term positive economic 
outcomes (Ferrer, Picot, Riddell 2014). The immigrants’ capacity to settle and integrate in Canada 
was still assessed through six selection factors, labelled as thoroughly “objective and transparent” 
(Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010: 1). However, in order to be considered for selection 
the candidates’ education was one of the most outstanding factors. Other selection standards 
included: relevant work experience, language skills, adequate age, arranged employment in 
Canada, adaptability elements (such as partner’s education, family relations in Canada, post-
secondary study and work experience in Canada). Under this program, any candidate must meet a 
minimum number of points corresponding to the established selection criteria, or what was called 
as a “pass mark”. In 2017, for example, that pass mark was set at 67 points (Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada 2018) 
Nevertheless, throughout the years, the program underwent various policy changes. For 
example, in 2013 the government of Canada added an eligibility criterion based on further higher 
education (studies in Canada towards a PhD) and work experience in specific fields (e.g., full-time 
paid work experience in the past decade in one of the 24 specified professions, which were later 
increased to 50 different professions)6 (Jan Ali 2014). The desirable professions listed by the 
program include, but are not limited to, the following career specializations: senior managers in 
the finance section or trade, construction managers, financial auditors and accountants, civil and 
                                                 
6 To view the full list of desirable occupations, please click on the following link: http://www.canadavisa.com/new-
instructions-federal-skilled-worker-applications.html 
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mechanical engineers etc. Since the program has been specifically geared to high-skilled 
immigrants, in 2013 the government launched a separate new program called the Federal Skilled 
Trade Program (FSTP) to address its needs for lower skilled migrants. The program was geared to 
immigrants with qualifications in specific trades or who have practical work experience rather than 
formalized education (Jan Ali 2014). 
 Throughout the years other immigration programs have been launched in order to address 
Canada’s increasingly varied needs. However, none of the projects launched reached the extension, 
significance and spread of the Federal Skilled Worker Program (especially in terms of the number 
of persons admitted in this category as well as the government’s arguments regarding the positive 
long term benefits of their arrival for the Canadian economy) that still accounted for the main 
circuit of arrival of permanent immigrants to Canada. For example, in the mid-1980s the 
governments of provinces wanted to have more power in the selection of migrants from abroad, 
so the Provincial Nominee Program was established (Jan Ali 2014). Similarly, in 1973 the 
Temporary Foreign Workers program was launched so that Canadian employers would have the 
opportunity of hiring foreign nationals on a short, temporary basis when faced with shortages in 
the workplace (House of Commons 2016). In order to identify foreign workers who were able to 
provide care for the young and the elderly, the government initiated in 1981 the Foreign Domestic 
Worker Movements program, in 1992 the Live-In Caregiver program and in 2015 the Hire a 
Foreign In-Home Caregiver under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program. Furthermore, with the 
explicit focus on attracting foreign investors and experienced business people to Canada, the 
government also launched briefly The Immigration Investment Program (IIP) and Federal 
Entrepreneur Program (FEP). Launched in 2014 and living a short life (the program ended in 
2015), the program aimed at attracting long time businessmen and investors as a means of investing 
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in Canada and assuring the country’s future growth. Having in view Canada’s development and as 
an increasing recognition of the educational and work experience that people who already live in 
Canada possess, in 2008 the government launched the Canadian Experience Class. The Canadian 
Experience Class was developed for people who have Canadian work experience and education. 
It was considered that someone who had already studied and/or had been offered a job in Canada, 
had a better chance to integrate and settle in the country. Between 2014 and 2015, 8,000 
applications were expected within this category (Jan Ali 2014). Nevertheless, as already 
mentioned, none of the recent developments of the immigration program from the economic 
stream reached the spread and prominence of FSWP. From 2002 to 2014 FSWPs (principal 
applicants, spouses and dependents) accounted for more than 80 per cent of the total economic 
class and more than half of the total number of immigrants who arrived in Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada 2014). 
 In 2015, the Federal Skilled Worker Program, together with the Federal Skilled Trades 
Program and the Canadian Experience Class, were grouped together under Canada’s new Express 
Entry program (CIC 2015). The program was designed to put an emphasis on the skills of the 
immigrants, their ability to render them beneficial to the Canadian economy and to settle in the 
country.  While the grouping is new, there is also a lot of continuity to the Federal Skilled Worker 
Program. For example, the criteria of selection are again numerical with the maximum score of 
1200 and again based on skills, education, language ability, and work experience. What is new is 
the fact that Canadian degrees, diplomas and certificates, a valid job offer and a nomination from 
the territory or the province also give the candidate additional points. The skill selection criteria 
have special rankings and hierarchies, identified by different letters from the alphabet, such as 
Skill Type Level 0, A, B, C, D and E. However, only Skill Type 0 (zero), Skill Type Level A or B 
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are defined as “skilled jobs”. While Skill Type 0 are Management jobs, Skill Level A is for 
professional jobs that are usually associated with a degree (doctors, dentists, architects), and Skill 
Level B is for technical jobs and skilled trades that usually require a college diploma or training. 
Despite the new grouping of programs, through their definition and hierarchy they still put indirect 
pressure on high skills, foreign language abilities, transferable talents at the international level, 
whether nurtured abroad or directly in Canada.  
Nevertheless, the recent Canadian immigration focus only reflects what is happening at the 
international level.  The demand for highly skilled migration and its subsequent increasing flow is 
reflected by a lot of statistics and data from other countries as well. Based on a study run by the 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), the stock of highly skilled 
immigrants in the OECD countries has been estimated at about 20 million individuals in 
2000/2001, with more than 50 per cent of those residing in the USA, and another 22 per cent in 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand combined, which are four of the traditional countries that 
pursue highly selective immigration policies (Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and Rapoport 2012). 
About 24 per cent reside in the EU and other Western European countries, most of those in the UK 
(6 per cent), Germany (5 per cent), and France (3 per cent). Not accidentally, the number of 
immigrants in the population with tertiary educational attainment is high in those countries that 
pursue a highly skilled selective immigration policy. According to recent statistics, the share of 
foreign born individuals in the population with tertiary education amounts to 43 per cent in 
Australia, 24 per cent in Canada, and 21 per cent in New Zealand (Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2012: 40). In the United States, out of the 13 per cent of the population that is foreign-
born, 27 per cent of them have a bachelor’s degree or higher. Such statistics show that in terms of 
education distribution, the proportion of the foreign born with at least a bachelor’s degree matches 
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that of the native born in the United States (Kandel 2011). In Canada, the proportion of recent 
immigrants with a university degree is even higher than that of the native population, a gap that 
continues to widen across the years. If in 1994 the proportion of immigrants with a university 
degree was 20.8 per cent in 2001, that proportion rose to 45.6 per cent and remained at the same 
levels through 2009 (Kelley, Marcelino, Mulas citing Reitz, Curtis, and Elrick (2014).  
 However, the tackling of either the “brain drain” or “brain gain” issue has certain effects 
for feminist analysis. In this regard, there is not enough feminist literature to address the gendered 
effects and consequences of the worldwide governmental race for a high-skilled workforce and 
“brain races” through immigration policies together with their framing as such. For this reason, I 
am arguing that it is important to draw on feminist theories of migration and social reproduction 
(Abu-Laban 1998, Koc 1999, Peterson 2010, Raghuram 2009, Thobani 2007) to understand the 
“brain drain” phenomenon and its supposed gendered neutrality and blindness. With this in mind, 
I am asking from a feminist perspective: what are the implications of implementing “brain gain” 
policies such as Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker (FSWP) immigration program? I am mostly 
asking these questions from a feminist perspective since one cannot have a “brain” extraction or 
absorption without considering the materiality of the “body” or knowledge economies without 
considering the contexts of immigration and movement within which economies and markets 
unfold. While Canada also added in 2014 a Federal Skilled Trade Program as one of its 
immigration targets (with a focus on acquiring particular manual and practical skills in the field of 
industrial, electrical and construction trades or supervisors and technical jobs in natural resources, 
agriculture and related production (electricians, plumbers, carpenters, painters, crane operators, 
etc.), and a Canadian Experience Class (with the goal of valuing the persons already studying and 
working here), the numbers were much smaller than through FSWP. For example, in 2014 the 
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Federal Skilled Trades class had a cap of 5,000 applications per year, the Canadian Experience 
Class of 8,000, whereas the Federal Skilled Worker Program had a much higher upper limit of 
25,000 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015). Additionally, traditionally the majority of 
Canada’s economic immigrants since the 1960s onwards (up to 60 per cent throughout the 1990s 
and more than 55 per cent throughout the 2000s) were drawn to Canada through the absorption 
and retention of highly skilled university graduates who were born outside the country (Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada 2013).   
The dichotomies of “mind” vs. “body” or of “intellectual production” vs. “social 
reproduction”, “culture” vs. “nature” have been critiqued by several feminists (Grosz 1994, 
Fausto-Sterling 1992, Luxton 1997). The feminist scholarship has argued that such 
dichotomizations are gendered strategies largely associated with one biological sex or another. For 
example, the opposition between mind and body has been largely associated with an opposition 
between male and female. The body and bodily functions were regarded as connected with women 
and labelled as inferior to the pursuits of the rational mind which were the attribute of men (Bordo 
1987, Butler 1990, de Beauvoir 1949, Harding 1986). Similarly, intellectual production and 
cultural outputs have been traditionally considered male characteristics, whereas the body, the 
social reproduction and nature have been associated with the female gender. However, the most 
problematic part is not their connection and embeddedness in different gender regimes, but their 
hierarchical status in such equations, with one gender on the one side of the equation being 
perceived as more rational and superior while the other one is seen as feminized and inferior 
(Bordo 1987, Butler 1990, de Beauvoir 1984, Harding 1986). The situation is one of hierarchical 
ranking, with the male, masculine traits, characteristics and values triumphing over the same traits 
and characteristics connected with the feminine and women. However, for other feminists like 
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Catherine MacKinnon the relationship is as much about hierarchy as it is about power and 
domination, with men’s forms of dominance subordinating women’s condition, socially and 
economically (1989: 61).  
When immigration policies focus on “brain drain”, they are inevitably promoting a 
gendered division of migration, as the brain and the mind have historically been seen as the 
characteristics of men and men’s labour, and as embodied in such professions as engineering, and 
computer programming, etc. They are automatically and indirectly endorsing a dualism between 
mind and body, with those subjects possessing minds and brains constructed as more rational and, 
thereby, deserving attention and importance, whereas those subjects concerned with bodily needs 
and lives are marginalized and de-prioritized. Such policies perpetuate a division of mind and 
body, and an unsustainable separatism and opposition between the two. One cannot have a body 
in the absence of a mind, just as one cannot possess a mind outside of a functional body. Such 
binaries are unsustainable since they do not take into consideration the material needs of the bodies 
that make the intellectual production possible. The material needs of these bodies (feeding, 
cleaning, etc.) are mostly satisfied by women’s work (Armstrong 2003; Arat-Koc 2001; Besanzon 
2006; Laslett and Brenner 1989; Luxton 2006; Waring 1988). Furthermore, the higher value and 
emphasis placed on “brain” and intellectual production does not happen in a vacuum: there is not 
a focus and a placement of value on brain without a subsequent devaluing of the care and social 
reproductive work performed by women to make possible the knowledge production of the brains 
(Bordo 1987, Butler 1990, de Beauvoir 1984, Harding 1986).  
The government immigration programs such as that of Canada’s “Federal Skilled Workers” 
program with its focus on “brain gain” and its goals to attract the most talented and highly skilled 
workers worldwide function in a system where the social reproductive work mostly performed by 
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women is subordinate. Any governmental prioritization on “brain gains” and race for highly skilled 
talents has real world consequences for women. It does so at the expense of women and women’s 
work from transition countries, such as is the case for the Romanian women. As revealed through 
my example, this approach that ends up recruiting some from transition developing countries to 
do the work and others from already developed locations to benefit from it, is deeply inflected 
through gender, class and nationality. It leads to a devaluing of the work usually associated with 
and disproportionately performed by women: social reproductive work. Subsequently, this 
selection indirectly leads to a hierarchical subordination model for other immigration programs 
that favour women’s work. In this sense, immigration programs such as Canada’s “Federal Skilled 
Worker Program” imposes costs for, and negative consequences on other immigration programs 
outside its purview while perpetuating a patriarchal agenda and devaluing women’s work 
worldwide. Immigration programs that are meant for attracting work that is highly associated with 
women are much smaller in quotas, labelled as less or low skilled and assessed as less valuable to 
the Canadian market (Ahmad 2013). Such it is the case of the now defunct Live-in Caregiver or 
Foreign Domestic Movements program. Launched in 1981 as the Foreign Domestic Movement 
Program (FDMP), only to be replaced by the Live-in Caregiver Program in 1992, and discontinued 
in 2015, the program allowed Canadian families to hire live-in caregivers from abroad to care for 
children, aging and elderly persons, and disabled individuals (Kelly, Park, de Leon, Priest 2009). 
For example, while the number of immigrants admitted under the Federal Skilled Worker FSWPs 
(principal applicants, spouses and dependents) accounted for 81 per cent of the total economic 
number class and 46 per cent of the total number of immigrants who arrived in Canada from 2002 
to 2008, the arrivals under the LCP between 1993-2009 constituted only 2.1 per cent of all 
immigrant landings (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010). Furthermore, the programs have 
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been historically envisioned as being outside the “point system”, and thus not so worthy of the 
merit points, signaling a lesser worth and potential value to Canadian society (Arat-Koc 1997, 
Valiani 2009). By this analysis, it does not mean that women cannot participate in the highly skilled 
program, but that the real issue concerns the social reproductive work that is mostly done by 
women and that does not get equally recognized, prioritized or granted equal rights in the 
immigration selection process. Governments’ programs that focus on “brain gains” participate in 
setting-up two different immigration standards, in a way which highly deprioritizes women’s 
work, largely associated with social reproductive work, and over-emphasizes men’s work, deemed 
as of higher value and importance. Indirectly, it creates women’s work as second class and of lesser 
value, even though production and reproduction economies cannot exist without one another 
(Ferguson 1999; Luxton 2006; Laslett and Brenner 1999).  
When our family friend who migrated to Canada was visiting us in Romania, he was 
emphasizing how Canada only selects brainy and incredibly intelligent immigrants. Nevertheless, 
his assumption, and that of so many immigration programs worldwide, does not consider the 
reproductive contributions that enable the program and make it possible. 
Whenever Canada searches for “brainy” immigrants, feminist scholarship tells us that one 
cannot have a selection of brains and skilled talents without considering the reproduction and care 
economy that needs both to produce and daily sustain, feed and clean the bodies of these brains 
(Armstrong 2003; Luxton 2006; Waring 1988). In this sense, “brain” work becomes a code for all 
professional, highly skilled immigrant labour that renders invisible the production of such labour, 
as well as the context within which this happens, and the resources that go into it. While minds 
and bodies cannot but co-exist and function interdependently, separating and prioritizing 
immigration goals that focus on masculine traits (“minds”) and jobs where men dominate, end up 
 27 
subordinating women’s social reproductive work (overwhelmingly connected with the function of 
the “bodies”) in equations that are already patriarchal and unjust. This migration selection 
imbalance further creates hierarchies between genders and between different geographic parts of 
the world. In this regard, I will utilize the historical, political and economic circumstances of 
transition Romania to reveal certain theoretical effects and understandings, effects that are not 
necessarily accounted for in the circumstances themselves as well as in the feminist or brain-drain 
migration scholarship debates. This attempt, therefore, is not as much a history, as it is a theoretical 
analysis of a migration and social reproductive story unfolding where Romania is the site. 
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Section B: Theories and Analysis of Social Reproduction 
 
Migration policies focused on brain gains and brain-absorption such as Canada’s Federal 
Skilled Worker Program ignore reproductive costs while assuming artificial separations of 
knowledgeable skills and care components within a whole person. Nevertheless, in order to 
produce such knowledge-based outputs, one first has to have his/her social reproduction assured. 
In this sense, it is mostly the social-reproduction of women that makes possible the production of 
knowledge outputs. By social reproduction I mean “the social processes and human relations 
associated with the creation and maintenance of the communities upon which all production and 
exchange rest” (Bakker 2003: 40). 
Kate Bedford and Shirin Rai analyzed the concept of social reproduction and identified it 
as consisting of: “first, biological reproduction, the production of future labour, and the provision 
of sexual, emotional, and affective services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate 
relationships); second, unpaid production of both goods and services in the home, particularly 
goods and services of care, as well as social provisioning (by which we mean voluntary work 
directed at meeting needs in the community); and, third, the reproduction of culture and ideology, 
which stabilizes dominant social relations” (Bedford and Rai 2010: 10). 
Similarly, other scholars want to name social reproduction as the practices that are involved 
in maintaining people both on a daily and inter-generationally basis, and more specifically the 
series of activities and “attitudes, behaviours, feelings, responsibilities and interactions directly 
used for life maintenance, both in the everyday life, as in an intergenerational sense” (Laslett and 
Brenner 1989: 382). The process involves all manner of practices from caring- emotionally, 
morally, and physically- for children, older adults, other dependents and other family members, to 
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the provisioning of food and clothing, to acquiring and maintaining adequate shelter, to education 
and socialization, to the nurturing of kin and community relationships, to the managements of 
household budgets, and to other acts of love and responsibility (Stenning and Smith 2006). More 
concretely, some of the practices of social reproduction include cooking, cleaning, and clothing as 
well as a number of other auxiliary activities that involve less concrete, physical work, and more 
emotional labour, both deemed as absolutely necessary in the process of caring for the children, 
the disabled and the senior population. Consequently, the social reproduction process encompasses 
“manual, mental, emotional” forms of work that are considered necessary for the preservation of 
life and the perpetuation of new generations, from child bearing, rearing, nutrition and nurturance, 
child education and mentoring to senior caring and socialization (Laslett and Brenner 1989: 383).  
By focusing on issues of social reproduction, feminist political economists wanted to reveal 
how gendered the actors are in these processes, and how the burden of social reproduction is placed 
disproportionately on women’s shoulders. At the same time,  women’s disproportionate role in the 
perpetuation of new generations exemplifies how the local economies of production, consumption 
and exchange depend on households, as well as the reproduction of workers within families 
(Warring 1988). The great contrast comes if the issues of social reproduction are measured by the 
production of wealth and public output, which remains highly gendered, and leaves women’s work 
unacknowledged, invisible, devalued, and unpaid (Armstrong 2001; Besanzon 2006; Luxton 2006; 
Waring 1988). 
Feminist political economists have insisted on revaluing and reinterpreting the significance 
of social reproduction to the point that the concept is now foundational to our understanding of 
productive labour. Veronica Beechey (1979: 79) argued, for example, that “the inter-relationships 
between production and reproduction are a part of a single process” that changes over time and 
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place as opposed to two distinct processes. Anna M. Agathangelou notes that “the production 
economy is not outside the reproductive economy, and “reproduction is a productive economy” 
(Agathangelou 2004: i). J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006), Linda McDowell (2005), Cindi Katz 
(2001), Diane Elson (1994), Meg Luxton and Kate Bezanson (2006), Isabella Bakker and Stephen 
Gill (2003) and others (Mackenzie 1999; Villneueve and Rose 1988) have explored the ways in 
which gender is mapped on the current neoliberal economy, demonstrating that gender is a social 
relation of power dependent for its meaning on an imagined dichotomy between productive and 
social reproductive economies, or the masculine and feminine. Exposing the interdependence with 
and connection to the realms of production and social reproduction is one of the most significant 
contributions that feminists have made to the study of the economy (Rose 1993). In particular, 
current economies are thought to depend on the separation of private and public realms where the 
home is understood as a private space in which no paid work occurs (Katz 2001: 712). Conversely, 
the public realm is thought to be the workplace, the place in which paid work is undertaken. In this 
case, despite being considered non-productive and non-profitable, “it is actually the social 
reproduction which ‘produces’ societal members who are able to function ‘appropriately’: as 
family and community members, workers, and citizens” (Peterson 2010: 271-304). Unfortunately, 
these different valorizations are created through a gender division of labour, and rendered useful 
and profitable or unimportant and unproductive depending on which gender (male or female) is 
performing them.  
Of course, the issue is larger and more systemic than the work men and women do, and it 
mostly has to do with “a hierarchical codification of ‘difference’ that (over)values that which is 
associated with masculinity and devalues that which is associated with femininity. […] Long 
histories of social reproduction in hetero-patriarchal households have normalized this gender 
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coding — manifested in embodied identities and divisions of labour — with the corollary effect 
of coding ‘women’s work’ as ‘merely reproductive’ (natural, unlearned, unskilled, voluntary) and 
thus not worth counting (being valued) economically” (Peterson 2010: 274). The devaluation of 
feminized labour does not reduce itself to households, but enters other “feminized” work spheres. 
Similarly, the practices of caregiving, services, maintenance, for example, are imbued and largely 
associated with women’s household work, and are generating lower status and cheap wages 
(Peterson 2010). However, feminist Spike Peterson is not alone in believing that the sexual 
division of labour is caused by extensive successions of patriarchal heterosexual households. Other 
feminists suggest that it is exactly the parallel patriarchal construction of women as mothers and 
wives that perpetuates such binaries.  
If feminists have already identified how the issues of home and women’s work have been 
historically delegated to the “non-productive” and non-profitable sphere (Rowbotham 1993), it is 
equally important to notice how they made such critiques of patriarchal ideologies that construct 
women as wives and mothers. Such patriarchal identity constructions are done in order to justify 
capital imperatives for a cheap and unpaid labour force (Ward 1990). Paradoxically, it is exactly 
women’s unpaid reproductive labour that produces the most central asset and commodity to 
capital, that is, the workforce (Agathangelou 2004). Of course, as mentioned before, much of the 
invisibility of social reproduction and its presumed autonomy from formal production has 
stemmed from the delineation of the public and private spheres. Feminist political economists have 
challenged the private/public dichotomy which has obscured the exploitation of unpaid gendered 
social reproductive labour (Ferguson 1999; Luxton 2006; Laslett and Brenner 1999).  
The earliest feminist theorizations of social reproduction examined the separation of 
processes of production from reproduction in order to reveal how exploitation can occur in both 
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‘formal’ production and in the private appropriation of surplus unwaged reproductive labour in the 
household (Dalla Costa and James 1972). Writing in the context of the ‘Wages for Housework’ 
organizing in 1970s Italy, Mariarosa Dalla Costa problematizes the separation between the waged 
work men undertake in the production of commodities and the non-waged reproductive labour 
married working-class women undertake in their homes. She argues that women’s unpaid labour 
involved in social reproduction and in meeting the necessities of day-to-day life produce the very 
conditions that make possible the reproduction of the labour force. Consequently, the separation 
of waged and non-waged work is an artificial one, as it is premised on the notion that reproductive 
labour is non-productive. The fact that external powers are able to command and exploit unpaid 
reproductive labour in the home reveals the extent to which this labour subsidizes the wage paid 
to male working-class labourers.  Dalla Costa and James (1975 27-28) note:  
Since Marx, it has been clear that capital rules and develops through the wage, that       is, 
that the foundation of capitalist society was the wage labourer and his or her direct 
exploitation. What has been neither clear nor assumed by the organizations of the working-
class movement is that precisely through the wage has the exploitation of the non-wage 
labourer been organized. This exploitation has been even more effective because the lack of 
a wage hid it. That is, the wage commanded a larger amount of labour than appeared in 
factory bargaining. Where women are concerned, their labour appears to be a personal 
service outside of capital.  
 
  Dalla Costa’s and James’s perspective stretches the Marxist conception of capitalist 
production and exchange to include not only waged labour but also the unpaid labour of working-
class women.  
Artificial separations between production and reproduction are imbued with gendered 
relations. For example, feminist Diane Elson (1994) refers to the same gender division in the 
economy as she speaks of a separation between production and reproduction understood as a 
division between the monetary “productive” economy and the non-monetary “reproductive” 
economy. “These non-monetary social relations are subordinate to money in the sense that they 
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cannot function and sustain themselves without an input of money; and they are reshaped in 
response to the power of money. Nevertheless, neither can the monetary economy sustain itself 
without an input of unpaid labour, an input shaped by the structures of gender relations” (Elson 
1994: 40). Many assumptions about social reproduction and the subjects who are supposed to carry 
out this labour inform and shape divisions of labour as well as inequalities. A major assumption 
about subjects is that women are seen as their reproductive potential, as mothers and wives.  Also, 
there is a tendency to use different strategies to ultimately inscribe women as racially and culturally 
different, while creating an economic and moral environment in which the appropriation of a 
woman’s work, her children, as well as her childbearing potential, became rational and, indeed, 
natural (Elston 1994). 
The more mothers and wives provide reproductive labour for free, the more it remains 
hidden from economic interactions. Pointing to the invisibility of sectors of economy associated 
with women’s work, other feminists notice in turn that: “gender relations and inequalities are 
embedded in what might appear to be hidden economic interactions (Beneria et al. 2000: x).”  In 
this sense, women’s unpaid work makes possible not just the accumulation of capital, but also the 
extension and expansion of the capital in a process that classical economic theorists conceptualized 
as “globalization” and neoliberal development.  
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Section C: Neoliberalism, Migration and Social Reproduction 
 
 
Of particular focus in the field of feminist political economy research is how women's 
unpaid social reproductive work stimulated the growth and advancement of economies in the 
Global North and their neoliberal expansion over national and local borders. Of course, the recent 
global neoliberal expansion resulted in various forms of transversal and intersectional inequality, 
including women’s inequality. A considerable number of feminist scholars have made us aware of 
the specific ways in which gender relations are impacted by globalization and the advancement of 
neoliberal economies, and their analyses have already impacted scholarship debates (Bakker and 
Gill 2003; Bergeron 2001; Brooks 2007; Caraway 2007; Gibson-Graham 2002; Moghadam 2005; 
Mohanty 2003; Sassen 1998). Joan Acker contends that, before talking about impacts and 
consequences, gender must be understood as already embedded and intrinsic in globalizing 
capitalist processes. The author is supporting the argument that there cannot be a separation 
between capitalist production and human reproduction (Acker 2004). Furthermore, capitalism 
would not have been able to extend to the global dimension of today if it were not for this primary 
gendered division between a capitalist production and a private human reproductive sphere. 
Today’s globalization and neoliberalism would not have been possible without a prior constitution 
of the male/masculine with production in the money economy and the identification of the 
female/feminine with reproduction and the domestic sphere (Acker 2004). 
Initially theorized only by feminist political economists, the issue of domestic work or of 
so called “social reproduction” work becomes significant in understanding globalization 
(Armstrong 1999; Koc 2006; Besanzon 2006; Laslett and Brenner 1989; Luxton 2006; Warring 
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1988). By globalization, I mean “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles 
away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990: 64) as well as “the spatial reorganization of production across 
national borders and a vast acceleration in the global circulation of capital, goods, labour and 
ideas” (Freeman 2001: 1008). Furthermore, Bergeron describes the process of economic 
globalization as the transformation of the world into a singular economic space, or at least the 
supposition of a singular space, through which the internationalization of all types of markets occur 
(2001: 983). Harvey stretches this definition when engaging with and discussing neoliberalism. 
For him, globalization is a “time-space compression” mostly due to free-market capitalism and the 
onset of neoliberalism. Through a set of economic policies and practices, both Reagan and 
Thatcher initiated in the 1970s and 1980s in the UK and North America the idea of a self-regulatory 
market. Harvey’s definition of neoliberalism as a system of “accumulation by dispossession,” has 
four main pillars:  1) the “privatization and commodification” of public goods; 2) 
“financialization,” in which any kind of good (or disaster) can be turned into an instrument of 
economic speculation; 3) the “management and manipulation of crises” (as above); and 4) “state 
redistribution,” in which the state becomes an agent of the upward redistribution of wealth (Harvey 
2005:159). 
 It is certain that the current processes of globalization and expansion of neoliberal capital 
could not have been done without a shrinking of the state and the increasing role and power of 
capital. Unfortunately, the restructuring of the state also translated into a reduction in social welfare 
programs, and an increasing privatization of public services (Bakker and Gill 2003). Such shifts 
end up in affecting women directly since the privatization of public services only means that these 
services are shifted from the paid work of women in the public sector to the unpaid labour of 
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women in the domestic sphere (Spike Peterson 2010, Bakker and Gill 2003). Government cuts of 
funding in public education, childcare and healthcare do not correspond to a lesser need of such 
services: the needs are still the same, and they still have to be met, with the difference that, where 
once it was the state assuring the fulfillment of such needs, now it is women's unpaid domestic 
work called up to fill in for their disappearance, or lack of affordability resulting from privatization, 
with the lack of sufficient affordable state funded childcare putting more pressure on women's 
domestic unpaid work to provide for it (Franzway and Fonow 2010). 
Some of the results of the increasing privatization of public services meant supplementing 
“gaps” through women’s unpaid work and intensifying their social reproductive work or their time 
dedicated to the “Second Shift” (Hochschild 1989). Rooted in 1970s feminist campaigns, the idea 
of a politics and theory of housework and social reproduction in Hochschild's classic study, The 
Second Shift (1989) brought to public awareness these issues by introducing the concept of 
“emotional labour”, and the identification of providing care as labour (Folbre and Nelson 2000). 
The 1970s were an auspicious moment for analyzing the gendered division of labour, a concept by 
which feminists meant the material and emotional back-up that women provide for men and the 
raising of children. The second shift identifies the necessary work women do to sustain families, 
households, and communities (cooking, cleaning and maintaining the communities through social 
networking and voluntary work). While it is unpaid/unwaged, devalued, and invisible, it is also 
the type of work that is totally necessary in the reproduction of the worker, and worker's labour 
and it is done at the expense of women’s full participation in the paid workforce and in political 
activism (Folbre and Nelson 2000). 
However, starting with the 1980s, but more in the 1990s and 2000s, globalization and 
neoliberal expansion put pressure on more classical (and mostly Western European) 
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understandings of the second shifts and social reproduction (Bakker and Gill 2003). Specifically, 
the processes of social reproduction started to challenge more women’s engagement with domestic 
work, but it also started offering the possibility of supplanting such shortages by finding care 
solutions beyond the regional boundaries of national economies. Such solutions meant an 
understanding of the fact that the domestic/social-reproduction does not have to be done locally: 
it can be done transnationally (Hondagneu-Sotello 2001, Nakano Glenn 1998).  
An initial set of understandings of the transnational social reproductive work translated 
into the fact that women are migrating and crossing the border transnationally for housework, 
nursing, childcare or sex work (Agathangelou 2006 Hondagneu-Sotello 2001 Nakano Glenn 1998 
Yeates 2004 Young 2003). Another understanding of the transnational reproductive work is the 
import of highly skilled adult migrants, whose training and skills were significantly contributed to 
in advance by women’s work in transition countries, such as the case of the Romanian highly 
skilled migration.  
As previously mentioned, starting with the late 1980s and 1990s the neoliberal shift 
translated into less government control over the economies and a global opening of markets for 
the ongoing expansion of capital.  Such processes meant massive cuts in public services and 
massive state withdrawal from its welfare functions. Many of these state withdrawals were 
compensated for by migrants pouring in from poor countries to rich ones to perform healthcare 
and childcare work, domestic work, etc. For example, cuts in subsidized healthcare and education 
in France translated into an import of physicians and healthcare personnel from Romania (Sechet 
and Vasilcu 2015). Nevertheless, this import meant an extraction of an already trained pool of 
skills and talents from developing countries. Many times, the training and formation of skills and 
talents relied on the resources of the transition states.  
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Migrant workers from developing and transition countries such as Romania or the 
Philippines could be called on in order to fill in domestic and social reproductive work for the new 
emerging and reconfigured ‘neoliberal’ state’s withdrawal from and diminishing capacity to 
provide for its own care. This way, what was initially a gendered female private vs. male public 
labour division has developed into what scholars now call “the international domestic labour 
division” (Bakker and Silvey 2008). By “international domestic labour division”, Bakker and 
Silvey refer to the globalization, expansion and creation of new markets, the reduced expenditures 
on state services, and the privatization of former public services, with women's work 
transnationally replacing and compensating for the costs of the former state expenditures in 
healthcare, education, etc. Nevertheless, while the academic concept mostly refers to the 
transnational work done by migrating women, crossing the actual borders in order to compensate 
for the work previously ensured by the state, it also raises questions about the ways “sending” 
states prepare the conditions for this migration through their own extensive work and life’s 
resources (i.e., the work and also their own life that goes into raising and educating young 
migrants) to prepare those who could be drawn upon to do work elsewhere.  
Some of the literature that explains the new emerging configurations of gendered and 
racialized labour relations draws on concepts like the “new domestic world order” (Hondagneu-
Sotello 2001), “the transnational economy of domestic labour” (Young 2003) or “the global care 
chains” (Yeates 2004) in order to connect immigrant domestic work, globalization/neoliberalism 
and social reproduction. While all these terms refer to the rapid increase in the number of 
immigrant women performing domestic work in developed countries, and the consequences of this 
situation for global inequality, they fail to notice or engage with how women’s work also gets 
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outsourced and localized in particular ways, as is the case of Romanian mothers investing so much 
work in raising highly skilled children only to see them migrate as adults.  
Evelyn Nakano Glenn (1998) discusses transnational gender relations that exist in 
providing domestic caring work, by providing the example of Filipina and Guatemalan women 
that migrate to the United States to become domestic workers for affluent women whose 
professional careers are facilitated in this way. Arlie Hochschild gives another example that shows 
the flows of care providers internationally without having any hesitations in naming the actual 
“global chain care” process as a “global care drain” phenomenon.  “A common care chain typically 
involves an older daughter from a family whose income is pretty low and who cares for her siblings 
while her mother works as a nanny caring for the children of a migrating nanny who in turn cares 
for the child of a family in a rich country” (Hochschild cited in Yeates, 2004: 80). Similar, albeit 
occurring in different scenarios, Romanian women’s social reproductive work toward the raising 
and bringing up of their children who may end up with professional careers is localized in other 
countries.  Instead of understanding and explaining the kind of work and life circumstances that 
go into facilitating this development, Romanian women’s labour and life are assumed as 
naturalized or even more problematically as ‘localized’, thereby erasing what such life and work 
make possible.  More problematically, their work does not seem to generate mobility for them or 
any direct benefits other than the fact that their children are now making it elsewhere.  
In this way, Romania has provided direct skilled work in Canada through the migration of 
professionals and indirect reproductive labour through the care in advance of those skilled workers. 
If in 1990 17 per cent of Romanians entered Canada through the Federal Skilled Worker, by 2004 
this number raised to 84 per cent (Culic 2012).  
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The direct and indirect social reproductive work in the hands of Eastern European women 
is directly linked to neoliberal shifts in the economies, expansion of capital across borders, and the 
state’s withdrawal from providing social welfare programs (education, childcare and healthcare, 
etc.). Such shifts impact women dramatically since the privatization of public services and State 
cuts in funding for public education, childcare, healthcare, etc. do not mean a lesser need of such 
services. On the contrary, it means that these provisions have to come from elsewhere: 
international women's work.  
Under neoliberalism’s withdrawal of state supported social programs, and increasing 
demand for child care, elder care, and other sources of women’s unpaid labour, a large proportion 
of women are living in poverty, a situation that has been referred to as the “feminization of 
poverty” (Burn 2005:17) or the “feminization of survival” (Sassen 2000). As mentioned before, 
the feminization of work and poverty do not happen in a vacuum: they become mapped and feed 
into a particular neoliberal shift of the developed “Western” and “Northern” economies coupled 
with transition economies of “East” and “South” that, when combined, create push and pull factors 
of outward migration. These push-and-pull factors lead to a two-tiered system of international 
migration that is both co-constituted and part of the same process. On the one hand, we have the 
migration policies of highly skilled professionals associated with brain races and embedded in 
masculine characteristics and artificial patriarchal divisions (brain vs. body), and on the other hand, 
the feminization of social reproductive work, deemed as unskilled and de-prioritized by migration 
programs, is simply left behind as it is in the case of the highly skilled Romanian migration to 
Canada. By focusing on what has come to be identified as “brain gain” policies and attraction of 
high skills usually associated with men’s work, such as engineering and software programming, 
governments such as Canada indirectly shape the mobility or lack of it for the social reproductive 
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work (largely associated with women’s work) necessary to create the development and 
maintenance of the said brains. The move to attract highly skilled workers within interstate 
structures becomes a source of gender inequality that spills over to economically weaker nations 
through immigration programs.  An example is Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker Program. An 
egalitarian, just migration scheme would be one in which migration programs are not 
disproportionately focused on the attraction of brainy skills and talents, largely associated with 
masculine traits while separating them from other immigration programs, such as the caregivers 
or family sponsorship ones, conflated with women’s traits, and considered of lesser value, 
importance, status, pay, and priority.  It would also mean a contextual understanding of how and 
at whose cost these wanted skills and talents are developed, and, consequently, of the impact their 
pulling away has on the communities and countries that invested in their formation. Individuals 
and targeted immigrant groups cannot be understood as just skills and talents, but must be 
considered as whole persons. Similarly, migration processes cannot be viewed as a one-way 
independent phenomenon from one location to another, but must be viewed as a constant 
interdependent relationship with the countries of origin that contributed to the creation and 
production of the labourers.  
The objective of many feminist theories has been to problematize and dismantle the 
segregation of the organization of labour in which unpaid feminized work occurs in the home and 
masculinized paid labour occurs in the market place. However, it is also important to notice how 
globalization, neoliberalism and the expansion of capital further subjugates this unpaid social 
reproductive work of women in certain homes in certain developing Eastern European or countries 
of the Global South while providing career mobility for certain skills and talents that occur in the 
public sphere that are traditionally associated with men’s work. The economic implication of the 
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“brain gain” race has obvious complex gendered impacts on labour migration. The labour 
migration associated with women not only becomes de-prioritized but also de-valued and 
outsourced, increasing the gender inequality worldwide. This is not to say that women are excluded 
from applying to the Federal Skilled Worker Program, but that the way it is designed targets 
education and work experiences that are historically associated with men’s work (engineers, 
computer professionals, etc.), and subsequently grants less rights and places less priority and value 
on the type of work usually associated with women, such as, the social reproductive care work. 
These separations between “brains” and “bodies”, “intellectual production” and “material bodily 
needs”, between “highly skilled labour” and “unskilled labour” are actually artificial, and no one 
can argue that they are separate in practice. The Canadian government’s move to further attract 
highly skilled labour cannot function without the support and the gathering of social reproductive 
labour associated with women’s domestic work within the household. Thus, economic 
competitiveness depends on both the attraction of ‘brains’, as well their formation and maintenance 
through social reproduction in households of the country of origin.  
My research analyzes how Canada’s migration policies that prioritize “brain gain”, thereby 
draining other transition states’ “brain” resources, constitute relations to social reproduction. 
Furthermore, I investigate how women’s work in transition economies constitutes relations to 
migration and neoliberal development. Countries that have national and international policies on 
absorbing highly skilled migrants already assume a clear gendered division of labour with the brain 
(always presumed to be masculine) performing intellectual/professional work while the care and 
the material bodily needs are left to the responsibility of women. Immigration policies re-enforce 
such patriarchal divisions of labour while not acknowledging their interdependence and inter-
relatedness. Such policies re-enact gendered divisions subordinating in the long run women’s work 
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and the work largely associated with women’s skills; there is no such a thing as a mind that only 
thinks without a body that needs to take care of himself, herself and make it reproduce.  
The recent professionalization of migration patterns with the focus on brain gain has certain 
gendered implications for the labour that such migrants are expected to perform. Of course, we 
cannot speak of brains alone and in the abstract, as if brains do not have bodies and as if bodies 
are not subjects and do not produce competitive knowledge. Without considering the ways these 
brains are socially produced and reproduced, we miss how such artificial divisions end up 
constituting a hierarchical two-tier system of migration.  The current analysis of highly skilled 
migration flows obscures the social reproductive labour that goes into constituting them. Even 
speaking of brains alone outside of bodies is a problem in itself that has serious implications in the 
organization of work and life. It allows, on one hand, for a masculinization of the highly skilled 
migration schemes, by associating the mind alone with knowledge production and, on the other 
hand, for a feminization and deprioritization of care work, by connecting the reproduction of the 
bodies with women’s work. In this sense, the Romanian highly skilled migration to Canada sheds 
light on these unsustainable and unrealistic migration flows in which the nurturing of minds and 
bodies is separated from the development of skills and is left unrecognized and inadequately 
compensated. The relationship is embedded in gender differences and artificially and 
hierarchically segregated. Such relationships are also embedded in certain larger economic shifts, 
be it the neoliberal one in Western and Northern countries that cut the state expenditures for public 
services associated with women’s social reproductive work but still need their productive highly 
skilled trained labour or be it the transition economies of the East and South that create insecure 
and precarious conditions and determine push migration factors for an already nurtured, fed, 
trained and skilled young workforce.  
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When discussing the reality of transnational movements of migrants, Fouron and Glenn 
Glick Schiller (2001: 54) argue that they can be defined as a set of “interlocking networks” that 
extend across the borders of two or more nation-states engaging the participants on a daily basis 
in activities of social reproduction. The authors envision a set of activities and relationships that 
connect individuals, and which go beyond the national borders.  Particularly, migrants have a 
special location in such transnational connections, since they leave their country in pursuing work 
in another. Ties with their home countries are sustained as many of their family members and 
relatives do not migrate. Most of the current research on the topic engages with migrant women 
who take care of families in the North finding themselves participating in an “international sexual 
division of labour” (Laurie 2007). Such scholarship describes, for example, the situation of 
transnational migrants being forced to provide childcare and eldercare in the countries of arrival 
while they cannot provide the same care to their own children and the elderly who are left in the 
origin countries. A new emerging concept such as the “transnational family” (Parrenas 2001: 80) 
comes to replace the idea of normative unified family, and it is used to describe the relationships 
between family core-members that live in at least two different countries. In this respect, the way 
the transnational families have been usually understood is through the movement of women from 
the country of origin, and the abandonment of their children and family members. However, less 
attention has been paid to the way the movement of people localizes women’s social reproductive 
work in particular ways or how women’s paid and unpaid work in the sending transition countries 
enables the migration of their children. In this respect, it is important to trace how social 
reproductive work is done transnationally and transferred onto the shoulders of other women from 
developing and transition countries, as well as to how unacknowledged it remains at the level of 
government policies.  
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Small effort has been made to understand women's domestic and public work, which 
enables the creation of highly skilled immigrant professionals. Furthermore, not much has been 
written on the processes through which such individuals often become the targeted group by 
migration programs. Following the global shifts to neoliberalism and global expansion of capital, 
welfare services in the countries in the Global North diminished significantly (Bakker and Gill 
2003; Bezanson 2006; Koc 1999). The collapse of government funded institutions and facilities 
left developed countries in dire need of private work done by families, and this vacuum was often 
filled by women’s work (Bakker and Gill 2003). When local women’s work is not readily 
available, it is other women’s work that comes to replace it either through migration (the migration 
of nannies, and nurses) or through outsourcing it and subsidizing the development of already 
trained migrants (the case of Romania). My research explores what happens when such 
externalizations occur and what effects they have on the social relations and the social conditions 
of the people involved.   
Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill (2003) point to the significance of new forms of social 
reproduction and the relationship between, on the one hand, mobile capital, and on the other, the 
nature of fixed production and reproduction of territorially based communities. They are also 
arguing that capital is less and less responsible for subsidizing any of the costs of social 
reproduction. Households and communities are increasingly absorbing the costs of social 
reproduction either locally or transnationally.  States, as agents of the capital, through immigration 
programs tend to externalize the costs of social reproduction as well. Indeed, transnational social 
reproduction and externalized domestic work are considered a domain where the expansion of 
capital is undertaken at the expense of greater insecurity for those positioned at the margins of the 
global gender, class and racial hierarchies (Young 2003). 
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Migration stands out as a good example of how neoliberal development requires developed 
nations to externalize the costs of such processes. I suggest that Romanian migrants to Canada owe 
a lot of their success to both the paid and unpaid work of Romanian women. In addition to women’s 
work there exists a continuous expansion and creation of new markets in conjunction with 
privatization of former state services which draws on other assets and resources from other 
countries’ state budgets: for instance, a state may be able to reduce public services to education 
(for example) when it decides to import migrants that have been educated in their own exporting 
country. One government can always cut its costs to education and social reproduction, which does 
not mean that those needs will disappear. Its costs will just end up being transferred either as a 
burden for private families and households within the country (i.e., the case of nannies) or will be 
externalized onto the shoulders of other developing countries and their families as is the case with 
young Romanian highly skilled migrants. Recognizing these relationships and links highlights an 
asymmetry of costs and benefits.  In cases where migrants are already educated, for instance in 
Romania, I explore whom these skills end up benefitting and the effects and consequences for their 
home countries. My research also seeks to see whom the many policies of international migration 
of the highly skilled migrants favour and benefit and the cost to developing transition countries 
and their economies.   
Aihwa Ong (1999) underlines the centrality of gender in the processes of macropolitical 
economy and globalization and uses the concept of transnationalism to describe "the conditions of 
cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space—which has been intensified under late 
capitalism"(1999: 4). Flexibility, mobility, and migration, she argues, still entail gendered 
expectations in basically all realms of life. "Family regimes that generally valorize mobile 
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masculinity and localized femininity shape strategies of flexible citizenship, gender division of 
labour, and relocation in different sites" (1999: 20).  
Considering that little attention has been paid to how ‘local’ women's domestic and public 
work enables, directly and indirectly, border crossings and transnational mobility through the 
creation of highly skilled professionals who become eligible as Canadian migrants, I plan to focus 
on these entanglements and negotiations. My analysis shows the often-invisible hidden world of 
women’s paid and unpaid work, its dynamics across regions, such as East and West, and points to 
the manner in which it enables the mobility of highly skilled Romanian migrants to Canada. While 
my analysis is subsumed in the neoliberal shift towards individualization, marketization and 
privatization and the state's reliance on women's social reproductive activities, it also makes visible 
struggles and contestations of such a global reconfiguration. 
My project emphasizes the mobility of global capital that is based on specific localized 
gender relations and social reproductive work. By focusing on the condition of socially 
reproductive work in its transnational iterations, my project also hopes to highlight Romanian 
women's work and to make them more visible in the equation. It does so by revealing the way in 
which such neoliberal reconfigurations keep women's work in marginalized socioeconomic 
positions, being ascribed the unfortunate label of either “unskilled” or low-paid work. Drawing on 
interviews, my dissertation highlights how vital Romanian women's work is in the formation of 
highly skilled Romanian migrants to Canada. Mapping these sites in which women's work enables 
mobility and migration transnationally, and how it affects the lives of these women locally will 
bring to the fore the centrality of social reproduction labour in the formation of migration and the 
growth of neoliberal economies. 
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Highlighting how neoliberal economies and immigration schemes rely on Eastern Europe’s 
transition economies, I draw on an analysis that allows me to focus on gender relations in what is 
considered a “post” communist transition site that enables the migration of Romanian highly 
skilled professionals to Canada. The assumption is that by linking the connections between 
different circuits of migration and women’s work, it will be easier to trace how such movements 
depend on gendered processes of marginalization and oppression, and on a continuous cycle of 
reproducing interstate inequalities rather than international parallel development and growth. 
Through this dissertation, I plan to address another gap in the literature on immigration and 
women’s rights in order to develop a contextual approach to globalization and neoliberalism that 
situates countries, movements, and people in a broader frame of injustice. Furthermore, I will show 
that the projects of growth and development in Canada are indirectly linked to processes of 
women’s marginalization in developing countries.  
 The gendering of work is one of the many areas in which feminists have examined how 
women’s work is drawn upon and shapes different location-specific relationships between 
“globalized” capital and “localized” labour. Carla Freeman (2000:3), for example, explored the 
interconnected “dialectics of globalization/localization, production/consumption, and 
gender/class” through the everyday lives of pink-collar informatics operators in Barbados. The 
author showed how the work process in informatics is imbued with notions of appropriate 
femininity and how dress and feminine image-making make workers’ experiences simultaneously 
burdensome and pleasurable. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty (1997) illustrate how global 
processes of capitalism use and exploit various gendered identities. Naturalized assumptions about 
work and the worker are constructed around “notions of appropriate femininity, domesticity, 
(hetero) sexuality, and racial and cultural stereotypes” (Alexander and Mohanty 1997: 6). She 
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offers the example of Maria Mies’ (1982) study of home-working lace makers in Narsapur to show 
how capitalists mobilized the ideology of women as housewives to define lace makers as 
nonworkers and to label their lace making for corporations as a leisure activity.   
My study seeks to identify the often-invisible links between the development of various 
immigration programs such as Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker program, focused on brain gains 
and skills accumulation, and women’s waged and unpaid social reproductive work. I am 
continuing the work of other feminist scholars such as Silvia Federici, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and 
Isabella Bakker in pointing out how women’s social reproductive labour makes the conditions for 
the waged work of the highly skilled professionals possible. I will add the theorizations of post-
socialist feminist scholars (Ghoodsee 2005; Miroiu 1998) to women’s waged work in Romania 
that contributes to the formation of the highly skilled migrants to Canada.  Building on these 
theorizations, my thesis argues that the current immigration schemes are tiered and gendered, both 
enforcing and intensifying women’s both paid and unpaid reproductive social work worldwide. In 
highlighting these often-hidden connections, my research is trying to show how the creation of a 
two-tiered immigration division leaves women’s work invisible and unaccounted for, as well as 
prone to further exploitation and low wages. Focusing on the migration of highly skilled 
Romanians, my study highlights the contribution of Romanian women’s paid and unpaid work in 
fostering highly skilled migration and mobility. First, I identify women’s social reproductive work 
in the creation of highly skilled migrants, followed by a description of Romanian women’s waged 
work in stimulating education mobility in what is configured and understood as a transition 
economy. While feminist scholarship has been largely focused on uncovering the social 
reproductive work that women do at the level of households, my research traces how emerging 
neoliberal configurations assemble aspects and subjects of Western and Northern economies and 
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how transition economies of South and East feed into a perpetuation of marginalization and 
oppression of women’s work and cycles of uneven development between different parts of the 
world. 
Various feminists have already shown how the home has always been a key site of capital 
accumulation resulting from women’s unpaid social reproductive work (Federici 2006; Mies 
1986). Through an analysis of the ways in which women’s reproductive labour makes the 
conditions for waged work possible, early feminist historical materialist analyses revealed the 
fundamental role played by women’s reproductive labour to capital accumulation processes 
(Picchio 1992; Dalla Costa and James 1972). More recent scholarship has emphasized how 
neoliberal shifts towards the expansion of markets and the privatization of classical state welfare 
functions have been predicated on the unpaid and hidden nature of women’s reproductive activities 
(Bakker and Silvey, 2008; Bezanson and Luxton, 2006). Building on these theorizations, this study 
argues that under the expansion of markets and the embracing of mobility and various immigration 
programs, global capital has both intensified and has re-subordinated women’s paid and unpaid 
reproductive labour locally. The highly skilled Romanian migration to Canada stands as an 
eloquent example of this as will be highlighted in the sections that follow.  
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Chapter Two: Autobigraphy and Methodological Approaches 
 
Indeed, no woman writer can write ‘too much’... 
No woman has ever written enough. (bell hooks) 
 
My own interest in Romanian migration to Canada is a result of my personal 
experience. In order to pursue my undergraduate degree, I moved from my small hometown in 
Romania to the university city 100 kilometers away. During all my undergraduate years, every 
weekend my peers and I would wait at the bus stations for cooked food packages prepared and 
sent by our mothers who now seemed to be worlds away. This practice of sending cooked food to 
their new university-going children was a wide spread phenomenon among Romanian mothers in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. While waiting for my cooked food packages, I could not refrain from 
acknowledging that, in addition to being a nutritional contribution, the packages were also a form 
of financial support toward completing my education. Once we graduated and were faced with 
little or no employment opportunities, my classmates and I realized that the maternal support 
provided to us during our years of study was vital in helping us graduate as well as excel. These 
same graduates, who were once waiting for the food packages sent by our mothers, found 
themselves collectively applying as federal skilled workers in Canada. The issue struck me as more 
important than just a life anecdote; I considered it relevant enough to pursue it as a research topic, 
hoping that writing about it would shed some light on how Canada’s migration system and the 
Federal Skilled Workers program are gendered with gendered consequences.   
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In Romania, in the summers of 2009 and 2010, I interviewed 25 Romanian mothers in their 
50s and 60s from my hometown, Zalau, who had at least one child who migrated to Canada. The 
method used was in depth, open-ended, semi-structured interviews, with most of the questions 
focusing on what they think of migration, how the migration of their children to Canada impacted 
them, and what their sacrifices and investments (from domestic/social reproductive work to 
explicit financial support) were in the process of their children becoming highly skilled migrants. 
Furthermore, I inquired as to whether they viewed their children’s migration as an overall 
beneficial positive process that has enhanced their well-being and that of their adult children.  
These questions regarding the effects of Canada’s immigration policies on the migrants 
and their respective countries of origin as well as questions about the indirect accounts and costs 
of various immigration policies such as Canada’s brain race in attracting highly skilled 
professional immigrants from developing countries are central to this project.  In wanting to find 
out about the factors that make some migrants “highly skilled” and some not, I examined how 
significant the education credentials such as diplomas are in the evaluation and acceptance of 
Romanians as highly skilled migrants in Canada. Last but not least, I wanted to analyze how big a 
role Romanian women’s waged and unwaged work played in the formation of the highly skilled 
migrants as well as the effect outward migration has on the developing sending country (in terms 
of gendered divisions) as well as on the lives of the women left behind. 
I also sought to consider migration not as a one-way, closed process that once accomplished 
is over, but rather as a fluid, dynamic experience through which various processes are connected 
and linked in order to expose women’s work investments.  In this sense, the objective was to track 
down detailed data on the various elements in the process of migration. For example, we have data 
on the number of Romanian migrants that arrive each year in Canada and on some of the 
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remittances they send home. However, there is not much data on whose accounts and costs the 
level of skills of Romanian immigrants was created so that they come to be selected as highly 
skilled migrants in Canada. Nor do we know the impact of their leaving on their families left 
behind and on the general welfare and development of their home countries. My premise is that it 
is the mothers’ work that contributes disproportionately to the creation of highly skilled migrants, 
and that it’s the mothers’ condition that is in general affected and negatively impacted in ways that 
have long-term effects both on their lives as well as some sectors of Romania. My research comes 
to identify women’s role as essential in such processes, and connects situations that otherwise 
would have been left unexposed. Research data is usually collected and administered locally in 
one country and it is not compared, nor co-related and juxtaposed, with findings from other 
countries. For example, there is research on the Romanian outward migration conducted by the 
Romanian National Institute of Statistics just as there is research carried out by the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada; however, there is a lack of research and analysis connecting the findings 
from the two countries. It is these types of gaps that my research is going to highlight, connecting 
facts and findings about phenomena that are otherwise treated in isolation and without accounting 
for the emerging reconfigurations in social relations, state relations, and ultimately possibilities for 
change toward justice.  
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Section A: The Feminist Methodology Scholarship: Resisting the Positivist 
Approaches 
 
 Listening to women’s voices and giving voice to the silent is one of the long-standing 
feminist aims in social science research (Fonow and Cook 1991; Ribbens and Edwards 1998; 
Smith 1987). I am hoping to give voice to their perspectives, especially as it relates to their 
children's migration and their personal investments in that arduous process. I particularly wanted 
to trace the migration process in the capitalist transition, and the establishment of ‘liberal’ 
democracy and freedom of movement; the former communist political regime in Romania 
prohibited and criminalized any outward migration, and the persons who were leaving the country 
were considered refugees by the receiving countries.  
When I conducted the interviews, I chose to disclose that I am a Romanian female 
migrant to Canada, a condition I was sharing with the adult children of the interviewed subjects. 
Making such information available to the participants was important for me since I anticipated that 
such disclosure would create a sense of identification with my interviewed subjects and encourage 
them to share more openly, sincerely and freely with me. Furthermore, I hoped that disclosing and 
politicizing my own gendered and ethnic migrant position would build a more solid sense of trust 
as well as allow me to have greater insight into my participants' lives and help me shed light on 
the common phenomena of gender subordination (Hartsock 1998). Indeed, belonging to the same 
ethnic group, being of the same gender, speaking the same language, and sharing the same 
immigrant condition led to more familiarity and an increased level of trust and a certain reliability 
in conducting the interviews. The issue of women interviewing other women was already tackled 
by feminist scholars who suggested that the act of women interviewing other women may lead to 
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an “opening up”, managing the establishment of a connection that transcends the subject/object 
relationship between researcher and interviewee (Hartsock 1998). 
Recent feminist scholarship has also argued that there cannot be a position of neutrality or 
objectivity from where the researcher speaks or writes. Feminists have critiqued positivist science 
and literature that required authors to present as neutral, as well as actively participating in 
reproducing all the norms of classical research and scholarship which calls for the writer’s voice 
not to be heard in the text (Hartsock 1998). The dismissal of the pretense of neutrality of any 
scientific discourse that was leaving out the subjectivity of the writer was important.  It opened up 
the space to think about power and the ways power informs and shapes research and the collection 
of data. This critique also problematizes positivism and its positivist agenda of research that 
assumed that truth came out of eliminating the role of interpretation and opinion. For the positivist 
researcher, subjectivity was seen as an obstacle to knowledge; the researcher’s biography and lived 
experience had to be brushed aside in order to make room for an “objective” stance that is at best 
negotiable, but ultimately unachievable (Hartsock 1998).     
One of the first critiques of the positivist epistemologies came from the feminist Nancy 
Hartsock. In 1998, Hartsock pioneered the idea of a standpoint, saying that there are different kinds 
of knowledge that are accessible from distinct backgrounds; for example, workers who have to sell 
their labour to capitalists develop a standpoint that leads to understanding work relations as a 
power struggle between those who dominate and those who are subordinate. They view their 
interaction as a relationship of domination, as in “power over”. However, the author argues that 
the situation of domination is not fixed and can be reverted. The idea of power can also be 
understood as “power with” since there is the possibility of resistance and opposition to that power 
(Hartsock 1998). 
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Another feminist author who questions and critiques the premises of positivist 
epistemology is Donna Haraway. According to her, any vision of the world is embodied, and all 
information is influenced by one’s senses (Haraway 1991). Positivist epistemology is, then, 
grounded in the materiality of people's bodies. Yet the author observes that positivism denies the 
influence of the body in making its claims to validity. The bodies of those dominating the 
production of knowledge, Haraway (1991) argues, have for the most part been in specific social 
locations in systems of race (white), class (privilege), gender (male), and nation (Western), and 
yet there is no consideration of how their observations might have been shaped by their social 
position. She uses the term “embodied vision” to emphasize that our vision is located in some 
specific social and physical place, that our knowledge is “situated”, and thus partial (Haraway 
1991: 43). 
Feminist Dorothy Smith challenges further the premises of neutral, factual methods of 
research. She juxtaposes the discipline of sociology against everyday life. The author argues that 
the sex-based division of labour in our society has created an artificial separation of human 
experience; those who develop knowledge about society are separated from the actual practices 
that sustain our everyday life, and do so through a process that is described as “relations of ruling” 
(Smith 1990: 25). According to Smith, the men who dominate the conceptual realm of knowledge 
can choose almost to ignore their bodily existence in every sphere of their lives. This has been 
made possible only because women have been taking care of almost all the activities of social 
reproduction for them, namely providing for their human needs and for their children outside the 
workplace.  The better these women are at their work, the more invisible that work is to the men 
who benefit from it. This fact allows men to take women's work for granted while they have their 
own authority and contribution strengthened in the process (Smith 1990).  
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Another author that challenges research’s neutral, impartial, positivist assumptions is 
Patricia Hill-Collins. In her work, she does not only question positivist assumptions, but she also 
offers alternatives to it, namely, black feminist epistemology (Hill-Collins 1990). She analyzes 
how Black women's standpoint offers a distinctive basis for developing knowledge. First of all, 
Black women have the experience of oppression and an interest in struggling against it. Second, 
their work has brought them in contact with dominant groups, but in a marginalized way, for 
example, as domestics in the households of the affluent and, more recently, as outsiders within 
academy. This marginalization is an epistemic advantage because it distances Black women from 
hegemonic thought and practices, facilitating the development of a critical attitude (Hill-Collins 
1990). 
It was with these critiques in mind, and knowing that in feminist tradition there cannot be 
any purely “objective”, “impartial” and “neutral” analysis, that I returned to my hometown Zalau 
to conduct my research.  
Zalau is the capital city of Salaj county located in the province of Transylvania in the west-
centre part of Romania. Although historically quite old, with its first attestation dating back to the 
1500s, Zalau is a rather small town. In 2011, its population was estimated at around 56,000 in clear 
decline after the population peak at around 80,000 during the communist regime. Its demographic 
peak was reached in the 1960s and 1970s when the city became the regional industrial centre. 
During the communist regime, industrial factories producing large scale valves, fittings, circuit 
regulating valves, dynamic control fittings and thermostatic valves for installations in heating, air 
conditioning, sanitary and gas appliances or vast industrial factories producing steel pipes and 
tires, such as Armatura Zalau, Silcotub Zalau and Anvelope Zalau, needed thousands of workers 
which created a boom in terms of population increase. However, the communist regime’s collapse 
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in 1989 and the more explicit capitalist transition meant a restructuring of the formerly large-scale 
factories which were considered unprofitable and were closed down. The closure of the factories 
brought high rates of unemployment and, consequently, high rates of outward migration.  Some of 
the first destination cities of migration were neighbouring Western European cities (i.e., Vienna, 
Berlin, Madrid and Rome). However, the more developed Western European cities needed 
unskilled cheap labour force, so that the more skilled and educated population of the town started 
to orient itself towards different immigration programs such as Canada’s or Australia’s which were 
targeting this educated workforce. If under the communist regime times the city of Zalau knew a 
highly industrialized development peak that attracted thousands of workers, after the transition to 
the capitalist market, its population was baffled by the process. The transition translated into a 
closing down of most of the industrial factories and resulted in high rates of unemployment. From 
a source of initial inward internal migration, the city became in a short period of time a fountain 
of outward migration. The Romanian Institute of Statistics found Salaj county to have the highest 
rate of population decline in the 1990s and 2000s, registering a 2.7 per cent population decrease 
per year. Although there is not a record of the outward migration in terms of cities, the one provided 
for the North-West region of Romania that includes the city of Zalau indicates a substantial 
youthful outward migration (population aged 26-40) (Romanian National Institute of Statistics: 
2007). 
While some of my hometown and in general Romania’s youth chose as migration 
destination places the Western and more European developed cities found in the geographical 
proximity, for the skilled and highly educated portion of its population one of the outward 
migration destination countries was Canada. The fact that Canada became one of the migration 
destination countries is given by the sheer reality experienced by my friends, university classmates 
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and myself. Graduated from university and facing scarce employment opportunities, we found 
ourselves checking the immigration requirements for countries such as Canada. We were not 
always open in wanting to leave our country or even sharing transparently such thoughts among 
ourselves, but the thoughts must have been there as every time the topic of migrating came up, 
each of us seemed to know so many things and so many details about the immigration programs 
to Canada that it was obvious that it must have been a clear preoccupation for all of us. It was the 
same for friends’ parents and acquaintances that I interviewed about their children’s migration to 
Canada. I relied on friends' and relatives’ time and effort in sharing with me stories about their 
children’s migration to Canada. My own mother was an invaluable resource in the process, as she 
was the one who collected full names, phone numbers and email addresses of various Romanian 
families whose children migrated to Canada. By the time I arrived in Romania to begin fieldwork, 
my mother had the preliminary fieldwork mapped: she had already contacted the families for an 
interview explaining my dissertation topic and made all the arrangements for the encounters.    
Most of the interview questions were about the Romanian mothers’ contributions to their 
children’s learning and their seeking professional skills that made them eligible as immigrants to 
Canada. I also focused on how their children’s migration to Canada affected them personally, how 
they came to terms with it, and if they considered their children’s migration a good decision. I was 
particularly intrigued to identify their investments in the educational process and the creation of 
the highly skilled migrants in terms of both public and domestic work as well as explicit financial 
support. As a surprise in the process, I discovered Romanian’s mothers’ contribution to the 
intellectual formation of their children, and not just the usual classical social reproductive work. 
Through these interviews I was hoping to track and make visible gendered investments not only in 
an economic sense but also in a life sense (i.e., imagination, creativity and intellectual stimulation) 
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in the creation of desirable highly skilled professional migrants. As already mentioned, the 
interviews were designed to be in a familiar, friendly, open-ended and semi-structured form with 
each of them lasting from 45 minutes to two hours. They were conducted in Romanian and were 
almost all digitally recorded. At particular moments, when my interviewees asked me to stop 
recording while they were confessing issues that were considered sensitive to them (i.e., such as 
bribing the Graduate Program Assistants in order to receive their children’s university transcripts 
faster), I took notes. Upon my return to Canada, I transcribed all the interviews. While I was 
conducting my fieldwork and was collecting the interviews, I kept a journal log with countless 
notes and observations. While looking back at them, I was surprised to see how many elaborate 
and rich in details notes I gathered in the process. My journal log was full of detailed and 
descriptive entries about the home of the particular interviewee, the decoration style of the 
apartment, the pictures at display in the house, the smell of the house and the dishes that were 
cooked that day, the information on display at a TV left on or muted in the background, the music 
that was played at radio, and even the sometimes loud conversations of the outside neighbours. I 
also found myself jotting down my own feelings in the process: the initial excitement of having 
the opportunity to take interviews, the conflicting views of bringing up delicate or painful topics, 
the disappointment when the interviewed subjects were reluctant and not sharing enough, the relief 
of finishing good interview sessions. It was upon my return to Canada when I realized that the 
interviews were not just about the interviewed persons and their valuable perspectives over the 
world. The interviews also contained my own intellectual and emotional production in the process. 
I found these interviews containing a lot of information about myself and being a trigger point of 
my own making as a feminist academic. Retrospectively, I am amazed to see how the fieldwork 
was from the beginning a process of continuous reciprocal and double investment (from my end 
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as a researcher and the interviewee’s end), undoing the usual assumptions of “neutrality” or 
“distance”.    
Feminist scholars have chronicled challenges when conducting fieldwork and already 
rejected any claims to objectivity, impartiality and neutrality of the researcher (Haraway 1991, 
Hartsock 1998, Hill-Collins 1990, Smith 1990). Following up on this kind of feminist scholarship, 
I did not find myself being neutral, distant and impartial when collecting the interviews. Since the 
fieldwork town was my hometown and most of the interviews were taken from families either I or 
my mother knew personally, the interviews were inevitably characterized by closeness, familiarity 
and intimacy. There were several instances when the interviewed subjects did not elaborate or 
provide details on various topics such as the parents’ feelings towards their adult children’s 
migration, or how difficult the integration process is in the destination countries, as they were 
saying that my mother and I were fully aware of the situation and were experiencing them as much 
as they did. It was within the same regimen of closeness and shared understanding that they were 
opening up some of the drawers in the house that still contained their departed children’s 
belongings as if waiting, perfectly aligned, for the absent persons to return. Within the same 
boundaries of intimacy, they were showing us Skype accounts set up on their computers for 
communications abroad and many framed pictures of their departed children that were on display 
in many of their bedrooms and living rooms while confessing that it is these Skype conversations 
and old pictures that many times kept them warm through long winters and even longer absences.  
The more pictures we were shown and the larger their frames were, the more my mother and I 
were feeling smaller and smaller for even bringing up such painful topics.  
Since I knew my subjects’ reality as much as they knew mine, I was relieved to make use 
of feminist methods of doing research that were not pressuring me for academic distance and 
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neutrality. On the contrary, they made room for disclosure of my gender and immigrant status and 
allowed to express my emotional and intellectual investments in the topic of my research. Being a 
migrant to Canada, and a highly skilled one resulting from the paid and unpaid contributions of 
my family and a state education system that contributed to my development as a professional, 
returning to my home country to do my research was, personally and methodologically, a real 
challenge. While I was fully convinced of the limits of the positivist androcentric methods of 
research and knew that the feminist methods are much better alternatives, I still struggled with the 
dimensions of certainty and stability regarding them. I kept on asking myself questions such as: 
are my methods of research the most recent and updated? Are they the most valid, legitimate and 
truthful in the field? Do they adequately and faithfully represent my interviewed subjects’ views?  
Other researchers have worked within this autobiographical methodological frame (Culic 
2010, Pernes 2010). Similar to their case, one of the challenges of the methods used in their 
research consisted in holding onto any framework of analysis while knowing that the methods 
themselves are assuming a continuing process of (self)criticism and (self)reflexivity (Pernes 2010). 
In my turn, I found it hard to engage with the external world and do my research while knowing 
that my research tools are subject of constant criticism and reflection of the process, including my 
owns’.  
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Section B: Autobiography and Research Methods: Writing the Feminist Canadian Self 
 
Returning to Romania for my fieldwork could not have happened sooner. I could not wait 
to head for it, and I was counting the days for my return home trip long in advance. Many of my 
colleagues in graduate studies were also heading abroad to do their own fieldwork. Some were 
travelling to remote areas of South America or East Asia. Nevertheless, I knew my fieldwork trip 
was different. While they were getting ready to travel to different countries and be away from 
contexts that developed them, I was travelling in reverse and getting closer to what I felt I really 
was and my original self. For me, fieldwork was my home, and the location could not have been 
more familiar and completely known. In Romania, I was visiting my family three years after 
migrating to Canada while at the same time doing research on how families such as mine had 
contributed to the creation of the highly skilled migrants that left for Canada. I knew the topic 
extensively and at the most personal level. Besides my extensive scholarly research, my own 
experience as an immigrant significantly added to my knowledge on the topic. The whole 
experience could have easily passed as a long-awaited family reunion if it were not for the 
interviews that I was planning to do. The terrain was very familiar and the people I interviewed 
had lived experiences that matched my own. Like my family, they had children who had migrated 
to Canada via the Federal Skilled Worker Program. While I was in Canada, I had to constantly 
struggle in order to integrate into a new country. Once back in Romania for my fieldwork, I could 
finally take a break from such integration and adaptation efforts and just be myself in a familiar 
environment. I returned home in the summers of 2009 and 2010 to do my fieldwork; after only 3 
or 4 years of being away to pursue my studies, my hometown felt very safe and reliable to me. 
 64 
While my interview questions were difficult and full of emotional turmoil, triggering a whole range 
of reactions (from nostalgia and sadness, to tears and rightful anger), I was sure that I would get 
them done since I knew how to navigate the community relations in my hometown. I was also 
speaking the same language (both literally and figuratively) as my interviewed persons, be it 
Romanian or sharing the same cultural references of openness, reciprocity, etc. Neither my 
documenting the migration process, nor my return to my hometown could be as difficult, alienating 
and unpredictable as my process of integration to Canada; from my point of view, Romania was 
the land of understanding and acceptance. 
Among the field of social sciences, I consider feminists as among the few who get 
significantly close to politicizing the relationship between researcher and their subject and/or 
location of research, either by interrogating their own hierarchical position in the fieldwork or by 
investigating their own objectives and motives in the process. In that sense, I was a highly skilled 
immigrant from Romania in Canada studying the Romanian highly skilled immigrants in Canada 
and the consequences of their immigration for the families left behind. Following in the footsteps 
of some other scholars who have employed self-referentiality and autobiography as a research tool 
(e.g. Culic 2010, Pernes 2010), from the very beginning, I found that my interviewees and I shared 
many parallelisms and common reference points. I had lived and experienced the same realities 
that they did by living in Romania during the communist regime and the years of transition to the 
liberal market. Like them, my parents knew what it meant to have their adult children migrate to 
Canada, with the hope that better opportunities would open up for them.  
However, my autobiography predated the actual fieldwork as I was already far away from 
my home country (highly skilled immigrant in Canada, doing my PhD in Women’s Studies) when 
I decided that I wanted to do research on the Romanian families left behind by the highly skilled 
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immigrants that arrive in Canada. As mentioned before, the project was deeply personal, based on 
interviews with family members, relatives and family friends that many times were burying their 
discomfort in talking about sensitive topics in order to assist me with my research.  It was crucial 
to hear their stories as I was trying to integrate into Canadian society, to do my PhD in Women's 
Studies and succeed as a feminist academic. Nevertheless, for an immigrant from the Eastern 
European bloc and a woman who was trying to succeed in North American academia and become 
a Canadian citizen while dealing with the guilt of leaving her family back home, taking up such 
research was embedded in all sorts of sentiments and challenges.  
Without a doubt, the path reaching to this theme was sprinkled with a lot of indecision and 
self-doubt. Taking under consideration the career and integration goals that were at stake, I initially 
did not know how I should identify myself and what I should reveal in the process of doing the 
fieldwork. For example, prior to starting my fieldwork, noticing my excitement about doing my 
research in my home country (Romania), two different professors in graduate courses that I had 
taken at York University warned me that I might be too emotionally involved in my chosen 
location and topic of research, suggesting I would be unable to stay detached from my home 
country realities and impartial about it. As a word of caution, they advised me to choose another 
topic altogether as a way of creating a more dispassionate and “objective” self. I found the advice 
upsetting and problematic since I considered that we all carried certain histories, backgrounds and 
experiences that informed who we became in time and how we interpreted the world. There could 
not have been a more unattainable goal than the one meant to find research topics that would bring 
forward my rational “objective” self. Although well-intended, the recommendations made me even 
more aware how we were all enmeshed in fleshy ethnic backgrounds and consistently haunted by 
our histories.  However, it did not deter me from exploring and researching this theme and in 
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Romania. As far as realizing that the maintenance of an impersonal, detached distance between 
the researcher and the interview subjects would be impossible for me and for anyone, for that 
matter, I am glad that I did not follow some of the advice given, and decided not to alienate myself, 
nor create an alienated and false distance between me and my interlocutors, namely my family or 
friends’ parents whose children had migrated to Canada.  
The first days of carrying out fieldwork at home, in Romania, consisted in familiarizing 
myself with the specific stories of my interviewees. Some of them I knew well and in detail 
already, some others faded away in the memory, so I was asking my family and friends to remind 
me of them and bring them to life. I was definitely conscious of my positionality as a community 
member and researcher. Nevertheless, I could not have lived and carried my research under the 
pretense that I was a theoretical researcher outside of my history and community of belonging. 
Such an abstraction of our work from the places and communities which we are part of may lead 
to further challenges and problems. A theorist or researcher must “prove” himself or herself to 
have a certain professional academic status while ignoring that he or she is also involved in the 
messiness of the national context or specific communities of belonging. It was as if researchers 
who wanted to be taken seriously were supposed to validate the seriousness of their scholarly 
inquiries with detachment and neutrality. Since I could not “prove” myself academically, if that 
meant hiding my national context and my community of belonging, I was looking forward to 
embracing methods of research that were compatible with disclosing the researchers’ backgrounds 
and their own intellectual and emotional investments in the process.  Furthermore, under the 
pretense of impartiality and neutrality, I did not want to create artificial boundaries and 
unsustainable divisions with my interviewees whom I shared so much familiarity, history and 
national context. At the same time, I was aiming to challenge them in order to obtain as much 
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depth as possible but more than that I aimed at recognizing their own story telling as theory itself. 
I wanted to not simply turn this vast and complex field of insight and knowledge that the Romanian 
women were sharing with me into something that merely comforts our academic sense of historical 
completeness and systematicity by adding one more case study to the mix of migration or social 
reproduction debate. In essence, the interviews were attempts to elucidate these uncanny processes 
of migration and social reproduction by expanding, disaggregating, and recomposing their 
insights. I did not want to assume them as my interview subjects who basically were going to 
provide me with as much information as possible about migration and their role in what is being 
reconfigured as global reproduction. Rather, as these were my family, relatives, neighbours, 
indeed, people of my community, I saw my fieldwork as an opportunity to mend the isolation that 
comes with one doing research, or with migration and social reproduction. Similar to such artificial 
boundaries between interviewer and interviewee, I also wanted to challenge the hierarchy of mind 
and body, or of the highly skilled and less skilled work by working to close this gap. I aimed at 
achieving that by spending time with the Romanian women I interviewed and understanding the 
changes in their lives, and by recognizing and working with them to think through ways of 
challenging these unsustainable binaries. The interviews themselves became collective moments 
of grappling together to devise creative ways of addressing these gaps.  
Practicing a false pretense of distance and detachment conceals the relationship between 
the researcher and the subjects, ignoring the potential for rich analysis and findings that might get 
explored particularly due to their common ties and their shared understandings. Such structures 
are similar to body and mind division in the migration program that allow for exploitation and 
oppression that benefit some at the expense of the lives and life worlds of others. Furthermore, the 
methods also transform researchers into anonymous individuals. If anything, the fieldwork was a 
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means for me to confirm that we cannot hide from our histories, communities of belonging and 
national context. Through interviews with the Romanian women, the past was consistently re-
enacted, my involvement in any type of research was anything but neutral and detached, and that 
we were much better off learning from such acknowledgements.  
Scheper-Hughes argues that what connects the collection of data and writing are the people 
with whom we engage even when the boundaries are clearly delineated and hierarchically 
separated as a field and as academic space (2000). Both the field and the spaces of writing are 
connected even when we want to maintain academically that there is a boundary between the two. 
My fieldwork was not conducted in a remote, distant place to which I had no previous connection, 
but rather in my home country and in the city in which I was born and raised. I found nothing 
controversial or surprising in the stories and realities conveyed to me by my interviewed subjects 
as their lives mirrored mine in many aspects.  However, having lived in Canada for several years, 
there were obviously glaring differences between me and my research subjects that had developed 
over time.  What I found challenging, was my trying to reconcile the fact that I was attempting to 
integrate myself as a Canadian citizen and succeed as a feminist academic through such self-
referential research projects. In that sense, I cannot deny that, whilst I was looking forward to 
developing knowledge about the processes of outward migration from Romania, I was becoming 
slowly aware that what I was studying related heavily to my own efforts to integrate myself as a 
citizen into a new country and at the same time establish myself as a feminist scholar. Therefore, 
looking for possibilities to analyze the creation of Romanian highly skilled migrants as well as 
advocating for fair, just, and less exploitative migration practices had a clear self-referential 
component. Nevertheless, my own involvement in the reality of my interviewees, my 
autobiography and life history influenced my decision to write about the struggles and challenges 
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of immigrants, similar to how the Romanian women’s perspectives were marked by their adult 
children’s migration abroad.  
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Section C: Auto-ethnography: Undoing the researcher-interview subject/ reader-writer 
“fictive distance” 
 
While there are many accounts of scholars researching the most suitable methods necessary 
in interviewing subjects, there is not much information on how factors such as autobiography and 
auto-ethnography can influence research and data. In some cases, autobiography and auto-
ethnography can be seen as research methods.  
When talking about research, Inayatullah introduces auto-ethnography as a more honest 
and substantial research tool that deconstructs the presumed anonymity of the researcher and 
her/his interviewed subjects while reducing what the author diagnoses to be a “fictive distance” 
(Inayatullah 2011) that all the academic writing presupposes. In this regard, “the writer presents 
herself/himself as absent, as distant, and as indifferent to the writing and ideas” with “ideas that 
are believed to speak for themselves while the writer serves as a vehicle for their expression 
(Inayatullah 2011: 5).” 
In addition to the “undoing of the fictive distance” premise, I was also trying to undo the 
dichotomies of self and other, exactly as previous feminists have been trying to undo the divisions 
between public vs. private, mind vs. body, rationality vs. affect. These dichotomies reminded me 
of the same artificial line that separates other well-known dichotomies, “science and arts, objective 
and subjective knowledge’s, the everyday and the exceptional, the personal and the political, and, 
most importantly, the ontological boundaries of ‘you’ and ‘I”, as a reader who hears another’s 
voice through the exclamation of an “I” can begin establishing social connections of 
empathy/sympathy, identification/difference, compassion and critique through the 
autobiographical text itself“ (Imperial 2012). Regarding the cancellation of the fictive distance, 
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the premises of auto-ethnography consist in exactly writing a personal story that helps readers 
identify easier with the writer, after which they start reflecting on their own experiences and the 
construction of the social realities around them.  
My interviews with Romanian mothers did not presuppose a conquering of differences 
since most of the persons I was interviewing had been part of my life already, as neighbours, 
relatives, and parents of my friends that migrated to Canada. We were also sharing the same 
political and socio-historical conditions (be it communism or transition neoliberalism), speaking 
the same language (Romanian) while being all connected by the experience of migration to Canada 
and separating oneself from the original family and network of friends. The many commonalities 
and similarities that we were sharing created an environment of familiarity and comfort as well as 
implicit knowledge.  
Nevertheless, the drawback of such a familiar environment was that my subjects were not 
giving me as many detailed answers as I wanted. For example, in cases where I was asking about 
how they dealt with the hardships, and challenges faced after their children migrated to Canada, 
the answers given were short, basic, with minimal content.  Phrases such as “you know how it is”, 
“your parents lived through the same situation as well, they can tell you better”, were repeated 
throughout the sessions. Even though our common implicit knowledge and shared life experience 
encouraged those I interviewed to tell their stories with a greater sense of trust, it also created an 
environment of silenced identification and parallelism which required no further evidence and 
proof, based on the assumption that I already knew all about the process of migration.  Because of 
the assumed familiarity, I found myself asking my interviewees for more examples and specific 
situations that demonstrated the difficulties that arose due to their children’s migration to Canada.  
This was done through a process where a sense of identification created an environment of trust as 
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well as, on my part, a higher degree of personal effort in getting that implicit knowledge to come 
out.  
When talking about auto-ethnography, three of its leading methodological promoters 
Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. Bochner understand it as both a “process, and a 
product,” since the researcher is analyzing and at the same time engaging with his/her personal 
experience in order to reach a certain understanding in cultural, political, social terms. According 
to the authors, it is an “approach which challenges canonical ways of doing research and 
representing others and treats research as a political, socially-just and socially-conscious act” 
(Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. Bochner, 2011: 1). 
The use of the autoethnographic method of research transformed me. If initially I was 
talking to those I interviewed about the experience of migration with easiness and confidence, later 
on, as I advanced in my research, I had to change my interview approach towards them. The 
experience of migration was more traumatic than I imagined; so, there was less predictability in 
the original planned familiarity of the fieldwork. My interview subjects had difficulty in talking 
about their children being overseas, and my initial assertion that they could not but feel proud 
about their children’s accomplishments was immediately challenged. A sense of loss loomed over 
the discussion. In that regard, I remember that one of the questions to my interviewing subjects 
was framed as: “Do you think your children are planning to come back at some point in time, and 
re-settle again in Romania?” After two or three interviews including that question, I found that 
people were quite uncomfortable in addressing that question, and most of the time the response 
suggested that their children were not planning to come back. I was also surprised to see that they 
were not even evasive or ambiguous in their answers. Nor were they trying to avoid answering 
with a fast reply in the line of “I do not know what my children’s plans are!” These parents 
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decisively knew their children would not come back, and they directly told me so.  However, such 
story telling also made them self-reflective and sad, realizing that their children’s migration was 
most likely permanent. Therefore, taking into consideration the pain and discouragement brought 
by my question, I decided to lighten up the conversation, and ask my interview subjects if they 
knew anything about their children’s future plans, if they think of moving again, or re-settling 
elsewhere without forcing them to deal with whether their children might come back home.  
As mentioned before, I knew that I would use this information for my research, as well as 
for personal career mobility. The interviews provided me with nuanced and in-depth insights that 
aided me in becoming a feminist and integrating myself as a migrant in Canada through a process 
of re-invention of my identity. It was weird that for my identity reinvention as a Canadian feminist 
I was not making use of new Canadian sources. On the contrary, I was returning to and making 
use of my social network in Romania, most specifically, my own family and relatives’ connections. 
Retrospectively, it is interesting to see how I was trying to integrate into a new Canadian world 
and seek legitimacy in the academic feminist sphere by returning “home”.  In short, this research 
project, although it focused generally on the rights of Romanian women, was also conducted with 
a great degree of self-awareness and self-analysis.  
What stood out in carrying out my research was that knowledge cannot be detached from 
the social conditions of its production, and I imagined that by just being aware of that, I could 
enlarge the spectrum of the research done so far on the Romanian migration to Canada. There was 
a strong bond between me and the subjects of my study, namely the community of friends and 
families whose children had migrated to Canada.  I myself am one of those children. The process 
required a lot of sensitivity and empathy on my part while also forcing me to keep a safe distance 
in order not to be biased.  My research work was strongly related to my own personal history, and 
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the interviewed persons were all people who played an integral part in my own life and being. The 
impersonal, detached role of a scientific researcher looking at the Romanian migration was 
impossible to play since I felt too much as if I were one of them (a Romanian migrant in Canada), 
and did not feel connected so much with how a Canadian researcher, for example, might analyze 
these phenomena. In this sense, my identity was first and foremost that of a female immigrant to 
Canada, and not so much of a Canadian expert-researcher. While listening to the stories of my 
subjects, I was also trying to sort out and make sense of my own feelings towards migration, 
without claiming to have the authority and legitimacy that I might know more than they do.  
My mother’s involvement in the research also informed the way I approached my 
interlocutors. She was the one preparing all my fieldwork contacts well before I reached Romania 
to start my research. While not taking over my own research agenda, she was actively asserting 
herself in it, by asking her own interview questions, evaluating the information given by subjects 
herself, asking for more details regarding once incident or another, or just by making sure that the 
recorder was on.  
Again, her taking the initiative and leadership in arranging the interview contacts and 
setting up the meetings had me concerned that my role in pursuing the research was being 
marginalized. A teacher herself, my mother knew how to simplify some of my questions that were 
not easy to understand, and render them more accessible to my interview subjects. At the same 
time, she was very knowledgeable and aware of the future use of this research; for example, she 
always knew that I was doing feminist research, and for her that automatically meant asking for 
more evidence, examples and proofs from my interview subjects when giving accounts of 
women’s work exploitation and subordination. For instance, when asking one of the participants 
to describe some of the domestic chores that she was doing while her children were pursuing their 
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undergraduate degree, she mentioned only the activity of cooking for them. This is one of the 
moments when my mother jumped in asking the interview subject (another mother) if she did not 
leave other activities unmentioned, such as washing or ironing clothes for her children. At that 
point, the interviewee realized that she left out quite a bit from her story. She also explained that 
the chores described could not be merely thought of as just specific work for her children since 
she was doing them for the whole family as well. Nevertheless, the incident speaks volumes of my 
mother’s acute awareness about the answers that were being given, her active/agent role in 
requesting more details and examples especially as they related to Romanian women’s work 
exploitation.  It also underlines her efforts in supporting my feminist PhD and my struggles to 
integrate in Canada. With that in mind, I would also mention that interviews were rarely perceived 
as formal and private stances, conducted in closed spaces with rigid research objectives in mind. 
My subjects were opening up about the migration of their children while cooking or even having 
guests over.  
I cannot recall any moment when my mother was not an active or pro-active element in the 
background of my research. If she was not by my side when taking the interviews, asking my 
interview subjects for more details and examples, she was cooking or preparing snacks for them 
when the interviews took place in our apartment. It is almost as if she was, at times, the one more 
in control of the research than I was. I can remember only one instant when she felt more 
vulnerable, and less in control of the situation. It was around my tenth or eleventh interview when 
I was asking one of the interviewed subjects about the future plans of her children to settle in 
Canada, if they planned to move more or just settle where they were.  I was trying to reformulate 
a milder phrase for my usual “return” question when the interviewed person turned to my mother 
and asked her: “What about your daughter, Lia? She will never come back, will she?” It was the 
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only moment when I saw my mother getting sad and feeling vulnerable admitting that “Probably 
not!” The emotional moment was rapidly counteracted by my mother’s claiming indifference, and 
the impossibility of being shaken up by my decisions: “Anyway, I don’t care. It’s her life!” 
However, nothing from her actions and especially around helping me carry out my research were 
a proof that she does not care or wants to remain uninvolved in my academic endeavours. On the 
contrary, her determination was proof that she cares quite a lot, and that she is really invested in 
having me succeed as a feminist and an immigrant to Canada.  
When discussing the implications of authoethnography, Ellis, Adams and Boschener bring 
forward the idea of the relationality of such a method. In using personal experience, 
autoethnographers not only implicate themselves with their work, but also closely involve intimate 
others, as it is the case of my mother (Adams 2009; Etherington 2007). They argue that, for 
example, if a child recounts a story that involves his mom, she is enmeshed in what he says which 
implies that it is hard to hide his mom’s presence without adjusting the importance and motivation 
behind the story. Indeed, a more prominent consideration should be given to the relationality 
characteristic of any analysis: we all live within social networks that include friends and family 
relatives, spouses, partners and children, colleagues and collaborators. Subsequently, when we 
investigate and write research pieces, we involve others in our work. Ellis, Adams and Bochner 
(2011) exemplifies the case of a researcher who studies the tobacco industry effects on health 
outcomes and ends up developing anti-smoking campaigns within her university. Due to this 
researcher’s work and activism, tobacco companies may avoid from monetarily contributing and 
sponsoring the university; even though the researcher is conducting the investigation privately, the 
researcher may indirectly implicate others—in this case, the university.  
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Instead of making invisible and denying the relationality of my research topic and of all 
my interview questions, I choose to acknowledge it, and be constantly aware of it. From this point 
of view, the methods of autobiography created a space to analyze social relations that extended 
beyond the ones with my interviewed subjects, such as it is the case of my mother. Finally, it let 
me focus on my own personal experiences and personal transformations as they evolved and 
changed while resisting dominant hegemonic claims of scientific “objective” research.  
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Section D: Auto-ethnography as a Method of Challenging the Dominant, Hegemonic, 
English-Speaking Scholarship 
 
When talking about auto-ethnography, Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. 
Bochner talk about the auto-ethnographic method as a modality to resist dominant Western 
English- speaking scholarship, and its mainstream study and traditional understandings of the 
“Other” (2011: 18). The same conditions apply to most of the research that has been carried out in 
Romania so far, and that consisted mostly in the critical analysis of Romanian realities and social 
relations by English-speaking “Western” scholars (Kligman: 1998; Verdery: 1996). Nevertheless, 
by claiming one’s biographic and personal involvement in the research conducted, Ellis, Adams 
and Bochner (2011) argue that the autobiographic method can get closer to the indigenous/native 
ethnographies that are developed from colonized or economically subordinated people, and are 
used to address and disrupt power in research, particularly when it comes to the outside researcher's 
right and authority to study the “exotic” others. “Once at the service of the (White, masculine, 
heterosexual, middle/upper-classed, Christian, able-bodied) ethnographer, indigenous/native 
ethnographers now work to construct their own personal and cultural stories; they no longer find 
(forced) subjugation excusable” (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011: 3). 
For me it was also important to write in order to resist the history of “Western” based 
research done on Romania which, in search for theoretical truths, decontextualizes the Romanian 
subject (Kligman: 1998; Verdery: 1996). Equally important for me was to challenge a tradition of 
classical research that perpetuates dominant, hegemonic views of doing research in Romania while 
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not bringing a level of analytic reflexivity on the researcher himself/herself. In contrast, I was 
trying to become a more analytic and self-conscious participant in the conversation, and more 
aware of the emotional connection that the researcher has with his/her subjects, as well as his/her 
effects and influences upon them. On another level, this engagement requires an awareness of the 
mutual influence the researcher and his/her interview informants exert on each other, while 
acknowledging that one’s views might change after such interactions. This approach also means 
acknowledging the fact that the interviewer may have been heavily affected by the process of 
interviewing, and that he/she is part of the stories being told. The researcher also assumes a position 
of vulnerability and doubt by engaging in processes that might develop the knowledge of the self, 
but might also transform the researcher’s own beliefs, actions and sense of self. Through writing 
an autobiography, the “expert” researcher comes to understand that she does not just develop 
knowledge from her subjects’ stories, but that she might learn and even be transformed by the 
knowledge gained through interaction with others (Ellis, Adams, and Bochner 2011).  
 I would not have imagined that my doing the fieldwork in Romania might change the way 
I feel about migrating to Canada. I was very hopeful about my migration and insertion into Canada, 
but became less motivated after finishing doing and transcribing all the interviews, seeing the 
consequences of migration for the families left behind, and their constant longing for their children 
to come back.  
That is why I could not agree more with Cann and Demeulenaere’s (2012) evaluation of 
auto-ethnography as a critical co-constructed process. I took it to mean acknowledging that my 
interview subjects and I share a history together (of migration, poverty, transition, etc.) and that 
the process of sharing stories with one another could influence us reciprocally. I had a story that 
my interlocutors shared with me, namely the migration to Canada, that brought me and my 
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interview subjects together.  I was looking forward to the ways this reality would be constituted as 
a shared and common background. The thought that immigration to Canada might be a more 
challenging process than initially imagined came after the interaction with my interview 
participants, demonstrating the real transformative effects that such exchanges had on me.  
In this regard, Tillmann-Healy (2003) takes into account the possibility of considering the 
formalized relationships that we develop in our fieldwork as lasting friendships. Requiring such a 
personal investment allows us to sustain a decolonizing project that destabilizes the traditional, 
colonial, exploitative research formerly done by Western researchers (Tillmann-Healy 2003: 150). 
Friendships formed during fieldwork are perceived as diminishing the exploitative side of research 
such as using the subjects for their information and knowledge without any reciprocation. 
Likewise, these friendships have the potential to effect change in society in order to confront and 
challenge dominant power structures. They also have the potential, particularly when they are 
friendships that extend across cultural boundaries (such as our own racial and ethnic differences), 
to create lasting alliances and solidarity amongst people (Tillmann-Healy 2003). 
In conclusion, my whole project was enmeshed in relationality, co-constructed personal 
relationships, close connections and friendships. Auto-ethnography is one of the few research 
methodologies that allows me to acknowledge it as such, and allows me to question inadequate 
research methods that required unrealistic and unattainable objectivity.  Therefore, what I needed 
most was a break from such a restrictive pattern of methodology and to explore my life and my 
life’s stories with a less restrictive methodology. It is important to emphasize that to disrupt forms 
of discourse that render the author's identity unimportant is challenging. I deliberately chose to 
situate myself in a sphere separate from conventional research projects. Autoethnographic research 
acknowledges and validates my status as a Romanian immigrant to Canada as well as draws 
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attention to the marginalization and discrimination that Romanian immigrants to Canada, 
including myself, were subjected to. In opting for an autoethnographic method of research I wanted 
to explore how such a method could make use of one's own migration experience in order to look 
at the immigration process as a whole, and its significance for the whole community of Romanian 
migrants in Canada and their families. I wanted to connect individual lives with larger economic 
and social issues. I wanted my autoethnographical study to be a clear mix of autobiography, “story 
of one's own life”, and ethnography, “the study of a particular social group” (Reed-Danahay 1997: 
6). I was trying to make my research project more truthful and “alive,” as Ellis states. 
“Autobiographical stories really make theory and history come alive, don't they?” (Ellis, 2004: 23) 
I wanted to analyze the effects of highly skilled migration on the countries and families left 
behind. So what better way to study such processes than tracing back my own migration 
experience, the elements that made me a highly skilled migrant to Canada (from educational 
degrees to women’s work), and the effects that my leaving had on my own family. Transnational 
feminism and feminist political-economic theories allow me to critique and analyze the 
consequences of migration on women’s work, especially as it relates to the exploitation of these 
working women. Combining my personal history with my research is an effort to produce new 
forms of knowledge and understandings of what migration entails, the factors that shaped the 
process, and what the consequences are in terms of women’s rights.  
Following up on the work of feminists such as Dorothy Smith (1990), Nancy Hartsock 
(1998), Donna Haraway (1991), I seek to dislodge what many mainstream scholars consider 
“objective” and “impartial” methods by undergoing a deeper and more nuanced analysis of the 
migration process. Towards this end, my goal was to capture the nuanced ways in which women 
are oppressed in the migration process and how they talk about it.   Concretely, my project was 
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also rupturing these ideas since I was focusing on migration which I myself have lived through 
various migratory struggles. As a result, I am both a witness to and a principal actor in the 
migration process while I aim to bring a greater understanding to immigration as a whole.  My 
analysis also pushes me to be self-analytical and self-exploratory while I hope to help effect 
changes in the migration process to make it more socially just. I hope that my research analysis 
will shed light on the challenges and oppressions in the migration process. Auto-ethnography and 
self-analysis are a good place to start if the goal is to change unjust aspects of migration.  
Given the above discussion, I used my own life experience and autobiography instead of a 
constant object of analysis as a point of departure for diverse theoretical discussions. The use of 
such methods is empowering especially as they challenge the dominant patriarchal research 
paradigms. At the same time, they provide an excellent basis in which to present new insights and 
perspectives from the position of a migrant in Canada, enabling me to challenge classical methods 
of research. Consequently, in using this research method I am able to counter dominant research 
tools that claim neutrality and impartiality. Another benefit from the use of autoethnograpy as a 
research method is that it allows my writing to act as a form of resistance against oppression 
(Solórzano and Yosso, 2002). This method allowed me to speak and tell the story in a nuanced and 
sometimes messy manner to show the complexity of oppressive conditions of migration. Another 
component that legitimizes the use of autobiography is the centrality of the knowledge produced 
through the experience of migration. In this regard, auto-ethnography calls for the recognition of 
diverse forms of knowledge created by migrants through the experience of migration, as a way of 
challenging hegemonic forms of understanding the experience of migration. Similarly, as with 
other groups experiencing discrimination and marginalization various methods are used to describe 
and transmit their knowledge that include forms of “storytelling, family histories, biographies, 
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scenarios, parables, cuentos, testimonios, chronicles, and narratives” (Solórzano and Yosso, 2002: 
26), I was envisioning a way of providing accounts of Romanian migration in Canada from both 
the point of view of the migrant and the researcher. In today’s scholarship, it stands as implicit for 
the race theorists to call for the validation of these alternative ways of understanding the world as 
a form of resilience and resistance. 
By grounding my work in autobiography this project problematizes the role current 
knowledge plays in explaining the migration process. Without the power of the first-person 
account and the role of experience in the process of migration, my ability to challenge dominant 
perspectives of the process would be limited. However, auto-ethnography, a marginalized 
research-methods approach, speaks of a marginalized immigrant position in a foreign country, 
doubles, parallels, and gives voice to a perspective that encircles my position from the margins. 
My perspective, generated from an oppressive situation, mixes with my desire for social justice 
while supporting the need to improve the conditions of migration. Consequently, auto-ethnography 
represents an alternative to the migrants’ voices that are usually excluded from both 
representations in academia and in the society, they are migrating to. Furthermore, it provides a 
way to communicate the experiences and realities of the oppressed, and it configures itself as an 
initial step on the road to justice. Without the voices of the migrants, and of their own analysis of 
their situation, it is doubtful that we can build less oppressive conditions for the migration process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
Section E: Authoethnography and Autobiography: Research as Therapeutic Value  
 
While I have talked already about the production of myself as a feminist academic, and a 
Canadian citizen through the research done in Romania, I should also include the idea of writing 
on this topic in order to better understand myself. What was positive about my research in Romania 
is that it was indeed conducted to improve migrants’ conditions and women’s rights, but it was 
also intended to help me make sense of my own life in the movement, my particular struggle for 
survival as an immigrant in a foreign country, my guilt of having my family left behind as well as 
my own career dreams and goals. Approaching and writing about migration from Romania to 
Canada and various experiences that shaped me as a highly skilled worker ended up having a 
therapeutic and healing value.  
When writing about auto-ethnography, Ellis and Bochner argue that we should never be 
ashamed if our work has therapeutic or personal value. They even suggest that in such situations 
it is better to express the said vulnerability and subjectivity openly in the text rather than to hide it 
behind frameworks such as “social analysis” (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 747) and deny our own 
existence; our personal stories are already included in what we are researching. In this regard, 
positioning oneself in ethnographic research is crucial, and auto-ethnography acknowledges the 
researcher’s influence in the text. This is a much better stance than assuming that such 
positionalities do not exist. It is also important to reveal that the research participants are not just 
alienated, impersonal subjects, but are often friends and family of the interviewer, or part of the 
same social network, and that we should not normally regard them as impersonal "subjects" only 
to be explored for data. Auto-ethnography also acknowledges that the researcher, by interacting 
with others, becomes a subject of research, blurring the distinctions of personal and social, self 
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and other (Ellis and Bochner 1996).  
By revealing such positionalities, and by using auto-ethnography, the researcher becomes 
visible, and active in the text, changing the assumption that the person behind the research is a 
hidden, yet seemingly omniscient presence, in ethnographic texts. In this regard Leon Anderson 
argues that “a central feature of auto-ethnography is that the researcher’s own feelings and 
experiences are incorporated into the story and considered as vital data for understanding the social 
world being observed” (Anderson 2006: 384). Leon Anderson also argues that by virtue of the 
auto-ethnographer’s dual role as a member in the social world under study and as a researcher of 
that world, “auto-ethnography demands enhanced textual visibility of the researcher’s self” (2006: 
384). Interestingly, Leon Anderson notices how researchers do not just sit observantly on the 
sidelines during their research, and they are also involved in the construction of meaning and 
values in the social worlds they investigate, and are members of the community that they study 
(2006: 384). The author considers it significant for the analysts to affirm their presence in the text 
and reflexively evaluate the course in which their interest and participation replicates or transforms 
social understandings and relations (2006: 385). 
One of the instances in which I felt that I was influencing the construction of meanings and 
social values of the persons around me was during one of the interviews when I asked about the 
maternal investment in their children’s education in the form of social reproductive work (cooking, 
cleaning), and one of my respondents did not see it as necessarily work, but more like a “duty”, 
and moreover a “woman’s duty.” “But does that not imply effort? Why is it so natural?” Suffice it 
is to say that at the end of our conversation, she started to consider her domestic tasks less as 
“women’s roles”, and more as effort and work.  
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By sharing an honest account of how I sought to do research on Romanian migration to 
Canada, I hoped to get other immigrants to make sense of themselves and of their own process of 
migration to Canada. At the same time, I was invested in doing research in Romania from a 
different standpoint than the mainstream superior Western Anglo-Saxon researchers whose works 
I have been reading about my country (Kligman 1998; Verdery 1996), in which different 
researchers enter Romanian culture, exploit the members of that culture for professional and 
financial gain, and then leave that country behind (Ellis 2007). 
Writing about Romanian migration to Canada was truly therapeutic for me as it reinserted 
me once more into networks that provided me with comfort, familiarity and support. Other 
researchers know it already; while there is a story of physical migration and movement, there 
cannot be a similar matching story of separation and emotional removal from a life already lived, 
with its many personal experiences and memories. Perhaps this is because an immigrant never 
fully leaves his/her country of origin. He/she always keeps in contact with family, friends, and 
acquaintances, revisits them, and keeps in touch with them. In that regard, the field of auto-
ethnography also allows the researcher to continue reliving his/her past in the home country so 
that the field continues to exist and is reconstructed discursively through writing after the end of 
the experience. And this is probably the most therapeutic part of autobiographies. 
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Chapter Three: Transition Economies and Neoliberal Development: Co-Constituting the 
Highly- Skilled Romanian Migrant  
 
The question is not what is the problem, but according to whom is this a problem, and 
why [...] We are moved to interrogate the meaning and purpose of power: 'Whom does it 
benefit? Whom does it sacrifice?' (Aganthangelou and Ling 2005) 
 
While I have shown the neoliberal demand for acquiring highly skilled migrants as well as 
the cuts in social services that determine an externalization of social-reproduction, it is equally 
important to identify how transition economies are also push and pull migration factors. In the 
section below, I will describe the conditions of economic transition from Romania, the failed 
expectations after the arrival of the capitalist market that together with neoliberal demands and 
Canada’s race for “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) worldwide end up co-
constituting the highly skilled migrant. The purpose of the chapter is to show how the expansion 
of the capitalist market in Eastern Europe and the pursuit of relentless growth and accumulation 
of assets in the Global North co-create the phenomenon of highly-skilled migration.  
 In the past twenty years, Romania has experienced a large outward migration. The 
movement coincided with the collapse of the communist regime, and the spread of globalization, 
capitalism and “democracy” in Eastern Europe. Due to the authoritarian characteristics of the 
communist system and the absence of any right of free movement across the country’s border, the 
nation faced insignificant levels of migration before 1989 (Culic 2012). It was only after the 
expansion of global capital and Romania’s transition to a “liberal”, “free” market economy, which 
started in 1990, that the numbers of outward migration grew exponentially reaching millions fast. 
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It is evaluated that 3 million Romanians left the country between 1989 and 2008 out of a population 
of 22 million and are currently working abroad (The Romanian Department for Labour Abroad 
(DMS) 2008).  
The transition to a capitalist market resulted in a massive restructuring of the economy and 
a switch from state-centralized and state-ownership of factories to privatized, competitive, market-
based enterprises (Burawoy 1999, Kornai 1992). The new directions meant an entire change of the 
components of goods generation, amassing and redistribution, with the state stopping to do its 
share of redistributing merchandise to the population. Moreover, the state stopped providing for 
free the educational projects, medical services and accommodation and lodging that it had given 
before. From a planned and state concentrated economy, with products collectively produced and 
redistributed, the switch involved an unconstrained formation of new capitalist markets, financial 
and banking frameworks, and stock trade. In this specific situation, it is not shocking that the 
extension of current globalization could not have occurred without an earlier fall of the Iron 
Curtain, and a full destruction of the past communist frameworks in Eastern Europe. The end of 
the communist frameworks in Eastern Europe converted into a "transition" to a capitalist period 
which also implied a lessening of state engagement, support and subsidizing in accommodating 
the welfare and prosperity of the population once so thoroughly guaranteed. Overall, the transition 
process had significant social impacts including destabilising the labour market and creating a new 
class of poor people (Gallagher 2009).  
 What is remarkably clear is that the so-called “transition” period from a communist state-
centralized economy to a liberalised free-market economy did not improve either living or working 
conditions for the majority of Romanians (Gallagher 2009, Zaman 2007). In fact, these 
transformations led to rather high rates of economic and social instability in Romania. Major heavy 
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communist industries (automobile, mining, petroleum, chemical, and steel industries) were shut 
down with no development initiative to replace them, leading to high unemployment rates, up to 
25-30 percent (Ruminska-Zimny 1997). The transition aimed for a radical restructuring and 
transformation of the former communist economy, mostly consisting in a mass deindustrialization 
or a privatization of all the state-owned companies, considered as inefficient and generating losses. 
Slashing jobs and firing people (in the rhetoric of the time making people “disposable” from 
Romanian “disponibilizat”) were just auxiliary and secondary consequences of a large process of 
reinvention and rebirth of the economy as promised by the newly installed capitalist markets. The 
reinvention and rebirth of a newly installed economy is quite well documented, and scholars speak 
of an actual “tabula rasa” approach toward Eastern European realities and erasure of all the 
connections that existed before (Burawoy 2001). The assumption in many of these “transitions” 
was that there was nothing to be saved from the former communist state-planned regime and 
everything had to be recreated from scratch. Following up on such assumptions, everyone 
considered socialist economies so moribund and inefficient that the fact that self-regulating 
markets and privatizations could bring only economic improvement was unquestioned (Burawoy 
2001). The desire was for a smooth change from communist totalitarianism to liberal democracy 
and from a planned economy to the free market. The fact that workers from former communist 
state-owned companies were made “disposable”, therefore available for new and promising 
experiences, and were not simply “fired” speaks of the promising expectations about the new 
market-based regime. There was of course, a major assumption based on a linear understanding of 
time: the break with the communist past could only lead to an evolutionary ascent to a future 
capitalism (Burawoy 2001: 271).  
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Nevertheless, despite the hopeful “triumphalist” expectations of the announced free-market 
democracies (Verdery 1996), the whole transition episode was a rather painful period, with high 
social costs, including poverty, and conditions that led many people into worsening positions 
reducing their economic, social and political access to resources. Furthermore, the abrupt switch 
from the centrality of the state in the communist regime to a withdrawal of the state from any 
regulation of the market deprived people of necessary mechanisms of support and protection. For 
example, the restructuring of the mines that was carried out at the installation of a market-based 
liberal economy has left thousands of people unemployed. According to the Romanian agency of 
statistics Mediafax, nearly 60,000 miners—mostly from the Jiu Valley and Oltenia—were made 
redundant at once in September 1997 in one of the first and the biggest series of mass firings in 
transition Romania (Toma 2011). At the same time, the capitalist switch suggested an absolute 
incompatibility between the neoliberal recipes of reform and restructuring and the former 
communist organization which actually converted into a rushed dissolution and annihilation of the 
latter. The sudden capitalist conversion cancelled a lot of the communist states’ allocation and 
redistribution capacity (in terms of housing, healthcare, education), its principles of labour 
organized collectively and its standards of collective support. As Michael Burawoy argues “the 
new was created by destroying the old”, equation represented in this case by a disappearing state 
that unfortunately got replaced by a new domestic oligarchy colluding with global finance and 
corporate capital (Burawoy 2000: 17).  
 In this context, the scholarship on the topic speaks of “a poverty of magnitude” generated 
after the post-communist transition with severe setbacks in human development and rises in human 
poverty to an extent unprecedented in industrial countries during peace time (Ruminska-Zimny 
1997; Izyumov 2009). Along the same lines, a 2001 United Nations Development Programme 
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document analyzing the transition in Romania in terms of human development speaks of “an 
explosive increase of poverty” with the minimum salary falling tragically from its 1989 level while 
the proportion of those earning the minimum salary or close to it had expanded sharply (Berthin 
2001:11). In fact, increases in the percentage of the population living below the poverty line of $4 
a day in transition countries like Romania or Bulgaria reached 40 per cent in the ‘90s (Ruminska-
Zimny 1997, Izyumov 2009).  
Following the demise of communist structures, the transition to a market economy in 
Romania has been marked by long recessive and negative effects. For example, the share of 
industry in Romania’s GDP decreased from 46per cent in 1985 to less than 28per cent in 1999 
(Berthin 2001). Throughout the decade, as a measure of inflation control and fiscal deficit 
reduction, the government was forced to decrease subsidies for key sectors of the economy (i.e., 
agriculture, mining, industry) and as a result there was a rapid decrease in real wages (40 per cent 
during the first 3 years of the transition). Moreover, in spite of the privatization measures taken, 
very little growth was registered and instead the debt and the budget deficit have continuously 
shown increasing rates. For example, the number of public-sector employees in the decade 
decreased by 44 per cent while the Romania electorate participation has been gradually declining. 
At the same time, after a moment of enthusiasm and excitement post the transition to the capitalist 
market, the instability and precariousness generated by the market reforms brought forward a 
depreciation of the political and economic ideals of capitalism and market-based development that 
the respective transition was supposed to lead to. Not accidentally, the new managerial and 
entrepreneurial approaches of the transition brought chaos, confusion, mistrust and doubt. In this 
context, it not surprising that, from 1992 (the latest census year) to 1999, the total population of 
Romania decreased substantially (Ruminska-Zimny 1997; Izyumov 2009). The most important 
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cause seems to be an increase in emigration together with a decline in the birthrate, and, last but 
not least, in an increased death rate (Ruminska-Zimny 1997; Bandelj and Mahutga 2010). At the 
same time, the average family size in Romania has shrunk: instead of the communist common 
households counting an average of 4 members, in transition Romania we found an increase of the 
number of smaller households formed of one or two people. Of major significance is the increase 
of non-remunerated unpaid family labourers, whose number grew eight times between 1992-1998, 
reaching 25 per cent percent of the population while the salaried employees decreased by 25 per 
cent in the ‘90s. Furthermore, the infrastructure conditions did not improve, and the urbanization 
of rural people did not increase substantially: from rates of 11.3 in 1990 to 12.3 per thousand 
inhabitants in 1998 (Ruminska-Zimny 1997, Bandelj and Mahutga 2010).  
The transition has confirmed that economic, political and social transformation processes 
that Romania was undergoing in post-communism have downgraded living conditions, instead of 
improving much of the people’s well-being. The promises of capitalism, development and 
democracy remained highly elusive and intangible and failed to be concretized and bring any 
substantial change in the quality of life of the majority of the population. On the contrary, their 
pursuit created a political and social chaos and a wreck that manifested itself as an increase of 
poverty, of unemployment, social stratification, as well as a reduction in people’s ability to fulfill 
basic human needs (food, shelter, education, health). For example, the transition in Romania was 
accompanied by a dramatic rise of economic insecurity and deterioration of living standards. In 
1989, an estimated 7 per cent of the population was poor. By 1994, the poverty rate ranged, 
according to the methodology employed, between 22 per cent- 39 per cent. A second wave of 
economic insecurity began in 1997 and by 1999 the poverty rate had reached 42 per cent (an 
increase of more than 60 per cent over the 1995 rate), while extreme poverty doubled over the 
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same period. Furthermore, during the first years of transition, income inequality rose by 
approximately 50 per cent above its 1989 level. The income differential between the richest 10 per 
cent of households and the poorest 10 per cent continued to rise; the incomes of the top 5 per cent 
on the average exceed those of the poorest by a factor of more than 15. In addition, the minimum 
wage pays, an essential certification of any employee welfare, has fallen significantly from its 
1989 level, and the extent of those earning the minimum compensation or near it has expanded 
significantly (Ruminska-Zimny 1997, Bandelj and Mahutga 2010). 
Similarly, when looking at the living standards in Romania the researchers Philip Martin 
and Thomas Straubhaar found that these standards fell dramatically during the 1990s, whereas in 
2000 they were only a bit more than half of what they were at the end of the communist rule 
(Martin and Straubhaar 2000). Additionally, in the 1990s and 2000s 40 per cent of Romanians 
lived on less than $4 per day at a time when the economic development was much slower in 
Romania than in the rest of all the EU countries (for example the GDP in 2000 was at $34 billion, 
and per capita GDP was $1,600, one tenth of the EU average). In terms of demographics, there 
were about 30,000 more deaths (118 per 10,000) than births (105 per 10,000) each year in Romania 
and the country's population fell by about 750,000 between 1990 and 2000.The number of children 
younger than 15 in 2000 was only 50,000 higher than the number of people 60 years old and older 
(Martin and Straubhaar 2000).  
   It was the first time that the majority of Romanians have experienced a sense of insecurity 
and uncertainty about employment prospects. In terms of the human development index (HDI) 
used by United Nations Development Programme, transition Romania did not change much its 
index throughout the ‘90s and early 2000s (from 0.0770 to 0.0772), a number pointing to the lack 
of a substantial improvement to the quality of life and general well-being of people. In this sense, 
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the UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) has been rather successful in serving as an 
alternative measure of development, supplementing economic indicators. It has three distinct 
components: indicators of longevity, education and income. As the UNDP Index demonstrates, the 
annulment of the state welfare rules and the launching of privatized endeavours and market-based 
private enterprises did not convert into Romanians having more beneficial, secure and better 
educated conditions in postcommunism (Berthin 2001). A 2006 broad survey about general 
fulfillment and life satisfaction in transition Romania concluded that Romanians' fulfillment is 
much lower than that of all the Western countries with around 74 percentage of the general 
population in the sample being not in any manner fulfilled or not exactly happy with their life 
(Andren and Martinsson 2006).  
 Such major shifts have pushed more and more Romanians to outward migration. With a 
shattered economy and such high unemployment rates, many Romanians left the country. Clearly, 
the first destination for migration were cities closest to Western Europe. Restrictions though on 
the movement of Romanian migrants and the imposition of entry visas by Western European 
countries forced migrant Romanians to find illegal contract work in construction (men), services 
and domestic work (women). Despite the precarious working conditions, the Romanian migrants 
found themselves in, economic insecurity and the lack of opportunity in their home country assured 
that outward Romanian migration continued to grow. At the same time, Western Europe of the 
1990s was experiencing economic growth and development which drove labour migration from 
Eastern Europe. The extent to which Romania was generating substantial outward migration was 
shown in the fact that by 2003 approximately 900,000 Romanian households had at least one 
member working abroad (Chivu 2004).  
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In 2010, Romania was still a major stakeholder in the migration process contributing about 
5 per cent of the migration flows to the OECD countries, together with countries such as India, 
and Poland (OECD 2012). While China remains the main country of origin of migration flows to 
the OECD, accounting for nearly one in ten migrants, Romania saw the largest increase in 
migration to the OECD compared with the situation in 2000. Romania is also the country with the 
largest migration in per-capita terms. In 2010, more than 1.3 per cent of its population migrated to 
OECD countries. The only other country for which such large outflows was recorded was Bulgaria, 
which also lost about 1per cent of its population. Both countries’ large flows are mainly due to 
migration to other EU countries, following Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to the EU in 2007 
(OECD 2012). 
 In 2003 the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated approximately 1.7 
millions of Romanians working abroad (IOM 2003) while another study conducted in 2008 
provided new local estimates that speak of 3 million Romanian migrants, which represent 15 per 
cent of the entire population. A 2012 OECD report estimates that the number of Romanians 
working abroad in 2010 to be around 3 million persons. However, data on emigration of Romanian 
citizens or persons born in Romania is limited. Officially registered emigration captures only a 
small fraction of actual outflows. The number of newly registered permanent emigrants in 2010 
was about 7,900, down 23 per cent from 2009. A better approximation of actual emigration is 
provided by the statistics of the main destination countries. For example, the Romanian population 
residing in Italy increased by around 80 000 (to a total of 969 000) in 2010, and the corresponding 
increase in Spain was 33 000 (to a total of almost 864 300) (OECD 2012). 
 The lifting of the European Schengen visa (2001-2006) registered another huge wave 
of Romanian outward migration at a rate of 28-30 immigrants per 1,000 inhabitants, the main 
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countries of destination being Italy (40 per cent of all labour migrants), Spain (18 per cent), 
Germany (5 per cent), Hungary (5 per cent), and Israel (6 per cent). The large increases in migrants 
from Romania, Poland, Germany and Lithuania are all associated with expansion of free mobility 
in European OECD countries. Romanians are the main nationality of new migrants in Hungary, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain. Linguistic proximity seems to explain the orientation of Romanian 
emigration to the latter three countries. In addition, Romanians were also the second most 
important group for Austria, Denmark and Germany (OECD 2012).  
At the same time, Eurostats show that between 2002 and 2006 the number of Romanian 
emigrants almost doubled. The percentage of Romanians working in the EU reached almost 5 per 
cent of the total Romanian population of 21.5 million (source: National Statistics Institute 2008). 
Further analysis of the 2006 data finds that Romanians in the 26-40 age bracket constituted 57.74 
per cent of the total number of emigrants. This points to how the most productive and relatively 
young part of the population was leaving the country. An OECD Report from 2012 stated that 
Romanian citizens accounted for almost a quarter of all new enrolments of foreign residents in 
Italy in 2010. Their number rose 9per cent compared with 2009 to reach 969 000 persons, currently 
comprising the main group of foreign residents in Italy (OECD 2012). 
 The majority of the Romanian migrants in Western Europe, regardless of their education and 
work experience, ended up employed in low-paid unstable and unskilled jobs. The International 
Organization for Migration gives evidence from a survey carried out by CURS in 2005 which 
highlights the occupational status of Romania migrants and points to the prevalence of their 
employment in agriculture 36 per cent, construction 28.1 per cent and private households 14.6 per 
cent. Similarly, various European statistical reports found the Romanian immigrants working as 
construction workers, unqualified workers in agriculture, menders for electrical equipment, au 
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pair, etc. with most of the positions being short term and unskilled. Data collected throughout the 
years by the Romanian sociologist Dumitru Sandu provides us with the following portrait of 
Romanian emigrants to Western Europe: it is the young people, rather than the mature or the older 
people, who have gone to work, and for the group of men aged 18 to 59, the most frequent 
departures have been from the rural area (Sandu 2006 cited by Suciu 2010).  Another study of the 
migration of Romanians to Italy notes that they work in lower skilled positions with a significant 
proportion of the Romanian migrant women having jobs in the categories of “sales and services 
elementary job”, “personal care and related workers” and “house-keeping and restaurant services” 
while Romanian men mostly work as “extraction and building trades workers”, “drivers and 
mobile plant operators” and “metal, machinery and related trades workers” (Mara 2012). 
 Neoliberal growth, development and relaxation of visa restrictions by Western European 
countries and their stronger labour market provided opportunities for Romanian migrants to find 
jobs; however, it has meant low-paid, unskilled or unstable, insecure work opportunities that 
disregard Romanian migrants’ education and skill levels. In contrast, countries such as Canada and 
Australia promised better and more dignified and stable opportunities for migration, thus attracting 
skilled, university-educated Romanians. For them, Western Europe’s demand for unskilled, low-
paid workers was not as appealing as the Canadian immigration system such as the Federal Skilled 
Worker (FSWP) which places emphasis on education credentials, work experience, and language 
proficiency. Canada was popular with the young highly educated urban Romanians, who searched 
for better labour market possibilities to realize their potential and set them above their peers 
struggling with unskilled and low-paid unstable insecure jobs in Western Europe.   
Canada’s immigration selection systems were seen as attractive for Romania’s young 
educated population. Citizenship and Immigration Canada statistics showed a continuous increase 
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of the number of Romanians moving to Canada, and the migration rates reached 3,000-4,000 
annually in the 2000s. As mentioned before, in contrast to the waves of Romanians who were 
migrating to Western Europe to perform unskilled or paying jobs with low entry qualifications, 
the categories of the Romanian population that applied for migrating to Canada were highly skilled 
professionals. Little did the highly-skilled applicants knew to what degree Canada’s FSWP 
program would deliver on its promises and meet their expectations.  
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Section A: The Canadian Immigration System: The Point-System 
 
While Western Europe opened itself to low-paid and unskilled immigrant work, countries 
like Canada and Australia had immigration programs that promised more dignified and more 
skilled opportunities for Romanians working abroad. A country of immigration like Australia and 
the United States, Canada has been built and founded by mass immigration (Gabriel and Abu-
Laban 2002). However, utilizing a skill-based points system dedicated to targeting migrants and 
evaluating their human and labour capital, the Canadian state has been historically selective when 
regulating migration practices and repeatedly revisited the selection criteria.  
After World War II, mass migration was believed to be the most efficient way of enabling 
economic growth and development. Initially, Canadian immigration officers were given a lot of 
discretion in deciding to whom to give entry to Canada as migrants. The basic regulations only 
required migrants to be individuals who by their education, training, skills or other special 
qualifications were likely to become successfully established in Canada. Nevertheless, Europeans 
were favoured and the system started to receive a lot of criticism for the discretionary and 
subjective power granted to immigration officers. In order to diminish the widespread criticism, 
starting in 1967 the selection process became more formalized and regulated, with the creation of 
a “point system” (Gabriel and Abu-Laban 2002). The “point system” assigned the prospective 
immigrant a score in the following categories: age, education, training, occupational skill in 
demand, knowledge of English or French; personal assessment made by an immigration official 
in an interview; relatives in Canada; arranged employment; and employment opportunities in the 
area of destination. 
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The presence of a number of different pre-established attributes, such as age, occupational 
demand, education, work experience, language ability, and adaptability together with removing 
national origin as an explicit criterion for selection were considered as a fairer and more democratic 
mechanism for selecting migrants than the previous more arbitrary and subjective system. If 
awarded a high enough score, individuals would be assigned a pass mark and granted entry (Walsh 
2008). It is important to mention that at first there was no formal quota in the points’ selection 
strategy; a quota was only later incorporated and is as of now still on the books. If an immigrant 
passed the points’ criteria, he or she would be accepted to Canada, regardless of the number of 
migrants that Canada welcomed that year. Overall, the 1967 points’ framework was thought to be 
more neutral, free of prejudice and non-biased determination criteria that diminished border 
officers' subjective choices. Additionally, it was thought to be an enhanced version of all past 
processes of selecting migrants and was considered to function outside the inherent prejudices and 
biases of the border assessors (Liston and Carens 2008). 
However, two methods for adjusting an applicant's outcome remained from the previous 
system. First, under the “Personal Qualities” section of the required application form for 
immigration, up to fifteen points out of one hundred could be assigned by the interviewing officer 
based on “adaptability, motivation, initiative, resourcefulness, and other similar [subjective] 
qualities” (Kelley and Trebilcock 1998: 392). Second, an immigration official had the discretion, 
with the approval of a superior officer, to deny admission to applicants who had a 'pass' mark, and 
to admit those who otherwise failed. The Globe and Mail acknowledged that the new system could 
be criticized for dehumanizing applicants because of its mechanistic approach to evaluation 
(Kelley and Trebilcock 1998: 393). 
 101 
The point system was intended to ensure admission of immigrants whose skills were 
needed in Canada. Over the years it particularly gave preference to immigrants who could fill 
occupational demands in the labour market. Nevertheless, in 1978 a “Canadians First” Policy was 
implemented to ensure that Canadian citizens were given first priority in all jobs. Similarly, in 
1982, with the country mired in the depths of a recession, the “Canadians First” policy was 
amended to an even more extreme position: prior to immigration, all migrants had to have firm 
offers of jobs for which no Canadian or permanent resident was available (Kelley and Trebilcock 
1998: 393). 
The current system of immigration, organized in three different admission categories, was 
set up in 1976. It clearly delimits an independent or economic class, mostly comprised in the 
Federal Skilled Worker category and a small Business Class category, from the Family class 
(including family members’ sponsorship) and refugees. The most important category is envisioned 
as that of the skilled workers seen as the category that will contribute most to the economic growth 
of the country while the rest of the categories are rather framed as burden and costs (Culic 2012). 
However, as mentioned before, such framings have various consequences for women’s rights and 
the work largely associated with their gender.     
One of the marked features of the period was the significant change in the country of origin. 
Prior to 1961, 90 per cent of all immigrants to Canada came from Europe and only 3 per cent 
originated from Asia and the Middle East. By the 1990s these figures had dramatically changed; 
European immigrants accounted for less than 25 per cent of the total while those from Asia and 
the Middle East represented over 50 per cent of all arrivals. Ontario and British Columbia attracted 
proportionately more immigrants than other provinces, with close to 70 per cent of the total going 
there compared to the remaining others settling in the rest of the country. By 1991 the proportion 
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of immigrants to total populations in the cities of Toronto and Vancouver was 38 per cent and 30 
per cent, respectively. Some 46 per cent of Toronto's population in 2006 was foreign born, higher 
than in Miami (40 per cent), Sydney (31 per cent), Los Angeles (31 per cent) and New York (24 
per cent). Near the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, one in five residents of 
Canada was foreign born (Kelley and Trebilock 1998: 419). 
With the increasing rise in life expectancy coupling with falling birth rate (falling below 
the replacement rate), Canada targeted generally the young category of working immigrants for 
population growth and social reproduction (Gabriel and Abu-Laban 2002). At the same time, in 
congruence with the dismantling of the social-welfare system and a newly adopted neoliberal 
agenda that outsourced the manufacturing and heavy industry, the Canadian economy internally 
relied more and more on knowledge-based and service economies. The dismantling of the social-
welfare system, of the neoliberal shift and of the care support usually associated with women’s 
social reproductive work translated into a need to externalize that type of work and find alternatives 
to replace it. One type of externalization is through the acquisition of knowledge-based workers 
from countries that have already formed and trained them as such, as is the case of Romania. This 
fact also emphasized the need of the Canadian market to incorporate migrants of a certain 
educational and occupational background. Prior to 1996, the majority of immigrants 
(approximately 60-75 percent) entered Canada as either family members (part of the family 
reunification program) or as refugees (Walsh 2008). After that, state policies limited the access of 
these categories of immigrants, namely extended family and refugees, and favoured independent 
skilled immigrants such as well-educated physicians and engineers.  
Skilled migration is currently considered an essential part of Canada’s strategy of 
maintaining competitive position in a knowledge-based global economy (Citizenship and 
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Immigration Canada 2009). With most of its manufacturing, industrial and agricultural production 
moved abroad, and outsourced, Canadian immigration policies now also look abroad in order to 
target mostly the knowledge-based and highly specialized international professionals: computer 
programmers, engineers, accountants, managers, etc. (Gabriel and Abu-Laban 2002, Shields, 
Turegun, Lowe 2013). Rather than a previous focus on market labour demand, increasingly in the 
‘90s and 2000s the Canadian immigration system emphasizes “knowledge-based” workers with 
flexibility and transferable skills, and it commits to a stable annual inflow of about one percent 
annually of the current population (Culic 2012). 
In attracting the highly skilled professionals from developing countries, the Canadian 
migration policies fail to consider the gender implication of absorbing knowledge-based workers 
to the detriment of the social reproductive work that had been previously invested into the 
formation of these skills and the current care functions that migrants still need in order to function 
as such. Even though skilled immigrants can bring their spouses and children, there is less capacity 
to bring their extended families such as their parents and grandparents. While the immigration 
programs to Canada allow for a Family Class and family-reunification option, the numbers 
accepted are significantly lower than the number of economic migrants (CIC 2014). For example, 
while the percentage of economic migrants was at 63.4 in 2014, the family-class acceptance 
reached only 26.5. Furthermore, the programs do not consider the impact that the departure of 
knowledge workers might have on the sending countries and the home communities that invested 
substantially in their formation and specialization only to be left behind. In this sense, 
comprehensive migration policies probably should not be developed unilaterally, and the receiving 
countries should always evaluate and consider the impacts that their policies have on sending 
countries. The loss of skilled workers places the sending countries at a disadvantage (Skeldon 
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2009). The movement of so many professionals from developing countries cannot be but 
prejudicial to their development (Basch, Schiller and Blanc 1994; Bundred P. E. and Levitt C. 
2000; Laurie, K. 2008; Keddie, A. 2010; Kaneff and Pine 2011; Piperno, F. 2007).  
  The targeted groups encompass precisely the most skilled and proficient individuals 
(engineers, physicians, and computer programmers) that are highly needed for growth and 
development in their own country. Furthermore, the education of these professionals is done at the 
expense of the home countries’ families and state budget.  It is ironic that these developing 
countries should, at their own expense and on their own budget, educate and prepare their most 
valuable young professionals just so they can leave for work abroad, in an unfortunate mismatch 
between educational and economic opportunities. However, this is not a new phenomenon and not 
specific to Romania alone.  For example, “the basic cost of training of a British doctor in the mid-
1960s was around £12,000 (about US$ 33,600 at 1965 exchange rates) that was ‘lost’ to Britain 
and ‘gained’ by the United States if that person decided to migrate across the Atlantic upon 
completion of his or her studies” (Skeldon citing Last 1969: 31). Furthermore, there is an 
unfortunate gender split between the extraction of those subjects as “brains” (classically associated 
with male characteristics) envisioned as highly productive, and the subjects associated with care 
for bodily needs (traditionally understood as female) that is deprioritized, considered unskilled and 
is left unaccounted for. In this sense, Romanian migration to Canada clearly shows how such 
disentanglements are impossible, and that migration stories were not ones of migrating brains, but 
also ones of the initial social reproduction of those “brains,” largely performed by mothers’ paid 
and unpaid work. This research is asking who benefits most from such social reproduction journeys 
and for whom it will be experienced as a loss.  
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Section B: Romanian Migration to Canada: Before and After 1989 
 
Before 1989, most of Romania’s immigrants who were forced to leave the country did so 
due to political repression as well as other punitive actions taken by the communist state. The 
conditions set for entering Western Europe and the US or Canada required Romanians to be 
political refugees and not economic migrants in order to be allowed into those countries.  After the 
demise of the Iron Curtain, Romanian migration ceased to be considered in political terms and 
started to be regarded in economic terms. Thus, Romanians were no longer considered refugees 
but economic migrants.  In this regard, one of the first laws that was enacted by the national 
government after the 1989 revolution in Romania was Article 25. According to it, the rewritten 
Romanian Constitution guaranteed the right to free movement of all Romanian nationals residing 
internally or abroad. The law stipulated that every citizen was warranted the right to settle or reside 
anywhere on the territory of Romania, as well as the right to emigrate, and to return. While the 
free movement act was celebrated as a triumph of liberalism and democracy, and consequently a 
defeat of communism in Romania, it quickly became the means to permanently immigrate outside 
the country. After years of authoritarian rule, coupled with a painful transition to an open capitalist 
market, Romanians were free to leave behind their home country, exactly at a point in time when 
the country was celebrated as newly liberalized, capitalistic and democratic. Ironically, the 
transition to the capitalist market did not generate a sufficient condition of economic well-being 
so that the Romanians had also the freedom to stay in their home countries. So, “free” to stay at 
home, but not having the employment opportunities and decent living conditions expected after 
the transition to the capitalist market, or “free” to move around and not have a home, or “free” to 
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move and not have the support of their extended families and communities, many young educated 
Romanians looked into the immigration possibilities offered by Canada.  
Although undergoing changes, from 1967 to 2015 the Canadian immigration system had 
three main categories of permanent immigrants: family class (where Canadian citizens and 
permanent residents older than 18 could sponsor certain relatives who wished to immigrate to 
Canada); refugees (those people who, according to the United Nation's definition, had a well-
founded fear of persecution); and independent migrants that included skilled workers and business 
migrants but there was more focus put on independent skilled workers (Abu-Laban, Gabriel 2002). 
While other categories of immigration, such as provincial nominees, live-in caregivers, and 
temporary foreign workers 7  accounted for the process, historically for the main bulk of the 
schemes of immigration to Canada consisted of the three categories already mentioned. For 
example, in 2008 out of a number of 247,243 immigrants, the Canadian Immigration System 
consisted of the following four Admissible Categories: economic (60.3 per cent), family (26.5 per 
cent), refugee (8.8 per cent) and other (2.6 per cent) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2008).  
Canada’s Skilled Worker Class Immigration, often referred to as the Independent Immigration 
Class and Federal Skilled Worker category, consisted of those foreign nationals whose education 
and work experience would help them settle in Canada.  The requirements for one to qualify as a 
skilled worker immigrant to Canada were the following: Education (PhD/Master's, Bachelor's, or 
Trade/Non-University certificate/diploma);Work Experience (1 - 4 years of work experience); 
Language Skills (Speaking, Listening, Reading, and Writing in English and/or French); Age (21 
to 49 got the maximum points); Adaptability (education and/or employment in Canada, having a 
relative in Canada, spouse/common-law partner's education level); Arranged Employment in 
                                                 
7 Please see glossary for the definition of these terms.  
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Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada and Border Connections Assessment 2014). Some 
of the eligible occupations for the federal skilled worker program included civil, mechanical, 
chemical, mining, petroleum, etc. engineers, computer programmers, financial analysts, 
physicians, medical laboratory technologists, physiotherapists (Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada 2014). 
Skilled workers represented two thirds of the total number of permanent migrants. The 
"family" class represented about 26.5 per cent, and refugees and assisted relatives about 8.8 per 
cent, while the number of entrepreneurs, self-employed and investors are equally few. While 
recently there have been new additions to the usual streams of the immigration programs such as 
Provincial Nominees, Canadian Experience Class, Start-Up Visa or Self-Employed Persons 
Program (Canadian Citizenship and Immigration 2014), the bulk of the migrants under Canada’s 
immigration programs consist of Federal Skilled Workers (FSWP), Family Sponsorship, and the 
Asylum Seekers Programs. Historically they had a long tradition of attracting immigrants to 
Canada (they were launched in the ‘60s) while being stable and consistent in their design and 
format throughout years. Furthermore, they particularly mapped and reflected the “work” vs. 
“care” understandings of the type of immigrant work needed. Of course, the gendered 
understandings of the type of immigrant work needed was also connected with different parallel 
similar understandings of their prestige and priority, number of admissions as well as access to 
rights and degrees of independence and autonomy (Yasmeen Abu-Laban 1998, Sunera Thobani 
2007).  
The point system in Canada has been quite problematic and critiqued by feminists such as 
Yasmeen Abu-Laban (1998) and Sunera Thobani (2007). This system favours the work typically 
performed by men and pushes immigrant women and their work to the margins. The point system, 
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Abu-Laban observes pertinently, reinforces the artificially constructed sexist difference between 
women’s private household work and men’s more valuable public work.  
Official figures indicate that the percentage of university graduates leaving Romania 
permanently rose from 6 per cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 2003, which is double the percentage 
of university graduates in the total adult population (almost 10 per cent of university graduates 
according to a study estimation). The trend increased slightly as 26.4 per cent of those emigrating 
in 2005 were university graduates (National Institute of Statistics Romania 2008). The statistics 
found emigration rates getting even higher for certain specializations: for example, Martin and 
Straubhaar found that about half of the 5,000 graduates of Romanian universities in computer 
science emigrate each year, and a March 2001 study found that up to 66 per cent of the Romanian 
students would emigrate if they could. (Martin and Straubhaar 2000: 81). When looking at the fate 
of Romanian job-seekers in Canada, Tudoroiu found that 2,386 persons destined for the labour 
force 1,044 (44 per cent) have qualifications in "natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics" 
(Tudoroiu 2007). The same researcher considers that Romania was the country of origin of the 
most important number of immigrant engineers to Canada in 1992 and 1993 and the third most 
important in 1994 and 1995 (Tudoroiu 2007). If in the 1990s, the Federal Skilled Worker class 
represented 17 per cent of all Romanian immigrants, with the rest distributed across family and 
refugee classes, its levels rose dramatically in the next decade to reach a percentage of 84 in 2004 
(Culic 2012). 
The Romanian annual immigration to Canada is small in relative terms and represents 
about 3 per cent of the total immigration to Canada. Nevertheless, between 1995 and 2004 
Romanians were the group with the highest numbers of immigrants from Europe (Tudoroiu 2007). 
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Romanian migratory dispositions coupled with the labour needs of external markets 
remained a constant feature of the country during the ‘90s and 2000s. According to a 2006 survey 
in Romania, 9 per cent of the adult population still intended to work abroad, and 23 percent of the 
18-24 age group (Horvath 2006).  
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Section C: Romanian Immigration to Canada: History and Socio-Demographic Elements 
 
The first account of Romanian immigration to Canada dates from 1898 when Ichim Jurca 
from the village of Boian in Bukovina, together with his wife and daughter, settled in Alberta. 
Soon tens of other families joined them and a couple of years later they founded their own village 
named Boian, exactly like the one they left behind in Romania (Patterson 1999). According to 
Canada’s Dominion Lands Act, the first Romanian peasants were given 160 acres of land to 
cultivate crops and build a residence. After WWI, we find accounts of almost 30,000 Romanians 
(mostly from Transylvania and Bukovina) having emigrated to the mid-West of Canada (Patterson 
1999). Analyzing the waves of Romanians reaching Canada, sociologist Irina Culic actually 
identifies three distinct waves: the first wave of peasants in the late nineteenth century that settled 
in the prairies; the second one of Romanian refugees fleeing the communist regime; and the third 
wave of Romanian migrants, that belonged to the category of skilled workers, arrived in Canada 
after the fall of the communist regime (Culic 2012). The number of Romanian immigrants to 
Canada after the installation of the communist regime in Romania is estimated to be more than 
38,000 (Culic 2012). During the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, both Canada and United 
States had in place special refugee programs in order to help Eastern European migrants fleeing 
communist regimes. For example, in the late ‘70s, Canada created the East European Self-Exiled 
Person program meant to attract Eastern Europeans fleeing communist regimes. Their arrival was 
also assisted by an interest-free Assisted Passage Loan Scheme that aimed to help immigrants from 
Europe with covering expenses that they could not afford, including their own transportation to 
Canada (Culic 2012). 
However, the inflow of Romanian immigrants to Canada grew exponentially and became 
significant only after 1989, resulting from the relative opening of the borders that had occurred 
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since the fall of the communist regime and the failure of the transition to the capitalist market to 
improve economic conditions for the majority of the population. Thousands of Romanians were 
now leaving the country, in an outward movement that was growing higher and higher, and which 
peaked in 2002 with a number of 5,688 persons registered that year in Canada. During the first 
years of the 2000s, Romania became the top European country to send immigrants to Canada 
(Culic 2012). Nevertheless, the rates started to decrease by 2005 to 4,964. Coupled with Romania’s 
accession to the European Union, and relaxation of restrictive mobility in the European Union 
space, the figures of the following years up to the most recent one show a slow and steady decrease 
of Romanian immigration to Canada, from approximately 5,000 immigrants per year in early 2000 
to fewer than 2,000 persons in 2011 (Culic 2012). (See Table 1 in Appendix 2. Title: Number of 
Landed Immigrants per Country of Origin: Romania8) 
According to the 2006 Canadian Census, there is a population of 153,905 over 15 years 
that identify themselves as being Romanians or as having a Romanian ethnic background. Out of 
a Canadian total population of 31,612,897 in 2006, that makes the Romanian presence in Canada 
number around 0.48 per cent out of the current total population at that time (Statistics Canada 
2006). In addition, 54 per cent of Romanian migrants to Canada are legally married while only 31 
per cent are single. Thus, the majority of them come in as rather conventional families. As landed 
immigrants, they shared an employment rate similar to that of other immigrant ethnic groups in 
Canada, a rate which averaged in 2006 57.4 percentage as compared to the rate of Canadian born 
(64.5 per cent) (see Table 3a. Title: Labour Force Survey Estimate (LFS), Employment Rate by 
Immigrant Status9). 
                                                 
8 Table 1 in the Appendix shows the number of landed immigrants in Canada per various years who have Romania 
as a country of origin, data collected by Census Canada 2006 
9 Table 3a. in the Appendix shows Labour Force Survey Estimate (LFS), Employment Rate by Immigrant Status, 
data collected by Statistics Canada 2017. 
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When compared with the employment rate of native born Canadians, the number of 
Romanian landed immigrants in Canada is predictably lower, of course. Once integrated into 
Canadian society, becoming citizens and living for several years here, the 2006 Canada Census 
shows the ethnic Romanians in Canada sharing an employment rate of 68.7 per cent with males 
that identify as ethnic Romanians having a higher employment rate (73.2 per cent) than females 
with the same ethnic background (64.5 per cent) (see Table 4 in the Appendix: Census Canada 
2006 Survey, Employment rate by sex, and ethnic origin10). The statistical numbers are overall 
higher than the average employment rate of Canadians, and the higher numbers remain valid for 
both male and female rates (see Table 3b in the Appendix: Labour Force Survey Estimate (LFS), 
Employment rate by sex11).  
  The downside of the higher employment rate of ethnic Romanians is that we find them de-
skilled (i.e., we find that most Romanians are working in the field of sales and service which is 
overall in contrast with their higher education rates). A main feature of the Romanian migrants in 
Canada is their high level of education. However, those who are employed in highly qualified jobs 
are very few which suggests that most of the Romanian migrants work in lower and de-skilled jobs, 
a situation shared with other migrants as well (Tudoroiu: 2007).  Similarly, as it relates to their 
working field and specialization, we find the majority of immigrant Romanians working in 
manufacturing and retail trades, and less in the skilled jobs they were selected for in the immigration 
process. Furthermore, the same statistics data shows that Romanian migrants have a 13 per cent 
chance to be in the low income category in 2005 for working family members, and have a 31 per 
                                                 
10 Table 4 in the Appendix shows Employment Rate by Sex and Ethnic Origin, data collected by Census Canada 
2006. 
11 Table 3b in the Appendix shows Labour Force Survey Estimate (LFS), Employment Rate by Sex, data collected 
by Statistics Canada 2017. 
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cent chance to be in the low income bracket  in 2005 for persons who are not working family 
members, which means that one in every three Romanian immigrants in Canada living alone has a 
chance of being poor. The at-risk poverty rates of ethnic Romanians are higher than the average of 
the Canadian born residents with rates of 7.1 per cent for persons in working families, and 29.4 per 
cent for unattached individuals (Murphy, Zhang and Dion 2012). The fact that Canada through its 
“point system” immigration program selects highly skilled Romanians, for example, without 
valuing the said skills through high earnings, complicates the analysis further. However, suffice it 
to say that high skills and educated potential still render high profits. Since their skills are not valued 
enough through high wages, the profits resulting from their highly skilled work is even more 
retained by employers.  
 Ethnic Romanians in Canada specialize in the fields of architecture, engineering, and 
related technologies, with men outnumbering women in this specialization by 76 per cent (Census 
2006). Taking into consideration such traditionally gendered specializations, it is evident that the 
bulk of the above-mentioned specializations belong to men who outnumber the highly skilled 
Romanian women (Census 2006). It is also men who outnumber women in the fields of 
mathematics, computer and information sciences although the gap is smaller, 58 per cent to 42 per 
cent. Women outnumber men in the domains of business, management, and public administration 
(65 per cent). We can also find them outnumbering men in the fields of social and behavioral 
sciences, law (62 per cent), and physical and life sciences and technologies (56 per cent). All 
health, parks, recreation and fitness diplomas are more likely to be held by Romanian immigrant 
women than by men, with a ratio of 77 per cent to 23 per cent. Predictably, the field of humanities 
is also saturated with women, with 65 per cent of Romanian immigrants graduating with a diploma 
in this field being female. When examined for gender parity, statistics show that both average 
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employment income and median employment income is higher for Romanian men, a fact which 
may speak to Romania’s patriarchy that one cannot escape even in Canada. While average 
employment income is $39,013, ethnic Romanian men make on average 12 per cent more than 
women do (Census 2006).  
Regarding the educational characteristics of newcomers, the statistics show that 
immigrants to Canada are actually more educated than the Canadian born population. While 
persons born in Canada reach education levels of 28 per cent for university bachelor’s degrees, the 
rate of immigrant holders of university degrees is, according to Statistics Canada and the 2006 
Census, 58 per cent of male immigrants and 49 per cent of recent female immigrants (Galarneau, 
and Morissette 2006). 
The employment rate of Romanian landed immigrants in Canada is significantly lower than 
that of the Canadian born and, once integrated, living in the country for several years and acquiring 
the Canadian citizenship, ethnic Romanians are de-skilled in their specializations and education 
which speaks both about the challenges and barriers that they face in Canada and also to a rather 
dysfunctional system that awards higher points for education and experience before and during the 
migration process, but does not value them as such after the migration process is finalized. In this 
sense, although the migration of highly skilled professionals still is the aim of Canada’s migration 
programs, what statistics show is that they do not reach the employment opportunities and high-
level earnings to which they aspired and which would match their educational background. This 
creates frustration and anguish in them as well as the families they left behind. 12 As the statistics 
point out, Romanians experience a relatively high degree of de-skilling and underemployment. 
                                                 
12 Please note that, while my dissertation focuses on the formation of highly skilled Romanian migrants through 
women’s work, it is not within the scope of the present study to give a thorough investigation on the de-skilling and 
devaluing of all categories of migrants after arrival in their destination country.  
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De-skilling and under-employment are defined as processes through which an immigrant’s 
education, employment skills, and career specializations, work experience and foreign language 
abilities, which are obtained in their country of origin, are not recognized once the persons reach 
Canada, so that immigrants are forced to enter low-paid and low-skilled jobs (Sethi 2014; Tariqul 
Islam 2014; Guo 2012). As noted above, the process is at odds with Canada’s immigration system 
that actually values and encourages education and employment skills and awards them higher 
points prior to the immigration process, but that ceases to be valued as such after immigrants reach 
Canada. Their situation does align with the experiences of other groups of immigrants, and various 
scholarship resources have pointed out the historical structures of discrimination that determine 
the failure of immigrants’ career specializations and educational attainments to translate into 
comparable occupational status and financial compensation (Teelucksingh and Galabuzi 2005). In 
1999 the scholar Shahrzad Mojab wrote a case study about immigrant “knowledge workers”13 in 
Canada with extensive professional experience and careers in their origin countries who were not 
facing an easy transition to the labour market they were recruited for through immigration policies: 
the knowledge market14. She argues that, contrarily to the expectations set up in the immigration 
policies, highly trained immigrant women remained either unemployed or pressured into low 
skilled jobs that required “the use of their hands, not of their minds” (Mojab 1999: 123). Gillian 
Creese and Brandy Wiebe (2012) have pointed out as well the gap between the recruitment of 
highly skilled migrants and their weak economic rendering of their sought-after jobs. Interviews 
with well-educated men and women from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa find them all 
                                                 
13 The concept of “knowledge workers” refers to the highly skilled and multi-skilled labour force that Canada 
attracts worldwide through its immigration policies (Mojab 1999).  
14 The concept of “knowledge market” describes the transition from a production-based economy to an information 
and knowledge-based system which reflects also in the transformation of necessary labour: from physical and 
manual work to intellectual production of information and knowledge (Mojab 1999).  
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predominantly in “survival employment” jobs. Their findings point out to weak economic 
integration of highly skilled migrants, multiple barriers that result in de-skilling and the need for 
government policies and settlement services that enable a more equitable economic integration of 
migrants (Creese, Wiebe 2012). The migration experience places people in insecure, low-wage, 
precarious jobs usually reserved for the poorest and ill-educated citizens. It also deprives them of 
their social status as the survival employment jobs that they are getting require fewer skills, fewer 
credentials, and are rewarded less prestige, authority, and income (Creese, Wiebe 2012).  
Subject to economic discrimination, Romanian immigrants to Canada are faced with the 
inability to have their human capital adequately recognized and compensated. This translates into 
a source of disappointment and dissatisfaction both for them and their families back home who 
invested so much in their success abroad. Despite what determined their immigration process, 
namely the desire to improve their lives and be dignified and productive contributors to an 
advanced economy, Romanian immigrants find themselves many times in precarious employment, 
low wave sectors, low skills job. They feel undermined in their trainings and education and mainly 
a source for low skilled customer service, retail, and manual positions. Similar to the cases of other 
groups of immigrants, there is real difficulty in converting the human capital investment supported 
by resources of their families and origin countries into adequate occupationally rewarding social 
standing and financial compensation. The case of highly skilled Romanian immigrants in Canada 
is one that exemplifies the systemic blockages, barriers and weak economic using of their actual 
skills when reaching Canada. Having families and state resources in origin developing countries 
invested in the building and creation of skills and credentials that are not valued and rendered 
useful once reaching the country of arrival seems like a drain of resources and a loss of potential 
and human capital. Recruiting immigrants for qualifications that more likely will not be used in 
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Canada also creates a mismatch with their own expectations and that of their families and 
communities back home, as well as their own confidence and self-worth. The next chapter will 
further detail some of the families’ investments and expectation regarding their children’s 
migration, their sacrifices to see them qualified and adequately trained as “highly skilled 
migrants”, and their feelings towards the outcome of the process.  
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Section D: Social-Reproduction and the Making of a Highly Skilled Migrant for Canada  
Migration would not be happening to me!... only to others! 
 
As a migrant, I arrived in Canada through the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP), 
leaving behind my family. I was constantly aware of the range of anxieties and fears that I was 
experiencing while interviewing Romanian mothers in Romania whose children have become 
migrants to Canada. While the bigger goal consisted in documenting Romanian women’s work in 
creating highly skilled migrants for Canada, and the consequences it had for the families and states 
left behind, I recognize that, as the metaphor of brain made invisible, how my own migration 
journey was not just one of a subject with a detached brain that moves trans-continentally, but also 
and equally a body and mind that were previously nurtured, educated, fed, and cleaned 
predominantly by my mother’s work. My own biography reveals how unsustainable and unrealistic 
the dichotomies of migration are planned in terms of how deeply entrenched in gender divisions 
of labour they end up to be. Furthermore, migration policies such as Canada’s Federal Skilled 
Worker (FSWP) unnecessarily focus on attracting high skills, brains and talents (usually associated 
with male characteristics and male labour) while not equally considering how those skills were 
formed and nurtured, and indirectly ignoring and not similarly prioritizing the care work (usually 
associated with women). This reveals not only that minds do not operate outside bodies, but also 
that bodies and the social reproductive work that sustains them are invested in knowledge 
production and immigration processes as well. In this sense, Romanian women are not just 
assuring the social reproduction of their children, they are also invested in supporting Canada’s 
current immigration schemes, focused on the attraction of the highly skilled workers. However, 
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they are not just the repositories of nurture and care for the Canadian immigration workforce, but, 
as my interviews show, also knowledge generators and sharp critical thinkers themselves.  
In this sense, through my interviews I asked a series of simple questions meant to engage 
with the investments and effects of the children’s migration process for the families left behind: 
i.e., what do Romanian parents think about the reasons their children migrated, and what were 
some of the factors that triggered such a decision? What were their investments in the process of 
raising and educating them? What do they think of migration in general? Are they satisfied with 
the choice of their children to migrate abroad? What are the effects of migration for the parents 
left behind?  
 As somehow expected, the breakdown revealed that Romanian parents list the transition and 
economic motives as the main drivers of migration of their children. In particular, the motive to 
“look for work/find a job” was the reason that had the highest frequency in my interviews. Other 
motives such as “earn more money”, “better career prospects”, “better standard of living”, “study 
purposes”, “lack of seriousness and sufficient discipline in the home country” and the “long 
transition” are listed among the driving factors but seem to be less relevant. It is important to notice 
that none of my interviewees listed the possibility of moving abroad in order to “take a specific 
job offer” particularly, suggesting that migration happens in an area of career vagueness and 
uncertainty of future employment status and it is not as specific and concrete as the category of 
“skilled worker” might suggest. Furthermore, only one of the interviewed persons listed emotional, 
affective motives as one of the drivers of migration: i.e., migrate to “be close to someone (a 
relative, a family member)” suggesting that such movements occur less in wider family contexts, 
and are outside of networks of support. While they have friends already established in Canada, the 
migration decision seems to be taken individually, and in isolation of potential family support 
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networks. In this regard, the replies of my interviewees seemed to contradict the network effect on 
the mobility of Romanians to Canada which argues that an existing social network is always a 
critical factor in the location choice, settling down in a new country and finding new employment 
for immigrants. The interviewees described a rather vague, arbitrary, and lonely migration journey 
with no specific job offers in mind and outside of social networks of support in the receiving 
country.   
 However, not all mothers disclosed economic insecurity and precariousness as a factor of 
migration. Due to the negative stereotypes associated with poverty and challenging financial 
circumstances, such topics were many times difficult and socially embarrassing for my 
interviewees. Admitting that one’s child’s migration is based on precarious economic situation is 
difficult. Thus, some of my interviewees spoke more of a re-invention of the self or experiencing 
an alternative life-style rather than the fear and anxiety and insecurity that came with the changing 
conditions in Romania especially with the restructuring of the welfare state and employment 
system. This is not to say that there are not highly skilled migrants that experience it this way, but 
witnessing and sharing the same socio-economic context of transition Romania with my 
interviewees, as well as hearing other parts of their interviews regarding their economic needs and 
financial shortages, it led me to believe that such claims were sometimes a tactic and a cover up. 
Migration as a desire for an alternative life-style sometimes camouflages the inevitable stereotype 
of shame that the conditions of poverty and economic hardships carry for migrants.  
 For example, Rodica, sixty-eight, a retired farmer with one child who migrated to Canada, 
thought that her daughter “did not need to migrate”. Her daughter always complained about not 
having enough money, but her daughter and her family “had good lives in Romania too, working 
in the court and in the city hall”. It is interesting to see how vital and urgent for one’s subsistence 
 121 
and survival the process of migration to Canada is habitually perceived, in the sense that in this 
case the migration to Canada was not “needed” as we need water, food, and air to breathe. With 
pride in her voice, Rodica was basically telling me that, if her daughter had stayed in Romania, it 
would not have been problematic for her and her family. Not only would it not have been dramatic 
for her to stay, but she might have had fewer conditions of hard work than in Canada, and maybe 
even a more comfortable lifestyle: “if they stayed here, they would not have had to work so hard, 
they would have been both a gentleman and a lady”. While the description of gentleman and lady 
make suggestions of upper-middle class positions, they also describe the lack of achieving a 
desired status in the country of migration, and their downward career mobility, outcomes that 
problematize such departures.  
 For the mother Sorana, physician, fifty-five, migrating to Canada was not described as a 
desperate economic action as more a way of avoiding experiencing the hardships of transition, 
with a market economy privatized in the hands of “unscrupulous greedy persons” with no 
education.  In the mother’s words, “Here they have privatized everything, and now you see wealthy 
company managers for whom all literature is a mystery for example (allusion that they do not 
habitually read, hence not cultivated).” The mother here expresses the view that migration acts as 
a protective cautionary measure against a potential public humiliation and shame that might 
translate into a cancellation of one’s years and years of education and training. This neutralization 
of one’s education was clearly perceived by the migrants and their mothers.  For them, it was 
possible that life in Romania was not going to allow them career mobility and the chance to move 
up in class. In the current context, one graduates with a solid specialization and certain well-
defined skills only to be employed “at the hands of illiterate, and unscrupulous wealth generators” 
of the transition’s managers and business owners that are planning to not even value or make use 
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of such an education: 
I did not want my daughter with her university degree to be jobless here. Or worse, to be so 
educated and to end up driving Mercedes cars for employers who cannot get their own 
driving licence because they do not know how to read and write. There is nothing more 
dreadful than to go to a workplace that you dread, working for bosses who do not have 
education or an understanding of a person’s psychology, and who make themselves tobacco 
from banknotes and smoke them in front of their employees (Sorana, fifty-five, physician). 
 Sorana had a certain vision about her daughter and a certain uplifting life trajectory.  She did 
not want her to stay behind and serve employers who themselves had no writing or reading skills 
just because they are making it through the transition as wealth holders.  Clearly, this mother 
believed and said that working for those who do not understand people, and use banknotes to make 
their cigarettes, is telling of one’s disproportionate ability to use, value, and so devalue people’s 
work and gains depending on their personal desires. Smoking banknotes seems to be a determining 
factor in how this employer will, irresponsibly, both use the banknotes and gains out of the business 
and how he will be treating the employees (since the gains are not used for benefitting others, but 
rather for ostentatious individual consumption). The mother Sorana seems to be suggesting that 
smoking is a whimsical habit made possible only by disproportionate wealth imbalances generated 
by the transition to the capitalist market, together with the desire to publicly flaunt and legitimize 
such new gains. It is as if this mother is pointing to the fact that education in transition Romania 
does not translate into upward mobility and gains, but that it is rather the uneducated and 
unscrupulous new business owners that reap all the benefits and do not even make good and 
reasonable use of it, hence the smoking of banknotes. Sorana makes an allusion again to the 
transition and the newly rich business owners who are despised and have their leadership authority 
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contested because they do not seem to fit the class image that this mother has of the rich.  Moreover, 
this mother goes far enough to argue that these “uncultured and uneducated” rich are exhibiting 
ostentatious, new, consuming behaviour (i.e., “making themselves tobacco from banknotes”). 
Indeed, they are destroying the major element of what makes them possible: money and banknotes 
revealing that they are not even “good capitalists” as we know them in North America.   
 Leaving for Canada seems like the best precautionary recipe against finding oneself working 
under the auspices of such “undesirable” potential employers, the new agents of the transition. 
However, when asked why only one of her two children left for Canada instead of both of her 
children, her response seems to be in tension with the first response if not outright contradictory.  
She told me, that her younger child, her son, did not leave the home country as he has “his integrity 
and does not like to be looked at with superiority”.  Both mother and son seemed to be aware of 
the marginalization and hardships that immigrants face when starting that journey and they were 
not idealizing the conditions that awaited them at the end of the journey. Furthermore, it seems 
that, from what this mother was saying, her son recognized that migration might not necessarily 
protect him from social humiliation and community shame either (without finding oneself in the 
hands of similar unscrupulous and illiterate business owners in the country of destination as the 
ones in the country of departure), despite the fact that one takes this long physical and emotional 
migration journey as an attempt to escape it and to live a better life.      
 For Simona, sixty-two, a retired teacher whose two children migrated to North America (the 
boy to Canada, the daughter to United States), the departure was at first sight less connected with 
dramatic material shortages, elements of the transition in Romania.  Instead, Simona told me that 
their migration was more about their aspirations, a desire to move up economically and socially, a 
move that could not materialize geographically in parts other than North-America. Most likely this 
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looks like a process of self-reinvention and self-transformation that only radical cultural difference 
can trigger: “they wanted to see a world they had never had access to it if they had stayed here”.  
The migration departure for Simona’s children is explained as not connected to economic 
conditions or situations.  Rather for her, the migration was an attempt to create an entirely different 
world as well as an entirely different self that could not be actualized in the home country.  Simona 
seemed to be pointing to a desire to de-materialize the usual concrete economic factors of and for 
migration. She wanted rather to speak to this decision as if it were an individual aspiration that 
emerged amaterially and without any forces effecting the decision or the ability to leave. 
Nevertheless, Simona wanted and managed to tell a “success story.”  Both of her children’s dreams 
materialized in Canada: they were able to pragmatically and financially achieve their goals by 
buying a car and a house that they could not have otherwise afforded if they stayed in Romania.  
 Cook Vasilica’s (fifty-seven years old) three children migrated to Canada. According to 
Vasilica their decision was informed and shaped by the connections that they made in Canada and 
what they thought was possible there.  She said the following about one of her sons, “He got 
attached to a family over there and he felt he would succeed there better than here”. 
 At first, I was surprised and puzzled by what she meant with his attachment to a “Canadian 
family”. The interviewee explained to me what she actually meant. He found a wife and a soul 
mate, a Romanian-Canadian girl. The couple met at a church while the Romanian-Canadian girl 
was on vacation in Romania. Brought together by the same church-going practice and affinity for 
the same religion, the confession brought forward less an individualistic love story, and more a 
falling in love with the collective family of the girl, and an attachment that surpasses the focus on 
one particular person. In this sense “to get attached to an entire family” targets probably a common 
and larger aspirational Western/Canadian middle-class status that is shared among the family 
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members. One does not fall in love with another person anymore, but with the whole family of 
that person and, presumably, the entire family’s Western/Canadian culture, superior values and 
class.  
 Brick factory worker Anamaria, fifty-eight, mother of two children (of which one left for 
Canada) did not mention either as a push factor for migration economic hardships and precarious 
material conditions. She mentioned only that it was a journey whose success depends on the 
individual temperament that is passed down inter-generationally.  In her words, “all depends on 
the character of the migrating person, on the person’s resilience of character, on a person’s 
strength, and the capacity to fight and believe: I have always been a fighter, and so is my daughter”. 
  The migrating and leaving behind one’s home country is a psychological journey and a 
character-building story whose motives and reasons are not disclosed: a fighter for what, and why? 
Resilience to reach what exactly and again why? Anamaria seemed to want to map this journey 
and articulates it as an abstract fight with oneself, for overcoming weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
that otherwise would make one a victim if he or she stayed at home. Similarly, interesting is how 
much tension and conflict-ridden such journeys are; Anamaria insisted it was a fight for which a 
lot of tenacity and patience is required. And from Anamaria’s story we never come to know the 
adversarial objects or subjects in this fight, whether they were in Romania or Canada, or internal 
to one’s self.  
 Throughout the interview, I also found out that it was actually Maria, her daughter, and Liviu, 
her son-in-law, who had changed her initial views on migration and that now she “accepts” and 
understands migration as the process through which people come to learn and understand the world 
more fully.  She told me, “through immigration people know the world, accumulate knowledge 
they learned more than if they stayed in their home countries”.  
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 Of course, what is said is also equally relevant for what is not said. The fact that one learned 
to “accept” and “tolerate” migration is a manifestation of a burdening process that one cannot cope 
with naturally, but only through effort and even at times with persuasive arguments to one’s self, 
others or even the researcher about this act of migration and its effects. Most of the interviews 
confirmed my initial assumption that Romanian parents are not always satisfied with the decision 
of their children to migrate. In Romania, the general sense of disillusionment is connected less 
with the decision of migration and more with the lack of economic opportunities and general social 
insecurity which determines it. Despite the stories being full of tension and contradiction, many of 
the women wanted to reiterate also that migration decisions are influenced by the circumstances 
in Romania. A lack of opportunities at home, particularly fulfilling employment possibilities, are 
major factors in such a decision: “I don’t like it […] It’s actually painful to see that kids now finish 
degrees and can’t survive (especially when they’re in the education and pedagogical field); they 
can’t find a job” (Adina, fifty-five, teacher).  
 Most of the mothers spoke of the stakes in this decision to migrate.  For them, the greatest 
frustration is their children’s not finding a job in their countries of origin after graduating with 
degrees that are considered essential and in continuous demand in the labour market, such as the 
education field.  
 Faced with these challenges, Romanian parents console themselves in different ways.  They 
speak of how their suffering and longing for their children is more bearable than witnessing the 
suffering and pain of their children who chose to stay in Romania without being able to make a 
living and move up in positions that could enhance their well-being. Listen to what Gabriela, a 
sixty-seven-year-old, retired nurse had to say about this tension:  
       I don’t like migration but to see my children suffer, jobless and in pain  
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       here, it’s better for them to leave, and for us to keep missing them here.  
 It seems that this kind of emotional labour is supposed to be carried out by parents and more 
concretely by mothers. If transition Romania demands the sacrifice of one’s professional future 
and well-being, the migration process demands that the parents sacrifice their own happiness and 
even feel the pain of not having the family members around, in an equation that does not have 
winners, only shared losses. Furthermore, the departure through migration is never anticipated as 
such, and while parents are prepared for temporary absences, they are not ready for departure of 
their children for good. This is not perceived as the most obvious and linear development of one’s 
family future and disrupts one family’s sense of unity and cohesion. It contradicts the popular 
understandings of family and future, bringing on the anomalous and the chaotic into one’s 
fundamentals of existence, or as Gabriela says it:  
I had three children and I thought that when they grow up I will have such a large family, 
and now they are all gone. The first child left in 1998, and another one in 2001. The second 
one came to me and asked for permission to leave: will you let me go? And I responded to 
him that if he thought it would be better in Canada, then he should go. 
 The children’s departure through immigration brings to the fore tensions and even implicit 
assumptions and expectations of the reasons people have about their role, present and future, in 
the household. While this woman thought that her three children were going to have their own 
children thereby making possible a “big family”, all of them migrated to Canada leaving her behind 
and without the possibility of having them in proximity for support. The son asked her for 
permission to leave to Canada setting up this dichotomy of future well-being between Canada and 
Romania. Of the two, Canada is invested with future well-being, thus the departure. 
 The decision to migrate is not always passively accepted by Romanian parents. In several 
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instances, the Romanian mothers complained that having invested so much of their time, 
dedication and focus into raising their children, they were left with no returns or benefits for their 
life’s worth and investments. Gabriela, sixty-two, retired teacher, does not hesitate in describing 
her children’s education and career accomplishments as in fact her own:  
I struggled so much to see my boy and my daughter educated, and they both ended up going 
to the medical university and the technical university. It was very hard, but I didn’t give up. 
 In highlighting that there was a lot of work in making sure that her children went to the 
University, Gabriella points to how the children’s education and career specialization do not only 
belong to them, but also to their parents whose efforts and hard work made it possible. 
Nevertheless, migration is also a great re-configuration of relations and international power 
dynamics. The same parents attach new significance to their contributions as well as demand some 
sort of active compensation and retribution for their work, in the name of reciprocity. Or as 
Gabriela sums it up: “Now that I am old I have the expectation to receive something back: you 
cannot give and give to your kids without expecting anything in return”. 
 Florica, the nurse with one child in Canada, echoes exactly Gabriela’s thoughts. For her it 
was terribly expensive to support her children through university as it must have been for many 
other families in the country. Even though the children went to public universities and the 
education was free-of-charge (private universities appeared in the 2000s and were not particularly 
in demand, nor popular), both the costs and work associated with their being able to complete their 
university studies were high. However, the problem was not the efforts and the financial 
investments in the education process, but the fact that there was no recognition and compensation 
for such contributions. “Honestly speaking, I don’t see migration as a positive process; I think 
people should remain in the country and all our values should not leave the country. They should 
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stay and work in the countries that train them and form them as people”. 
 Similarly, Anca, sixty-two-year-old, retired teacher whose two children migrated to Canada 
informed me of her hard work and suffering in order to secure an education for her children.  She 
told me that “only my back knows the hard work I put to get my children to university”. However, 
in her turn she was also re-considering the value of her “investments,” and the possibility of 
looking at them as wasteful and absurd, as she asked herself rhetorically: “So much work, for 
what? Only not to have my children right beside me? To notice these empty streets in the city? Not 
to sleep at night and wake up at 4 a.m. and just look outside the window as if they were even 
coming back?” 
 The biggest contrast was between her determination and investment of effort to see her 
children succeed that many times left her back in pain and their heartbreaking absence. The 
emotional vacuum left by their departure was also represented in her describing her city as one of 
“empty streets”.   
 Similarly, interesting is how migration phenomenon is described in all its inherent 
contradictions, sometimes as both a negative and positive phenomenon. For Florica, fifty-seven, 
retired nurse with one child out of two in Canada, migration was “a positive phenomenon, people 
experience countries where there is more work discipline, and work seriousness, but the problem 
is that they never come back.” In principle, the migration process had advantages and benefits. 
Living in a different environment and working in settings of higher ethics and discipline, my 
interviews recounted in theory, brings forth positive and negative aspects.  However, when it 
actually happened, such a process lost the potential benefits and Florica got literarily sick and upset 
after Iuliana, her daughter, left Romania: “This distance towards your child…arghhh, it is very 
bad, unhealthy, and very hard to handle. I thought I raised a good obedient child and then she took 
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this decision to leave”. 
 The issue of her daughter’s departure was seen as a parental responsibility, and more so, as 
a failure of a good parental pedagogy. Moreover, it rather contradicted the mother’s self-image as 
a good educator. Migration as a phenomenon of positive aspects seemed to lose its luster as the 
consequences for the family left behind are many ranging from emotional burden to loneliness. 
Hearing the parents speak of their anxiety and loneliness as well as the self-criticisms and self-
reproaches of not being good educators and parents revealed to me the violence and trauma that 
comes with migration. Furthermore, Romanian parents’ proclivity to assume the children’s 
migration as their own fault did not match the rest of their interview statements, which point to the 
poverty and economic shortages of Romania’s transition as clear triggers of outward migration. 
The fact that many Romanian parents tended to blame themselves for the migration of their 
children and the prevalence of parental guilt speaks of the internalization of negative external 
situations, outside one’s control of them. It also speaks of the neoliberal transition that generate 
both such unfavourable situations as well as their subsequent internalization. Namely, the mothers 
seemed well aware of the neoliberal forces in work and education.                                                           
 While neoliberalism incorporates a motivation for individual achievement and encourages 
people to seek fulfilling jobs for themselves, in my interviews I found out that the role of parents 
is significant in this process. They take a lead in their children’s career quest and journey, 
sometimes finding out that children are working in professions and specializations chosen 
explicitly by their parents. The range of occupations with its fulfilling or soul-destroying part is 
again assumed by the parents, together with any retroactive corrective measures. Lucia, a sixty-
eight-year, retired statistician, with two daughters abroad (one in Canada and the other one in 
Germany) expressed the reassessment that she has made about the migration circumstances.  She 
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told me that, if she were a parent again, she would follow very different steps to make sure that 
her children did not migrate.  Clearly, she has rethought and reflected extensively on her new 
family circumstance recognizing also that she may never have a chance to parent her children 
differently.  In a wistful manner she told me: 
If only I were their parent again…If I were parent again, I would encourage them more and 
help them choose a better career which would lead to a healthier road (I would invest more 
money in them, more tutoring, etc.); I would encourage them to be more practical technical 
girls, and I would help them find a job that doesn’t require them to leave this country, like 
bankers, for example.  
Overly dedicated and invested in their children’s future, Romanian mothers seem to put a lot 
of zeal and devotion into educating their children, in an equation where children seem sometimes 
less free to choose their career and professional paths, and the determination to succeed in life is 
more connected to their parents’ ambitions. However, if they fail to set their children on a 
successful career path, and do not manage to significantly improve their children’s life conditions, 
they internalize such “failure” as their own. Leaving for Canada, for instance, comes to be 
interpreted by some parents as a punishment for their over-involvement in their children’s lives 
and their protectionism. They believe that restricting the decision-making space and freedom of 
their children was one factor in the responses they receive from their children: “Whenever I call 
them, my daughters think I check on them, and tell me to leave them in peace. Maybe Adina left 
for Canada to escape all this and be more independent from me; even today I still want to know 
what they do and where they go, and on what pavements they walk on, etc. “(Adina, fifty-five, 
teacher). 
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Of course, Romanian mothers want to keep connection with their own children, and that 
translates in maintaining both emotional and spatial bondings. Nevertheless, the family separations 
and ruptures are real, with few consolations and compensative mechanisms. When carrying out 
the interviews I felt the powerful affects that the mothers were expressing.  It seemed that even 
those mothers whose children succeeded in “making it” in the North felt that nothing could mend 
the ‘lost’ community. While there is opportunity to talk on the phone or occasionally visit, these 
acts are not substantial and sufficiently meaningful alternatives to the feelings of isolation and 
abandonment. Or as Mariana articulates it: “instead of talking in person, now we just hear each 
other’s voices when we talk on the phone, and on the internet, Skype, but this way we just miss 
each other more”.   
Camelia, the teacher with the only child in Canada, expresses the same feelings: “As a 
parent you remain with the thought of your child and nothing of what you live and experience from 
that moment after can replace the absence and missing of your own child”. The same Romanian 
mother talked about always externalizing and distancing herself from the idea of migration until 
her daughter finally left for Canada: “I have never imagined that migration would be happening to 
me! I thought it would only happen to others!” Such externalizations and attitudes describe the 
idea of migration as a rather traumatic, tragic, painful event that happens abruptly and 
unexpectedly and that is more closely connected with the occurrence of natural disasters and other 
climatic catastrophes than with a casual surprise about finding that her daughter is leaving. 
However, she notes that the only thing limiting the drama of her daughter’s departure consists in 
assuming the parental duty and responsibility to provide the children with the freedom and 
generosity to leave if this is something they want to do: “I can’t be that selfish to keep my children 
close to me if they don’t want it” (Camelia, fifty-eight, high-school teacher). Nevertheless, the 
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presumed selfishness is assumed to exist only in one way, on the part of the parents, but it is not 
critiqued as an equal, reciprocal situation that should also characterize children who leave. In this 
case, the only paternal critique restricts itself to their children’s idealism, and presumably age 
difference: “The migrated kid really liked literature. She was a bit idealist, and naïve, young, and 
unaware of the actual reality.” 
Similarly, another mother expressed her frustration with her child’s decision to migrate. 
She found the idea of migration as unfair and unjust to the internal Romanian labour market which 
struggled with significant and continuous loss of skills and talents after years of continuous 
investment in education: “I don’t see migration as a positive process: children should stay here; 
the valuable people should stay and work here where they received their education” (Gabriela, 
fifty-seven, teacher). The decision to migrate after receiving a higher education in one’s home 
country was considered nothing less than an “abnormality”, a deviance and a “pathology” in the 
course of one’s life development. "It is abnormal for educated individuals not to stay here; 
although, if conditions aren’t good here, the impulse to leave is understandable” (Gabriela, fifty-
seven, teacher). 
In the same sense, another interviewee opines that migration cannot be but a negative 
process since it reflects the poor living and economic conditions of the country one is departing 
from: “When the material conditions are good and you have a good life, you don’t migrate [….] 
you go on vacations, on boat cruises” (Corina, fifty-eight, nurse). People having a decent material 
well-being only travel abroad and experience the foreign world temporarily, during vacations: it is 
the poor people and in precarious economic positions that migrate and end up living uprooted lives. 
At the same time, she notes that: “Patriotism is something beautiful and very necessary…one 
shouldn’t be put in the position to depart oneself from your roots” (Corina, fifty-eight, nurse). 
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When asked what determined the current precarious material conditions that triggered 
people to leave the country, it was suggested by several interviewees that the determining factor 
was actually an “insufficiency of capitalism.” The fact that so much of the social reproduction of 
migrants is done at the mothers’ expense is considered a regrettable outcome of transition and, 
ultimately, a deficiency of capitalism. A fully implemented capitalist system it would never let this 
happen, pointing to the positive views that some of my interviewees held of capitalism. Along with 
other respondents, Corina believed that Romania was still in transition, fictitiously capitalist, 
capitalist on paper, but not for real, a country that underwent reforms and changes only half-
heartedly.  The characterization was made in sheer contrast to other developed Western nations 
where “capitalism is fully implemented and old, and where capitalism fully manifests itself as 
capitalism.” The issue of the authenticity and truthfulness of free market capitalism that was 
implemented in Romania came up very often in my respondents’ testimonies: the problem never 
lies in the actual capitalist system, but in its application or in the insufficiency of sincerity and 
truthfulness in those implementing it. Unsurprisingly, there was hope or belief that the future of 
Romania lay in the success of capitalism that would trump over poverty and other material 
restraints. They have a vision that is not consistent with the reality of capitalism for the majority 
of population in most countries.  
Nevertheless, in another context my respondents challenged the idea that their children left 
the country out of neediness and material restraints: “I don’t know what to say about migration. 
My kids didn’t need migration: they did well in Romania, they had good respectable jobs here, 
working for the court of justice. I’m not sure why they went abroad. They wanted to go and they 
went. Maybe they thought that Canada was a rich luxurious place, full of privileged people leading 
good lives full of leisure (“o tara unde umbla caini cu colaci in coada”- in Romanian). They were 
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of good standing here, and now there they have to work so much. My daughter Ica was working 
in the court of justice and now cooks for a catering company” (Rodica, sixty-eight, farmer).  
Rodica wondered about the reasons for her kids to migrate.  Not only did they have good 
jobs in the city hall and the court of justice, but they were also of “good standing” in society. 
Rodica highlighted that her daughter moved from her good job in Romania to turn into a cook in 
Canada working for a catering company.  Contrasting the jobs, Rodica seemed to not understand 
her daughter’s decision to migrate, as if she was saying her situation was not any better in Canada. 
How come she went? Rodica further pointed to the unjustifiable expectations that their children 
who were migrating to Canada had, expectations that did not become a reality. Rather these highly 
skilled workers were now settling for situations that looked like de-skilling and downward career 
mobility. The case is not unique, nor an isolated one: the example belongs to a massive pattern of 
migrants to Canada experiencing de-skilling. In this sense, the literature shows how only five to 
ten percent of university-educated Romanian immigrants (mostly computer programmers or 
engineers specialized in computer-related fields) find a job in accordance with their qualifications 
(Tudoroiu 2007). The same scholar believes that actually the great majority of university-educated 
Romanian immigrants became low skilled workers or shop assistants. According to Tudoroiu 
(2007: 212), a Romanian engineer and landed immigrant in Canada was hired as a low skilled 
industrial worker in the field in which he had earned a university degree. Sometimes if one is 
fortunate, he is promoted and becomes a technician but the chances of him working as a fully 
specialized engineer are actually low. The fact is that in Montreal many Romanian engineers were 
de-skilled to the level of concierge in Canada.  Concierge is a building administrator, janitor and 
plumber whose wage is lower than that of a low skilled industrial worker (Tudoroiu 2007: 212). 
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Another respondent mentioned that when her children decided to migrate to Canada she 
felt bitter, angry and in a poor emotional state. “My life changed after my children’s migration. It 
left my husband and me sadder and angrier. I, for one, could never abandon my country and my 
people. I could never separate myself from the country mostly because I love my parents too much” 
(Liliana, fifty-six, engineer).  
 Leaving one’s country behind was seen in this case as the ultimate betrayal of the parents’ 
love. Conversely, staying in the country was matched with specific family responsibilities and 
obligations, understood as loving one’s parents. In this sense, the interviewee alluded also to the 
disappearance of the values for new generations while being replaced by different stories of family 
relationships, parallel to the new capitalist conditions.   
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Section E: “What will happen to this country?” 
 
Affective expressions of anger and resentment are found throughout the testimonies of 
multiple respondents. The focus on intergenerational changes and the social reproductive work 
that women do for young people who migrate and leave their families and communities behind 
was also understood to have serious implications for Romania as a country: “What will happen to 
this country?” Ana’s expression captures the anxiety and fear for the country itself. Romania’s loss 
of all of its most highly skilled people who acquired their skills at the country’s expense is leading 
to the change and even the “loss” of the country itself: “I don’t see migration as a positive process 
at all.  Not for this country, for this people and its future. What is this? To educate engineers, 
physicians, etc. only to have them leave the country? What will happen to this country? Only the 
old and uneducated ones will stay behind, the ones without specialization: all the good and 
prepared ones leave (I don’t want to offend the ones who stay here)” (Ana, fifty-eight, statistician). 
The questions here were addressed rhetorically, although they also underlined general anguish 
over possible political and economic consequences for the country as a whole: “What will happen 
to this country?” 
Another respondent focused on how angry she was in relation to her children’s departure: 
“We were mad’. Why? “Democracy wasn’t correctly understood and properly applied. It was 
misinterpreted” (Mariana, sixty-two-year-old, nurse). As mentioned before, in my interviews I 
heard a lot of explanations for children’s departure, speaking to how “democracy”, “capitalism”, 
or “freedom” were misunderstood and mis-interpreted. The assumption is that there is nothing 
wrong with the processes themselves but rather with the attempts to apply them adequately and 
put them in practice.  
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Other respondents spoke to how they considered leaving the country to go abroad for a 
short time.  They wanted to seek better career opportunities and professional contacts.  They did 
not want to leave Romania for good though: “When you’re younger, if you have the possibility to 
work and make some money in the West, it’s great. You should not remain there for good though. 
I don’t agree with forgetting where you’ve come from, or forgetting your native language. It’s 
okay if you can go there to learn a new language, a new specialization; if you can accomplish 
yourself as a personality; as a human, but to ultimately return (after 10-20 years) back home and 
to keep the connection with your home country, as well as to fly here frequently for visits because 
no one will respect you there as you’re respected here, in your home country” (Sorana, fifty-five, 
physician). 
            The issue of respect came up often during my interviews, both in the origin and the host 
country of migration. While some parents described the humiliation of not finding good jobs and 
career prospects in Romania, others noted the lack of appreciation and respect that one got as a 
migrant, and the lack of opportunities in the host country of migration: “Wherever you go, one 
remains a migrant, and you’re treated with contempt, till the end of your days. Doroftei (Olympic 
athlete in boxing), for example, lived in Canada for many years, but only here, in the home country, 
in Romania is he welcomed and appreciated as a god”.  A reflection of the same lack of respect 
and recognition came in the following account about the situation of Romanian immigrant 
engineers in Canada. “Our engineers are well prepared, but not sufficiently appreciated there. Our 
engineers, teachers and physicians are much more qualified than all the local ones, but at 
interviews the immigrants are not put through a serious screening process, and they are asked 
inconsequential, soft-ball or rhetorical questions, such as: “Isn’t it true that the earth moves around 
the sun?” (Sorana, fifty-five, physician). It seemed also that this lack of appreciation points to the 
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devaluation of the Romanians in Canada. Romanians, who were highly educated, were being asked 
simple questions to confirm their migration status rather than whether they have a wealth of 
knowledge and expertise. While the mothers of the Romanian migrants in Canada spoke of a lack 
of respect and appreciation, one could wonder what these parents were trying to nuance and point 
to when they were speaking about this lack. Also, what kind of critique of both transition and 
neoliberal development they are making when they are doing so?  
           Speaking up about the lack of both respect and appreciation is an expression of the isolation 
and marginalization of the Romanian immigrants in Canada and in the labour market. The freedom 
to migrate and experience another setting is not a freedom from experiencing the hardships of the 
labour market, or of not receiving appropriate rewards after the years of education that the 
Romanian parents were so invested in. While transition Romania ‘failed’ highly skilled university 
youth, and pushed them to leave the country, the transition of migration to Canada similarly 
pressured them for the same struggles of fighting for material and economic dignity, in a process 
that mirrored the conditions of the home country left behind. The interviewees’ reflection that 
Romanian migrants are not respected, or appreciated in Canada might suggest the hypothesis that 
they are still on a long road to economic dignity and material security, despite their transition and 
departure from transition Romania with that explicit goal in mind.  
            When talking about integrating into a new country, and adapting to a new environment, 
most of my respondents said that their children were not well integrated, and that their environment 
consisted of other Romanians and their families. “The circles they run in are still predominantly 
composed of Romanians, or of Canadians married to Romanians” (Geanina, sixty-four, retired 
teacher). While it is great to hear about the Romanian circles that the immigrants share when 
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reaching Canada, my interviewee was also aware of the struggle to fit into the sea of diversity that 
the host country is celebrated for as well as to be accepted outside one’s ethnic circles.  
                The Romanian mothers acutely noticed the discrepancy between the initial dreams of 
migration of their children and actual daily life in Canada. “My daughter told me she would create 
a different story and a different future for her and her family, but what kind of future is she living 
now? She finished with Law Degree here and she has now a small catering business in Kitchener 
while Romania does not have good lawyers to defend it against so many injustices” (Rodica, sixty-
eight). 
               What is striking is the feeling of regret reflected in the accounts provided by my 
respondents. These parents felt powerless about their inability to help and be supportive of their 
children living abroad. What is even more striking is the fact that they perceived their grown-up 
children as still in need of their support without considering their own life-world including their 
own increasing vulnerability and powerlessness: “We cannot help them at all when they are 
abroad, not even with a piece of advice: the customs and rules that we have here are not the same 
ones they have there” (Geanina, sixty-four, retired teacher). The fact that the Romanian parents 
considered that their advice that ought to have some universal value and use, in virtue of their age 
and experience, could not be applied to Canada, spoke thousands of how different and alienating 
they think of their children’s host country and how their children’s residence and stay did not make 
it a bit more familiar and humanized place. Furthermore, it is also important to notice that Canada 
was exoticized and portrayed as a completely different location, functioning and governed by a 
different set of rules. From my interview accounts, Canada was constructed as a space of alterity 
and the descriptive epithet “different” comes up very often. For example, “Canada is very different. 
Canadians are more oriented towards their homes, towards quiet and private places, they aren’t 
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into parties and partying, etc” (Mihaela, fifty-five, architect). However, the difference between 
Canada and Romania was always played out in order to relate to a social reality with which 
immigrants have few elements of connection and identification. The difference was many times 
constructed as a positive one (i.e., “Canada is very clean: you can drink water safely from the 
rivers over there”; “Canada is very correct: you don’t have to count the change you get from your 
grocery store as it is always correct, etc.”) although sometimes it was also constructed as a negative 
incongruity (i.e., “people are not so open, more private”; “people are not so welcoming to 
immigrants and they perceive them as competition”). Nevertheless, the fact that Canada appeared 
to be constructed as an either a positive or negative different space ultimately spoke of the need of 
boundary-making as well as the lack of identification and commonality with the host country of 
migration, leaving us in the end with the proof of the solitary experience of the migrant created by 
one’s overly articulated and claimed “difference.” 
              When asked about what leads to outward migration, another interview respondent thinks 
that it is clearly financial and economic hardships that determine it. However, my interviewee 
notices a positive side to the process of migration, suggesting that it also reflects well on Romania. 
It does so by arguing that migration is also a result of the great education that Romania provides 
its youth with and which equips future migrants with the necessary skills and knowledge to qualify 
for the point-system selection process of migration to Canada. “In Canada, they use skills and 
knowledge acquired here which says a lot about what a good school we have here; what good 
education we provide. For example, I know from reliable sources that the man responsible for the 
Olympic contests in Mathematics in Canada is a Romanian” (Simona sixty-two, retired high-
school teacher). The social reproductive work of Romanian mothers together with the Romanian 
education system which, combined, help young Romanians acquire the skills they need in order to 
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live abroad (i.e., the wanted professional occupations, foreign languages, etc.) is a sign of pride 
for Simona. Nevertheless, the good educational system and great amounts of women’s social 
reproductive work do not necessarily improve the precarious economic conditions of the country. 
Thus, the overall economic hardships are still seen as the main cause of migration and push people 
to leave the country.  
Another interviewee elaborated on the poor education system in Romania and considers 
that higher-education was actually better in Canada. For example, universities in Canada draw 
people from all over the world to their campuses, especially through fellowships. The education 
system was seen as superior, and is idealized as different and more practical; thus, a source of 
attraction for future immigrants.   
“In my opinion, migration is a so-so phenomenon. What is great is that foreign universities 
through fellowships offer Romanian students the possibility to go and study abroad. Of course, 
after they’re exposed to a different learning environment, to a different education system (more 
practical, more anchored into the daily realities) some of them decide to leave their home countries 
altogether and immigrate. This way, many intelligent and valuable students leave for the countries 
where they are appreciated and paid accordingly while here we are left to be governed by rich 
mediocre and under-mediocre people” (Lavinia, fifty-seven, high-school teacher). 
             Through interviews, my respondents become more conscious not just about presenting 
their children’s migration to Canada, but also the situation in Romania, in ways and manners that 
they were never aware before. One description completely mirrors the other one. For example, my 
respondents have conflicting views about the education system in Romania: while some consider 
it as underfunded and impractical, others consider it of very good quality and proficient. The pride 
in the local higher education system is in some of these cases connected to a form of patriotism 
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and loyalty: “I have accepted the fact that the youth should get to know the world outside their 
country. They should know the world, and they should accumulate more knowledge (more than 
they would have if they stayed locally), but in the end, I want them to return to their country of 
origin, to their parents, families, etc. …. I’m patriotic” (Alina, fifty-six, retail salesperson).  
               On the same note, another interviewee pointed out to how difficult it was for her to 
separate all of a sudden from her children especially after investing so much effort in helping them 
obtain a university education. Her narrative reached a painful peak when she related her story: “It 
was very difficult not to see them, talk to them, do things together. For me this separation was 
terrible. It was like a death” (Simona, fifty-seven, nurse). In order to prevent such separations, she 
confessed resorting to childlike tricks, almost switching parental roles: “I knew they were applying 
for immigration, and when the envelope containing the results arrived in the mail, I hid it from 
them” (Simona, fifty-seven, nurse). 
                   Other interviewed persons had a more relaxed opinion regarding migration. “Things 
aren’t black and white with migration: they’re in the middle. Seeing other countries is great, but 
it’s difficult to adapt to a totally different civilization, different working environment, different 
culture, different way of living, so different that you can’t imagine how it is until you’re there. For 
my children, it was hard in Canada till they entered some circles, till they met other Romanians. 
Contrary to popular opinion, Romanians are helping each other over there” (Gabriela, sixty-two, 
retired teacher). 
                  The issue of trust/distrust between different Romanian immigrants in Canada came up 
many times in my interviews. The most common cultural stereotype was that Romanians distrust 
each other, and that they were prone to causing harm to one another rather than supporting and 
helping each other out in times of crisis. However, from the accounts of my interviewees, the 
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conflictive, tense issue was rather dismissed, and my respondents pointed to the support that 
Romanians provide to each other abroad. This support was expressed either directly or indirectly, 
as in “they were waited for the airport by other Romanians” or “they always have a Romanian 
neighbour around to help them out.” 
                  Sometimes my respondents wrapped up critical remarks about migration with 
apparently positive lines.  “Migration is a great process for those who can manage. My children 
didn’t manage so well in Canada, but I know kids from other families who succeeded 
professionally in Canada. I’m not ashamed to say that I’m helping them out from Romania and 
send them money: last year I sent them $1,300 and this year $450 so far” (Vasilica, fifty-seven, 
kindergarten cook). It was implied that migration to Canada should be about fulfilling one’s 
potential, skills and abilities. If they were unsuccessful, individuals were blamed for their own 
failure and the guilt is personalized, as in the case of my above respondent. What was apparent is 
that success stories of migration were externalized and celebrated as great examples of the 
Canadian point system migration process. Close scrutiny or critique was never paid to such 
systems in case of failure.  
                While the successful stories of migration are easily popularized and spread in the 
countries of origin of migrants, less is known in the home communities about the struggles and the 
challenges immigrants are facing in Canada. The fact that families in transition developing 
countries send them financial help despite their newly achieved position in an advanced developed 
country like Canada is a sign of these struggles. They all point to the lower levels of income of 
immigrants, weak economic integration and de-skilling despite having the credentials, experience 
and language abilities to succeed. 
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               In terms of how the migration of their children impacted them, I found Romanian parents 
confessing to being angrier, and lonelier, but also more in touch with technology and the digital 
devices. For example, parents spent a lot of time now on the Internet or on the phone, they learned 
how to type and use computers, learn English or even travel more abroad. Nevertheless, even when 
they affirmed that their children were professionally successful in Canada, they still considered 
that migration did not bring them any substantial joy, and that the children were too far from them 
to really be happy and celebrate their successes. A long-distance career success together with the 
hours spent on the phone and Internet did not make up for the proximity of the children’s physical 
presence. Furthermore, they also considered that it was always the valuable and intelligent people 
who left Romania whereas the country and its people remained to be run by mediocre, and 
moreover the “rich mediocre others” (Florica, fifty-seven, nurse). 
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Section F: “They Won’t Recognize Their Country Anymore If They Return” 
 
               When asked about their children’s intentions of returning to the home country, parents 
were rather skeptical about it, and in most of the cases they saw the migration of their children as 
permanent. They also seemed to guess that the longer their stay in Canada, the harder it would be 
for them to return. “They’re in Canada for ten years now: they bought a house over there; their 
children go to school in Canada. They became detached from their friends in Romania. To what 
to return over here? They won’t recognize this country anymore if they return here” (Mariana, 
fifty-eight, physician). While not fully integrated in Canada, the return to Romania as a solution 
also seemed complicated since the initial community ties and social connections in the home 
country had diminished throughout the years of migration and struggling for economic 
emancipation and acceptance elsewhere. The distance in time and cultural changes seemed so big 
that the interviewee wondered if there was anything they might recognize as Romanian and 
familiar if they did come back. Always changing, always fluid, impossible to be loyal and not 
betraying oneself culturally, the migration movement seems impossible to grasp: caught in the 
middle of not being accepted in the host country as well as losing irreversibly the roots and nuances 
of being Romanian yourself while doing so. This speaks relevantly of the indirect circulation and 
movement of social reproduction work as well.  
                While it is difficult and takes a lot of time to integrate in the countries of arrival, 
immigrants also become disconnected and separated from the development of their own origin 
countries. Their sense of belonging was challenged as they could not fully trust and identify with 
their new home and they lost their sense of place and community connections with the country of 
origin, inhabiting an “in-between” zone.  
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              Occasionally I did find testimonies of intentions to come back if not directly to Romania, 
then to wider Western Europe. Such intentions were connected less with individual desires, and 
were more triggered by wider family needs, such as raising and educating their own children in 
Romania. Nevertheless, such return stories were told rather easily without probably delving further 
how a possible story of return might be as challenging as the story of leaving for Canada and 
becoming Canadian. “Sorana and Mihai want to have a child, and they want Romanian education 
for him/ her. They don’t like the Canadian system of education: Canada does not have culture very 
much and it is not very safe to raise your children over there!” (Liliana, 57, architect). 
         The fact that the migration of Romanians is more permanent rather than fluid is also proven 
when considering the issue of remittances. From my ethnographic interviews and from their 
mothers’ perspectives, Romanian migrants to Canada do not seem to be wanting to return to 
Romania, despite the struggles for survival, de-skilling and acceptance in a new place. When 
analyzing remittances, the scholarship shows that it is rather migrants who plan short-term stays 
that send high proportions of remittances back home whereas the ones who intend to move 
permanently, they invest much less in their home countries (Mara 2012). In this sense, my 
interviewed parents do not mention substantial or regular remittances from their children other 
than the occasional gifts, another hint to suggest at their rather long term stay in Canada.  
              With the socio-economic conditions in transition Romania that triggered the migration to 
Canada post 1989, rather than bringing growth and development, democracy and liberalism so 
much hoped for, Romania’s post-communist transition to capitalism led actually to mass 
unemployment and massive outward migration. In this sense, I tried to show how migration to 
Canada was an overwhelmingly highly skilled movement initiated by publicly budgeted university 
graduates who were looking for better career opportunities than the low-skilled and unskilled 
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alternatives offered by the Western European labour market. The same movement was also 
triggered by Canada’s changing immigration selection process and switch to a neoliberal phase of 
economy, with a more intense focus on knowledge-based economies after cutting the welfare 
support to create them, thus the need “to import” university-educated migrants under the category 
of the Federal Skilled Worker (FSWP). The Canadian government’s migration policies, focused 
as they are on brain-absorption worldwide, indirectly assume a hierarchical gender division of 
minds and bodies where labour associated with male characteristics (highly rational and technical 
skills) are more prioritized and desired than the social reproductive labour of the bodies that 
equally produce the high skills, but are more connected with women’s work.  However, my 
interviews with Romanian mothers about their children’s migration focused on the effects of their 
departure.  The mothers revealed the movement of professionals across borders is made possible 
and maintained through women’s social reproductive work. They pointed out that transnational 
migration depends on both the labour of professionals but also their own labour, their families and 
the states of origin. By arguing this, the interviewed mothers prove to be more than passive subjects 
of research, but actually active intelligent thinkers and critical knowledge producers in their own 
turn. Their understanding and critical awareness of how the circulation of social reproductive work 
contributes to the accumulation of global capital stretches the debates about social reproduction. 
Their intelligence and acute sense of reality is seen in the way they grasp the drama and trauma of 
migration as well as the endless challenges of both capitalism and communism: while the trauma 
of a communist regime consisted in, primarily, food shortages, the new drama of capitalism and 
transition is played out in the loneliness and loss of not having their communities and family 
members close by, a lost due to migration. However, despite the difficulties and complexities that 
come with migration, the interviewees tell a story of resilience and stubbornness, continuously 
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adapting and changing, looking for new ways of legitimation and self-preservation, falling short 
of what they aspired their conditions would be, but nevertheless rebounding in many contexts of 
defeat and marginalization.  
              Additionally, I presented a brief history of the Romanian migration to Canada, together 
with an analysis of the socio-economic demographic of the Romanian migrants living there. 
According to it, the Romanian migration to Canada is led by highly skilled university professionals 
who, despite having the necessary qualifications and skills, are neither equally compensated for 
them, nor reaching the wages and employment rates of native Canadians once they reach and settle 
in their destination countries. While such de-skilling might look incongruent with the declared 
objectives of the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP), it is actually perfectly consistent with 
the neoliberal demands of the economy, with its requirement of constant rates of profit and 
innovation without a parallel rewarding of the work for it, thus the need to keep it cheap. 
Nevertheless, such programs already require social reproductive efforts and investments in 
education, training, etc. that take place in developing countries and are done before arrival in 
Canada. Furthermore, I described the relative vagueness, loneliness and insecurity in which the 
migration happens (without concrete job offers given in advance and less supported by social 
networks of family, friends, and relatives as it is usually assumed) and the sadness or anger of the 
parents left behind as well as their sense of unfairness and injustice for losing in this way their 
families and communities that they have raised and nurtured. Last but not least, I wanted to 
deconstruct the mind vs. bodies dichotomy through which migration policies operate and show 
Romanian mothers’ intelligent opinions on the migration of their children, how they cope with 
transition and dismemberment of their families’ effects, and what some of the impacts of their 
children’s migration to Canada are. More importantly, I describe how the Romanian mothers 
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pointed and spoke to the ways they have enabled their children’s brain migration, and show that 
they are not any less smart and smart and strong. Where migration policies focus so much on 
“brain” and skills accumulation, making invisible the reproductive labour (usually associated with 
women’s work) that goes into the production of such brains and skills, I wanted to reveal their 
feelings and their thinking on the processes, their political active being where they are imagined 
as passive undesirable bodies.  Of course, the migration of highly skilled workers is not a success 
story as many countries of the Global North present it and speak of it. The Romanian mothers 
provided more nuance to some of the negative consequences of post-communist transition as well 
as illuminated the problematic effects and short sightedness of the immigration point schemes such 
as Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker program. I also wanted to speak of the migration world 
through my own experiences as a migrant and the perspicacious eyes of the Romanian mothers, 
so involved in the process but also so socially and politically aware of all the hot academic topics 
such as capitalist transition, gender discrimination, de-skilled migration, global inequality, etc. 
without conceptualizing them as such. While they have invested so much in the highly skilled 
migration of their children, it is the stories of the Romanian mothers that educate us the most about 
transition Romania’s and Canada’s migration programs, proving the lucidity and roundedness of 
their insights in their analysis over the world. The most striking of them all is their desire to re-
build their identities beyond that of their families and parents in a world of migration and transition 
that supposedly has moved on without them. In this sense, I wanted my project to take the readers 
inside Romania pointing to what this transition means. This transition is directly linked to both the 
transnational movement of high skilled professionals with their parents and specifically their 
mothers specifically localized. Second, this division of high-skilled brains from bodies is also a 
discourse that makes invisible the dependence of these migrants on the North on both the social 
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reproduction (i.e., educational resources; household labour) of the state and the household of these 
migrants.  
               While so many projects focus on the challenges and hardships of immigrants in new 
countries, less is known about the havoc and ruptures in the social fabric that their departure can 
entail in the home countries. With that in mind, it was interesting to see what their investments 
were in the process, what their lives are in the absence of their children, what expectations they 
have now and what choices they have as well as what choices they do not have. Their stories 
revealed the difficulty of belonging in a new space and of re-settling, or of settling and finding 
stability in anything, and the impossibility of cohesive and united family stories. `              
                   As it relates to their reflections on the investments in the process of migration, 
especially in terms of social reproduction, another chapter will exemplify the different types of 
work that parents, and especially mothers, engage in, so that their children become qualified as 
Federal Skilled Workers in Canada. 
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Chapter Four: Migrants in Canada and Women's Paid and Unpaid Work in “Transition” 
Romania 
 
Love is an action, never simply a feeling 
 (bell hooks 2000:46) 
 
Since I was studying a degree in English and Spanish, women’s paid and unpaid work in 
Romania is not a topic that I engaged in my undergraduate courses at the university though it was 
something that was happening within my world of daily reference during the 1990s. The possibility 
of my writing about it acknowledges and highlights Romanian women’s work as well as my own 
lived experience of migration. As an academic feminist in Canada my research objectives were to 
bring to light some of the hard-working and physically exhausting labour days of the mothers who 
were investing themselves emotionally, intellectually, and practically in raising the current 
generation of highly skilled Romanian migrants to Canada. By their investment, I mean both their 
social reproductive activities (cooking, cleaning, etc.), and their intellectual efforts in framing the 
future adult minds of their children in Romania’s transition economy. My research objectives also 
aimed to highlight some of their struggles in raising their children within different changing 
regimes and the inherent patriarchal oppressions embedded in both of these regimes (be it standing 
in line, struggling to obtain food and basic meat packages, and fighting for gas cylinders or waking 
up and cooking in the middle of the night, etc.). However, the most important aim lies in 
highlighting how the migration policies of the developed neoliberal economies such as Canada’s 
that attract “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) of migrants heavily relies on 
women’s work from the developing transition world of Romania. In this sense, the purpose of this 
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chapter is to nuance how neoliberal Canadian growth and development are subsidized in part by 
Romanian women’s work, both social reproductive and waged. This is an equation that, rather than 
reducing and diminishing the inequalities in different parts of the world, accentuates and intensifies 
them.  If the social reproductive work had been previously presented, in the current chapter the 
aim was to underline’s women’s waged work in creating highly skilled migrants to Canada.  
Feminist political economists have tackled the issues of social reproduction (Armstrong 
2003; Arat-Koc 2001; Besanzon 2006; Laslett and Brenner 1989; Luxton 2006; Waring 1988). 
Beginning in the 1970s, they identified that there are critical areas left out of conventional political 
economy analyses, and the issue of “social reproduction” was one of them. In this sense, feminist 
political economists are the first to highlight the existence of two different types of work: one done 
in the public sphere, paid and visible, and the other one in the private sphere, unpaid and invisible. 
The separation corresponds perfectly to the gender division, one comprised mostly of men (the 
public sphere) and the latter containing mostly women (the private domain). Thus, while the work 
done in the public sphere is masculinized, the one done in the households is feminized.  
Challenging conventional assumptions about production and reproduction economies, 
Isabella Bakker and Stephen Gill argue that no economic system can be sustained without social 
reproductive labour of which there are three varieties: that of biological reproduction; the work 
required to reproduce the labour force; and the labour required to provision and care for members 
of society. “Social reproduction provides the cultural, social and economic values that support 
productive labour, that is, labour for which there is more often remuneration and a tangible 
outcome that is accorded a market value. Whether or not it is remunerated, social reproductive 
labour is a requirement of the social and material processes through which humanity is constituted 
and cannot be ignored in the theorization of the market” (Bakker and Gill 2003: 23).   
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The underlying oppression of women created by the burden of social reproduction is not 
particularly a “Western” or capitalist concern.  This oppression exists in Eastern European countries 
and it was a prevalent feature during the communist regimes as well. In this sense, the installation 
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe post WWII and their rhetoric promised a couple of 
egalitarian gender policies. Undoubtedly, the communist state’s promises of emancipation of 
women greatly increased women’s literacy and rates of enrolment in schools and universities, 
allowing them access to conventionally considered male fields and disciplines (math, physics, 
engineering, etc.). However, despite the former communist states’ promotion of women’s 
“emancipation” and support for egalitarian gender policies, the actual policies enacted by these 
governments did not effectively work towards a meaningful advancement of women’s rights, 
resulting instead in a “false emancipation” of women (Einhorn 1993). For example, the policies of 
the communist state aimed at “emancipating” women did not target issues of social reproduction, 
and in everyday life, all the household work duties were left to be done by women alone (Ashwin 
2000, Einhorn 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000). In this respect, there is unanimous agreement among 
feminists that Eastern European women were not empowered by the former communist system in 
the domestic sphere.  Therefore, it was women who carried the “double burden” of work and family 
care during communism (Ashwin 2000, Einhorn 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000a, 2000b, Saxonberg 
and Sirovatka 2006).  
While analyzing women’s situation during the communist regime, the renowned feminist 
critic Barbara Einhorn actually talks about the existence of a “triple burden” set for Eastern European 
women during communist times, the outcome of the so-called “emancipation” policies having them 
simultaneously perform the roles of mothers, wives, and workers (Einhorn 1993). Furthermore, the 
superficial and scarce results of the Communist Party's emancipation of women are also 
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demonstrated by the maintenance of a gender division of labour and a clear employment hierarchy. 
During communism, women were inclined to be employed in the less prestigious economic sectors 
(education, light industry, and textiles) while men were occupying positions in the more respectable 
and better paid industrial economy (iron, coal, steel, mining industry).  Moreover, as mentioned 
before, women’s responsibility for the work in the private sphere was never challenged, and the 
policies were massively silent about women being left in charge of all the domestic and childrearing 
chores in the private sphere.   
In this sense, some of the feminist scholars think that the Communist State Party did not have 
any real interest in women’s emancipation, and their only support of such egalitarian agendas was 
articulated as long as women could be used and exploited as labour force once “liberated” as 
workers. As any nationalist scheme the so-called “emancipation” of women was stimulated as long 
as the female subjects were needed in economic production (Einhorn 1993, Magyari-Vincze 2002, 
Verdery 1996). Consequently, women in Eastern Europe were often categorized as either “workers” 
or “mothers” according to the Communist Party ideological agenda of priorities (Fodor 2004, Haney 
1997).  In this sense, the promotion of women’s rights was part of the communist political ideology 
that defined women’s subject position as equally subordinated as men were to the projects of a 
national “paternalist” state (Verdery 1996).  
Additionally, it is important to underline that acquiring these rights did not result from 
women’s liberation and emancipation movements. They were just legislated as such by the Party. 
Therefore, the communist state’s egalitarian policies did not promote a pro-feminist mentality, nor 
a formal acknowledgement of women’s oppression in the private realm. This determined many of 
the Eastern European scholars to claim that, under the acclaimed “emancipation of women”, the 
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communist states actually enforced and perpetuated a patriarchal regime (Einhorn 1993, Gal and 
Kligman 2000, Kligman 1998, Magyari-Vincze 2001, Miroiu 1998, 2004, Verdery 1996).  
 Overall, what seems to be a common agreement among feminist scholars is the fact that 
the socialist states did not emancipate women, nor stimulate their personal autonomy, nor impose 
their social status (Einhorn 1993, Gal and Kligman 2000, Kligman 1998, Magyari-Vincze 2001, 
Miroiu 1998, Verdery 1996, 2000).  
If the communist regime is analyzed as too patriarchal and paternalist to meaningfully 
emancipate women, the collective desire was for the long-awaited transition to a capitalist market 
and the installation of democracy to bring better outcomes and more liberating conditions for 
everyone. The hope was that freedom from the authoritarian communist rule would also translate 
into individual freedom of women.  Nevertheless, such long awaited outcomes and conditions 
failed to arrive, while the post-communist Eastern European countries also faced a rather fast 
dissolution of former safety nets.  
To begin with, the socio-economic transformations that the capitalist transition brought 
about in Eastern Europe (privatization, and marketization) meant a withdrawal of the state from 
providing for its citizens and a dissolution of the former communist state’s welfare structures 
(Burawoy 2001). The newly introduced idea of the self-regulating market dismissed the former 
premise of a centrality of the state which used to assure much protectionism and security for the 
citizens. Furthermore, it immediately reduced the communist states’ allocation and redistribution 
capacity in terms of employment, healthcare, education, and housing.  
Feminists have already mentioned that every time the state reduces its budgets from its 
welfare institutions, it is women’s domestic work that is needed in order to supplement the losses 
(Bezanson and Luxton 2006). The dismissal of former communist state organization and structures 
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was, paradoxically, made up for by a catching up with Western advanced capitalist economies and 
through a return to previous and pre-communist forms of social organizations and political gender 
order, “a return to what is natural: to Europe, to private property, to hierarchy between the sexes” 
(True 2003: 22). Jacqui True argues that various oppressive features of a pre-communist past were 
deployed in Eastern European postcommunism: unequal pay, employment discrimination, sexual 
harassment at work, sexist advertising, domestic violence, rape and sexual abuse, the feminization 
of poverty, lack of publicly funded childcare and cult of domesticity (True 2003). Additionally, 
the rejection of former communist regimes also came with a dismissal of the communist party’s 
political promise and agenda for women’s equality. Although women’s equality never really 
happened during state socialism (Einhorn 1993; Kligman 1998; Verdery 1996; Johnson and 
Robinson 2007), the denial and lack of legitimacy for voicing political claims for gender equality 
and justice (due to the contamination by former communist party propaganda) did not generate the 
spaces for post-communist women in making claims and acquiring more rights and gender-based 
justice.  
In this sense, various scholars point to post-communist women's disproportionate social 
reproductive role (Einhorn 1993, True 2003, Verdery 1996). In fact, after the transition to the 
capitalist market, we find Eastern European women still performing the same disproportionate 
domestic work as during communist times.  It seems that the sudden injection of liberal democracy 
did not make a difference in terms of their workload, nor did it release them from the double shift 
of work and family care. While making some room for acknowledging issues of domestic violence 
and reproductive rights (for example abolishing the illegality of abortion), post-communist 
governments did nothing to address the unjust social reproduction distribution. On the contrary, 
the capitalist transition dissolved many of the public state budgeted methods of collective care and 
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support (i.e., free kindergartens) which now relied on women’s private work to be fulfilled. Later 
on, the integration into the European Union in 2007, again certified that women’s rights were to 
be upheld in Romania, and that they were to be democratically respected when they actually were 
not (Miroiu 2010).  
The Romanian communist state claimed that women’s liberation and equality were 
achieved with the arrival of communism. This ended the official discussion of the need for political 
struggle for gender equality. Romania’s transition to a capitalist market, and later its integration 
(also part of this transition) into the European Union (entrance in 2007) reinforced that women’s 
rights and the issues of women equality were again achieved. Women’s problems, if any, were 
often considered to be a residual of the old society. Both the communist and the capitalist state 
bureaucracy upheld the banner of women’s liberation, saying that they were serving both the state 
and women’s interests simultaneously without this being the case. In the next section I will show 
how the goal of women’s equality was never achieved during communism or transition, capitalist 
times, and how the current migration of highly skilled professionals advances an agenda of gender 
inequality and injustice. More than the issue of different political systems such as communism or 
capitalism, my interviewed women acknowledge that both systems intensified their childrearing 
responsibilities and household work, in various ways.  They also describe in detail their extensive 
social reproductive work in raising a new generation of highly skilled migrants, and problematize 
the migration flows to Canada.  
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Section A: Romanian Women’s Double-Burden and the Making of the Highly Skilled Migrants  
 
The issue of patriarchy and the social reproduction roles being unfairly gendered, leaving 
the burden of childrearing and household work to be done by women alone, is highly 
acknowledged in my interviews with Romanian mothers whose adult children migrated to Canada. 
In this sense, despite not being targeted by Canada’s migration policies focused on brain gains, for 
the mothers in Romania, who spoke about different political regimes, capitalist transition and 
migration proved to be not just social reproduction resources, but cutting-edge repositories of 
sagacity, insight, and a certain value as well. Furthermore, the social reproductive work of mothers 
demonstrates that the distinction between care labour and trained, skilled labour, between highly 
skilled immigrants and all the social reproductive work that is necessary for both the formation 
and continuous function of such talents is more connected than acknowledged in the government 
immigration policies (Grosz 1994, Fausto-Sterling 1992, Luxton 1997).   
Eastern European communist economies were “economies of shortage” (Kornai 1992), of 
scarcity of resources available for consumption, so that women’s experiences of social 
reproduction were inevitably burdensome and difficult. First off, Romanian mothers’ social 
reproductive work was difficult and challenging since they did not have access to different 
consumption products and accessories, such as washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and detergent, 
to support their household work. Second, preparing and cooking food, for example, acquired 
particular characteristics specific to a shortage economy and did not consist of simply or directly 
shopping for food. In communist Romania due to shortages of food and resources, the simple act 
of buying milk or bread in order to feed one’s family often required standing in line for hours in 
order to obtain these products. Many of the women I interviewed revealed the creativity that had 
 160 
to go into this process. Such creative acts, though, do not register formally as part of social 
reproduction.  And yet, they are. Much of the way in which the current feminist scholarship goes 
about describing or explaining social reproduction, for transition Romania, evades the complex 
creative process that women undergo to constitute it.  The Romanian mothers I interviewed 
expressed this nuance, but more so, brought to the fore the complexity of social relations that went 
into the social reproductive work, ranging from the sexual division of labour, sexual flirting, the 
responsibility of shortages of time, etc.  
As one interviewee confirms, it was the wives and mothers who would find themselves 
standing in line. “As a mother, it was more difficult for me to raise kids in communism. For 
example, I was the only one in the family who was queuing for food” (Simona, fifty-seven, nurse). 
These challenges and inconveniences were sometimes avoided by making use of other strategies, 
such as “flirting for food,” reflecting gendered agency, refusal of a passive victimizing process, 
and using alternative creative ways for survival. Therefore, one Romanian mother reflected 
proudly on using her own charisma and charm in order to bypass standing in line so that she 
procured the necessary resources to feed her family. “In my family, I was the one who became 
friends with the butcher and the cashier. Many times, I was flirting with them. I was entering the 
butcher’s store, flirting a bit with him, after which he would give me a sign that it’s not the time 
yet to pass by the store. I would leave and return an hour or two later for him to, discreetly, hand 
me two kilos of meat” (Simona). 
Although the communist systems were historically known for their food shortages (Kornai 
1992, Einhorn 1993, Verdery 1996), interviews in Romania with mothers of migrants pointed to 
the fact that the processes that make social reproduction are more nuanced than usually accounted 
for and also ridden with tension and emotional havoc due to other deprivations as well: “We didn’t 
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have heat, water, even potable tap water; we were going to a fountain and staying in line for hours 
to carry it home in canisters. Heat and hot water are always present now, but I work much more 
now, much much more…” (Anamaria, fifty-eight-year-old, brick factory worker). When 
mentioning the hardships that materialized with the capitalist transition, Anamaria highlights how 
hard she had to work and how much more difficult and intense this process was and in comparison, 
with employment conditions during communism. Another Romanian mother Gabriela, sixty-two 
years old, retired teacher recollected: “There were problems with the running water (it was 
available usually for only two hours in the evening). Heat too. The butter was rationed (reduced to 
half a package per month per family member). We were four in the family, so we got two packages 
a month, and it wasn’t enough”. Furthermore, they mention that such activities were more 
burdensome since they were performing them alone and, if they got some company, it was rather 
a negative, unhelpful one in the form of the critical judgements of their husbands. “My husband 
used to reproach me: don’t use the gas time so much, don’t cook so much! But what did he know? 
It’s not like he was the one ever cooking” (Florica, fifty-seven, nurse).  
  The mothers highlighted how the process of social reproduction during the communist 
regime was full of challenges. They spoke much about a gendered division of labour with regard 
to the raising of the children and the activities that sustain a household, ranging from shopping, to 
cooking to heating up the house.  More intensely, for them they even had to go so far to keep 
schedules and be ultimately responsible with what they call shortages of the time.  
Many mothers highlighted that much of their life was strained resulting from a shortage of 
time. The demands on them ranged from ensuring food on the table to warming up the house. For 
example, back then, there were not any mechanisms of central heating in the apartments, and the 
people had to obtain their own gas cylinders for cooking and heating. “Sometimes I had to wake 
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up at three or four in the morning to queue for gas cylinders. When it was winter and freezing 
outside, we agreed to leave just the cylinder taps in queues as our substitutes and return later in the 
morning to avoid the cold” (Mariana, sixty-two years old, nurse).  For instance, the daily chore of 
queuing up in order to purchase gas cylinders added to the hardships women had to endure, making 
their activities of social reproduction quite intense and difficult. Women felt that this process of 
ensuring their households’ survival and well-being was quite oppressive, and more for them than 
their husbands: “The queues, this is what I hated it most, for an egg, for 100 grams of butter, meat, 
gas cylinders…. When I think about it I realize we weren’t that hungry: families were storing 
kilograms of salami in the fridge, but it wasn’t so much hunger as it was the fear of not having 
them tomorrow…” (Mariana, sixty-two years old, nurse). 
The retellings and memories about their activities to do with social reproduction during the 
communist regime and the processes that constitutes capitalist transition were sometimes wrapped 
up in feelings of nostalgia. Such affects were connected less to the hardships they had to endure 
and more with the fact that people were young at that time. Recollecting glimpses of the household 
chores and the raising of children reminded them of their youth with all the advantages and benefits 
that such a phase of life brought forward:  
It was very beautiful back then when the kids were small. I was lucky to have my parents 
living in the countryside, and they were helping me out with milk, chicken, pork, etc. We 
were standing in lines, it is true. Even my daughter remembers how if she saw people 
queuing at the stores when she was returning home from school, she knew she had to line up 
automatically without knowing what for. She would find out later what they were all about 
(meat, eggs, etc.) but still it was nice back then when our daughter was a kid and we were 
young (Lucia, sixty-eight years old, retired statistician). 
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While most of my respondents acknowledged that they were doing most of the childrearing 
and household work, in one or two cases the Romanian mothers suggested that the chores were 
being rather fairly distributed between the partners. However, after a moment of pause and some 
reflection, a different portrait was revealed. “My husband helped me with the household chores. It 
wasn’t easy for either of the two genders to raise kids during communism…. or, oh wait, maybe 
women had it harder with the household, caring for the children, cooking, etc. It was harder for 
women, I think“ (Ana, fifty-nine years old, high-school teacher). 
In other cases, when asked about their partner’s input in raising the children, these women 
described them as being absent for most of the time for a variety of reasons. One common 
justification for his absence was his career mobility and professional development as in, “I was in 
charge of the raising of the children. He was always away, busy with his work” (Melania, sixty-five 
years old, administrative staff). Other times the justification for the husband’s absence relates to 
adherence to gendered social conventions and norms: “My husband thinks that the household 
activities are women’s jobs. Whatever there is to do in the kitchen, it is to be done by women. It is 
their obligation, it dignifies them. The man has other chores and responsibilities. For example, my 
husband wouldn’t change diapers. Even today, in modern times, if we would decide to have another 
child, he wouldn’t see it as fit to change the diapers. It’s beneath his dignity. He is not a 
metrosexual15 to do his nails, and to do what women do” (Sorana, fifty-five-year-old, physician). 
The process of sharing household work such as cooking, cleaning, and raising children was 
perceived as dangerous and threatening for men’s gender identity. This way, the male and female 
binaries were seen as mutually exclusive: one cannot perform the duties traditionally relegated to 
                                                 
15 The expression of metrosexual is used to define an urban man who is careful about his looks and appearance and 
who usually spends a lot of time and resources to maintain them; the expression is also used in connection to 
queerness and homosexuality 
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the opposite gender identity without transgressing and transforming himself or herself into the other 
identity. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that many interviewed Romanian mothers did not 
necessarily define their partner’s lack of contribution to household chores as particularly gender 
exploitation and oppression. His lack of involvement in the household duties was sometimes 
culturalized and ethnicized: “We are a Balkan country, with influences from the East; in our 
traditional society, we still have a conventional family division with men who work and women 
who take care more of children” (Mariana, fifty-eight, physician). In the above-mentioned example, 
the partner’s lack of responsibility in household reproduction is rather a cultural coordinate, of “the 
Balkan influences”, passively accepted and resigned to.  
The man’s absence, some interviewees pointed out, is generally accepted by the wife as she 
understands that he is alternatively engaging in other duties, the so-called “garage and car” duties 
as one of my respondents put it to me. However, the husband might be stretching the limits of 
household work tolerance and fairness when he sometimes expects to receive the same amounts of 
care as the children do: 
My home was always full of stress and anxiety: cook, clean, supervise the kids to and do 
their lessons. Besides that, I am a teacher of mathematics, and I was preparing so much 
the Math classes for next day that my husband was saying: don’t you know Math already? 
Why are you studying it so much? […] I was a loving wife, but when he was asking me: 
‘please do that and that for me’, referring to household chores, I was more like ‘no, I 
can’t! I’m tired’, and he was like: “And if your kids were asking you for the same favour, 
you wouldn’t reply the same to them, right?’ He was right, but I always believed that 
“One can’t compare what a mother can do for her kids with what she’s willing to do for 
her husband” (Lavinia, sixty-six years old, retired teacher). 
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Lavinia highlighted the same asymmetrical division of labour as well as the affective and 
emotional economy that came with the investment in social reproduction. The demands made on 
her are many without any discussion about sharing household chores. On the contrary, despite being 
an adult, the husband asked to be treated like a child, adding on to his wife’s burden rather than 
helping out. In other occasions the lack of equal distribution of household chores was still 
acknowledged, although in a softer, non-conflictive way, and it was referenced as “men’s 
protection”: “Men live the transformations easier…They weren’t that marked during communism 
either as they were more protected in the household” (Mariana, sixty-two years old, nurse).  In other 
households, the women excused their lack of involvement by taking the blame onto themselves and 
saying that it was they who did not teach them how to clean or cook for themselves: “My husband 
doesn’t even remove his plate after eating; my kids say that I have taught my husband this behaviour, 
and being lazy, and maybe they are right; only my back knows the hard work I put to maintain them 
through university” (Ana, fifty-nine, teacher). 
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, Romanian mothers did not necessarily see the unequal 
distribution of the household chores as oppressive.  The chores and duties involved in the social 
reproduction of the respective family are acknowledged as something vital and necessary for the 
maintenance of the family, and legitimized as gendered and relegated to women’s duties and 
responsibilities in connection to a temporal, unfixed, remote practice of ‘tradition.’ Cooking was 
such an example, as it was seen as a continuity of a long, well-established convention as well as 
stable, well-defined conventional gender roles. “Here in Romania we have a tradition of cooking. 
For a lot of time now, women are the actual pillars in the house, and, therefore, they have to cook, 
take care of kids, and sometimes even of husbands” (Gabriela, sixty-seven, retired nurse). On other 
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occasions, the social reproduction was part of maternal identity, and embraced as maternal love, 
especially when the outcome of it seems to be well-raised, studious and serious children:  
I was coming from work and was not even changing my clothes and immediately turning the 
stove on and putting the pot on for soup. But I loved doing that, especially when I was looking 
in the apartment and noticing that all my three boys were studying. It’s not like now when I 
come home and my nephew is just playing games on computers; they themselves really 
believed that one needs to study in order to be someone (Lucia, sixty-eight, retired statistician). 
As Lucia points to above, social reproduction was predominantly articulated as a burden. 
Nevertheless, there were also occasions when it is described as providing in mothers a sense of 
satisfaction and pride. The family quality of care was also seen as a badge of honour: “My pleasure 
was to see my husband and my children cleaned, well-fed and well-dressed; they were my pride” 
(Anca, sixty-two-year-old, retired teacher). 
With respect to the challenges of social reproduction and the way it materialized in transition 
Romania, one particularly noticeable difference between the communist regime and the capitalist 
transition came up in the reflections of my interviewees. They said that under communism the 
processes of social reproduction, particularly raising and providing education of children, could 
have been done from the income of one family member. However, with the transition to the capitalist 
market system, most of a family’s income was redirected toward the rearing and education of the 
children. Such an observation might sound unusual, especially since the costs were not related to 
the actual tuition fees for education (which were still free-of-charge), but to supporting the children 
financially while they were students and otherwise unemployed. “From an average income, even 
one per household, one could raise a kid back then, in communist times. However, when our 
daughters reached university after the transition to the capitalist market, the entirety of the family 
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income went towards supporting them in their studies and paying their living expenses, and it was 
still insufficient” (Mihaela, fifty-five years old, architect). Similarly, in another context, one of the 
Romanian mothers confessed sacrificing and abandoning the entire family’s material aspirations 
and lifestyle comfort so that their children could reach higher education and presumably future 
career mobility.  “Any sacrifice that we were making as parents, was done for the children’s sake. 
We gave up on buying a car so that we can support their university education” (Mihaela, fifty-five-
year-old, architect). 
What was interesting to notice was that the Romanian maternal investment in the process of 
social reproduction continued when the children finished high-school and entered university.  
Moreover, the maternal investments continue despite the children’s growing up, changing 
residences, and ceasing to live with their parents. Some of my interviewees expressed that they were 
hoping that nurturing for their child would end when the child moved out of the parents’ place and 
reached adulthood. However, it was not the case for Romanian children: “We were sending them 
food by buses. I continued cooking for both of my university children during all their university 
years. I was cooking, and my husband was taking the package to the bus” (Gabriela, sixty-two years 
old, retired teacher). While there is a partner’s input in such activities (i.e., taking the food packages 
to the bus) it is evident that his support takes less time than the activity of cooking and most likely 
less physical effort. Another mother recollects the ritual of preparing cakes, and how that cooking 
activity was children-centralized and massively children-dedicated: “I remember how I was 
preparing a cake every Sunday, and my husband and I were only eating the margins of the cake, and 
sent the best of it to children” (Liliana, fifty-five, engineer). Similarly, another mother confessed 
how the priority in nurturing and caring was always her children, and only secondarily her own 
needs: “For example, many times I never had time to cook for myself or even prepare sandwiches 
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for me, but I always had for my children” (Vasilica, fifty-seven, cook).  Sometimes, the number of 
the social reproduction activities took gargantuan proportions, on the border of the comic: “The 
problem was not that I was cooking every day. The real burden was the quantities of cooking.  My 
three boys were eating a pot of ten litres of soup per day, and a bag of bread. I was buying old bread 
so that they don’t eat it so fast” (Gabriela, sixty-seven, nurse). 
However, cooking was not the only activity that demanded maternal labour and investment 
in terms of time and effort in children’s lives and education. Mothers often recollect cleaning their 
children’s new university residence apartments or washing their clothes. “Every two weeks my 
children were bringing home their dirty clothes to be washed” (Gabriela, sixty-two years old, retired 
nurse). Or, “At the beginning of each university year, I was cleaning their university residence 
apartment, and even dyeing the walls. I had a great satisfaction to see my children’s university 
residence apartment clean, and found the work rewarding” (Anamaria, fifty-eight years old, brick 
factory worker). 
In contrast to men’s household and childrearing work, women’s unequal contributions and 
investments into social reproduction are more or less universal. According to some of the interviews 
taken, what made the situation more difficult and burdensome was when the processes of social 
reproduction prolonged themselves, and the children were actually old enough to be able to do both 
the household work, and also study for their courses at university. In this case, although the children 
could access free-of-charge public institutions of higher education, their education still ended up in 
being supported by a disproportionate maternal investment (for example, cooking for adult 
university children). When discussing family investments into education, the maternal investment 
is also shared to some degree with the fathers’ contribution. However, it is my argument that 
mothers’ efforts and investment are critical in covering such costs, first, due to the social 
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reproductive and care work that mostly women do and for which my interviews provide testimony 
for, and, second, due to their wages. With respect to the latter, some of the post-socialist scholars 
argue, that in the post-communist transition, it was women’s jobs (in the retail, manufacturing, 
customer service, tourism, food and entertainment industries, etc.) rather than men’s jobs that 
converted much faster and more successfully to the market economy (Ghoodsee 2005 Gheaus 2008 
Pasti 2003), a hypothesis that I will develop further on in the chapter. 
With respect to students acquiring a university education, and obtaining a diploma, there is 
little research on funding providers and different types of support that made that education possible. 
The research on state investments in education or on family contributions to educating the next 
generation seems to over-look how mothers’ both public and private work fully support such 
endeavours. While my mothers’ testimonies are relevant for the maternal investment in the social 
reproduction of their children and the acquisition of diplomas, little is known about women’s public 
work and their contribution to the creation of university educated individuals via taxes on their 
wages.   
In a world of neoliberal economies where governments worldwide believe that a well-
educated workforce is the source of growth and development but have undergone cuts to all the 
welfare structures that create it, highly skilled professionals become the target of various 
immigration strategies. Canada’s government is one example. Under the immigration category of 
the Federal Skilled Workers (FSWP) it is university-educated individuals who are the primary target 
of such immigration programs (Sachar 2006; Doomernik, Koslowski, Thranhardt 2009; O’Shea 
2009). Nevertheless, when examining such categories, the current scholarship looks monolithically 
at the state’s investment in the creation of university educated individuals and/or describes private 
families’ allowance towards that end (Psacharopoulos 1994, Tilak 1991). Nevertheless, beneath the 
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vague unclear notion of state and the indistinguishable notion of family it is more about the 
neoliberal state and, as my research and my findings from interviews show, women’s both public 
and private work that contributes towards the education of the highly skilled professionals. In this 
sense, the Canadian neoliberal market indirectly and less obviously uses women’s work outside its 
borders, and in the context of transition insecure economies.  
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Section B: Women’s Work and Higher Education in Romania 
 
Romanian men and women relate differently to the new political and economic realities that 
have changed dramatically through a “transition” of both production and reproduction relations 
(Miroiu 2004). This new development also re-shaped the Romanian economy. As the country’s once 
massive industrial sector collapsed, new fields of economy (i.e., textile manufacturing, retail sector, 
communication and customer services, tourism, food and entertainment industries) emerged as 
engines in the new post-communist transition. With the marketization and privatization switch in 
Romania, it is these sectors that continued to expand while the former industrial economies broke 
apart. Manufacturing, retail, and communication and customer service fields are all labour intensive, 
so that, at a time of massive lay-offs in the heavy industry, employment in these sectors grew. Yet, 
despite high unemployment rates for men, Romanian women continued to dominate these new 
sectors of economy (Miroiu 2004, Ghoodsee 2005, Gheaus 2008). 
  “The Last Inequality”, written by Vladimir Pasti, gives a thorough description of the 
transformations in the gender relations during the economic transition in post-communist Romania. 
Pasti (2003), a Romanian scholar, shows that women’s jobs in communist Romania were performed 
in the “easy,” “lower-paid” and ‘lower prestigious” sectors (textile and food industry, education, 
healthcare, and tourism) while men went into the ‘hard’ and most respected divisions such as 
extractive industries, or the sector of steel, coal, aluminum, and chemical items, the production of 
energy, petrol, transportation industries. Undoubtedly, “the division between ‘easy’ and ‘hard’, 
which was based both on physical difficulty and on social contribution, also meant that women had 
lower salaries and less prestige (Gheaus 2008: 190)”. Nevertheless, the challenging hypothesis by 
Pasti (2003) was later on supported by other international scholars such as Miroiu (2004) Ghoodsee 
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(2005) and Gheaus (2008). They all posit that, as the Romanian or Bulgarian economy restructured 
after the communist collapse, it was women’s jobs in the textile manufacturing, retail sector, 
communication and customer services, tourism, and food and entertainment industries that were 
sources of major profits and profitable industries for the market. Thus, ironically, the transition from 
communism to capitalism resulted in the formerly lower-paid and lower-prestige women’s jobs to 
being more easily privatized and rendered productive, while men’s jobs, from heavy industry and 
extractive industries, were considered unproductive and ineffective and were closed down.  
Pasti’s as well as Ghoodsee’s and Gheaus’s arguments do not stop at just describing women’s 
work conversion during the transition. Pasti also argues that the reform of the economy after the fall 
of communism (i.e., privatization and the shutting down of a great part of the industries) gave 
women an opportunity to renegotiate their status in the labour market and reach higher rates of 
autonomy and independence. This chance, however, was expansively missed because of the 
predominance of patriarchal conditions in the country and because of women’s lack of organizing 
themselves and being more activist in claiming their rights. Nevertheless, despite not reaching the 
rates of autonomy and empowerment that the new rearrangement of gender economic relationships 
could have led to, a group of scholars argues that it was predominantly women’s work that assured 
the transition to a functional labour market (see Table 3 in the Appendix Title: Male/Female 
Unemployment Rates by Sex and Country (Romania).   
According to the Eurostats statistics the unemployment rate of the male population age 15 
to 74 in Romania was reported at 5.5 per cent in 1998 while women’s unemployment rates were 
only at 5.3 per cent. The percentage increased dramatically from the communist times in the 1980s 
when unemployment was actually prohibited by law. The unemployment gap between men and 
women stayed high in transition Romania, with women less likely to be unemployed than men. 
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The World Bank offers the same unemployment rates and unemployment gender gap in Romania. 
(see Table 5 and 6 in the Appendix. Title: Male-Female Unemployment Romania, Gender 
Statistics) 
Similarly, according to a Gender and Development Study done by the Institute of the 
National Economy in Romania in 2007, the jobs held mostly by women prevailed in health and 
social security (77.1 per cent), education (73.3 per cent), hotels and restaurants (65.4 per cent), 
financial transactions (64.7 per cent), and commerce (54.1 per cent) (Ciutacu 2007).  
While women were hired in these jobs, scholars argue that the Romanian wage-earning 
women became actually the main taxpayers, making the Romanian state budget directly dependent 
on women’s jobs and their earnings. In this sense, political economists of Eastern Europe largely 
argue that post-socialist countries have “feminized” state budgets (Pasti 2003, Gheaus 2008). 
Obviously, such capture of the pie of women’s labour and the “feminization” is the result of 
women’s jobs being more easily converted to the labour market during the transition from a 
communist system to a liberal economic regime and their wages contributing more to the state 
budget via taxes. By being more easily converted to capitalist market, women’s jobs and earnings 
through their taxes predominate in forming state budgets (Pasti 2003). At the same time, Romania 
inherited from the communist regime a massive welfare state, whose institutions were supposed to 
provide, for example, a large scale free education, health services, support for the elderly and for 
parents of small children. Such institutions (higher education, health services, etc.) are still heavily 
subsidized by state budgets, and therefore rely on women’s earnings (Pasti 2003).    
Nevertheless, while women become a more employable force during transition, it is their 
wages and income that count towards the taxes. While statistics that break down the tax revenue by 
gender are not available, there is scholarship in the field that points to a remarkably reduced male-
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female wage gap before and during the first years of transition (Andren and Andren 2015). The 
authors argue that since the communist regime centralized the economy, it also controlled workers’ 
wages which were established according to a pre-established grid. Due to these pre-established 
centralized wage grids, women’s wages did not differ from men’s. Despite the fact that transition 
disrupted the carefully planned and centralized wages, the scholarship still points to a wage gap 
decrease during the first years of the change. This is due to diminishing of the employment of low 
wage female earners (Hunt 2002), and, as already mentioned, the expansion of the high wage service 
sector (Giddings 2002) which was female-dominated. With the expansion of the service sector, there 
was also an expansion of employment in the area where women predominantly occupied the 
positions, and, consequently, an increase in the taxes they contributed to the budget.  
Since women’s contribution through their taxes is critical to state budgets, it is important in 
guiding an examination of how the welfare state budget is spent and which branches of government 
and institutions are prioritized. The case of higher education is relevant here since it is mostly state-
budgeted in offering access to free education.  
With a history of higher education that started in the nineteenth century (the first university 
was founded in Iasi in 1860), and a population of approximately 22 million people, Romania has 
approximately fifteen public universities. The communist regime installed in 1945 stipulated by 
law that education was a public, free-of-charge right. At the capitalist switch in 1990, a number of 
private universities were created, although the Romanian state continued to provide free higher 
education in its public universities. By early 2000s, the public universities started to offer a number 
of so-called “charged admissions’ and university places for which one had to pay (the Romanian 
equivalent is “locuri cu plata”). The “charged admissions” were meant as an answer to an 
increasing number of university applicants and openings while the university funding stayed the 
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same. Not surprisingly, the number of “charged admissions” increased in the last years although 
the majority of university positions were still left free of any charge (Ministry of the Regional 
Development and Public Administration of Romania 2014; see Table 9 in Appendix, Title: Number 
of Students in Higher Education Per Year and Form of Tuition Financing).  
Despite a demographic recession and a decline in the total number of young people, 
Romania experienced higher enrolment rates in the higher education system during the 1990s and 
2000s (Eurostats, data extracted 2013). For example, during the period 2000-2009, in Romania, 
the student population in tertiary education doubled (Eurostats, data extracted 2013). Moreover, a 
third of all the 20-22-year old are in tertiary education, with the women outnumbering men. The 
majority of the students in Romania (around 98per cent) are enrolled in public institutions of 
tertiary education, and although private universities exist, the enrolment rate of students in them 
are marginal (see Table 7 in the Appendix, Title: Tertiary Education Enrolment Rate by Gender, 
Romania).  
The proportion of Romania’s total public expenditure on education was around 4 per cent 
of GDP in the late 2000s and around 3 per cent of GDP in the ‘90s. Expenditure per pupil increased 
also with the level of education. In Romania, the average annual cost per secondary school pupil 
is higher than that of primary school pupils. Similarly, the average cost per student in tertiary 
education in the European Union was almost twice as high as for primary pupils (Eurostats 2011) 
Almost all the education expenditures are financed through public funding, specifically through 
the state budget and private funding (in terms of loans to cover student costs) remain marginal. 
The public funding rates match other larger statistics. For example, in 2007 for European Union 
countries public financing accounted for almost 90 per cent (86.6 in 2008) of all the higher 
education expenditures. Nevertheless, it seems that the financing for higher education pays off: 
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statistics of the European Union show that holding higher education qualifications are more 
conducive to being employed. In addition, the tertiary education graduates find their jobs two times 
faster (Eurostats 2011). Nevertheless, despite such predicted outcomes of statistics at the European 
Union level, about half of the 5,000 graduates of Romanian universities in computer science end 
up emigrating each year and a March 2001 poll found that 66 per cent of the Romanian students 
would emigrate if they could. (Martin and Straubhaar 2002 :81) 
If the common rhetoric is that it is the state that finances free tertiary education, in transition 
Romania - women’s waged work is critical for such contributions (Pasti 2003, Gheaus 2008). This 
fact renders evident how women’s work facilitates the formation of capacities and skills through 
education, women’s paid work and the female labour participation being added to their common 
gendered social reproductions roles.  
Therefore, when different immigration systems, like the Canadian or Australian ones, 
favour highly skilled and university educated young migrants, their migrant desirability and 
mobility relies indirectly on both Romania’s women’s waged and unwaged work: waged work due 
to their earnings that substantially form the post-socialist state budgets that subsidize higher 
education, and unwaged/ unpaid work due to their heavily domestic labour that goes into the daily 
and generational maintenance of the population, a process also conceptualized as ‘social 
reproduction’. Thus, it is at the expense of a country of relative poverty (Romania) and its 
population that is already disenfranchised that the creation of highly skilled immigrants becomes 
possible. What comes to define the Romanian migrant as “highly skilled” and desirable by 
neoliberal economies such as Canada’s are substantially produced through Romanian women’s 
paid and unpaid work, respectively public and private work. As my Romanian mothers revealed 
in the interviews taken, they all pointed to a gross unbalance and injustice between efforts and 
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rewards distributed unevenly at both family and state level: “We raised kids, and made so many 
sacrifices to educate them only to see their skills benefitting other countries” (Mariana, sixty-two, 
nurse); “we raised children to have tomorrow’s safety assured not to see other countries’ future 
guaranteed” (Sorana, fifty-five, physician); “to educate from our resources engineers, physicians, 
teachers, etc. and to leave the country? How unfair is that?” (Geanina, sixty-four, retired teacher); 
“I could come at peace with the idea that they leave their countries and families temporarily to 
acquire more learning, but not for good after I worked so much and invested so much effort into 
their education” (Mihaela, fifty-five, architect).  
In this scenario, it is exactly women’s work that enters into the creation of the highly skilled 
desirable migrant, by taking into consideration their social reproductive work, but also their 
substantial contribution to the state budgets that further subsidize most of the higher education 
systems in the post-communist Romania.    
At the same time, as mentioned before, the access to free higher education and processes 
of outward migration become very problematic when such public state budgeted services do not 
usually end up providing benefits for the people who actually pay for it. If women’s work is critical 
in the support and maintenance of the higher education of the future engineers, physicians, and 
technicians, they are also entitled to benefit from the services that such professionals might provide 
when entering the labour market. Nevertheless, when these trained professionals leave for Canada 
identified as highly skilled workers, the country is drained of its own expertise. The constitution 
of the highly skilled immigrants and the role of mothers who actively involve themselves in social 
reproduction may not be standing in a causal relationship, but clearly their work does much to 
generate the conditions and possibilities for such a mobility. Thus, what is important here, and as 
many of the mothers brought up, is the material loss they feel once their children do not come back 
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or are not available to support them and use their skills toward the development of their state. 
As this segregation of social reproduction and expertise takes place in different locations 
and countries, presuming a division of minds and bodies in terms of work, it makes it difficult to 
make claims about compensation and redressing inequality. Despite the fact that my case study 
connects the social reproductive capacities of women in Romania with the highly skilled workers 
imported by Canada, an agenda of equal and fair redistribution of women’s initial investments, 
realistically speaking, might be out of reach. Nevertheless, Canada’s selective immigration 
policies and the attraction of highly skilled workers from Romania impede mothers later in life 
from enjoying the full benefits of their efforts. To draw on a very capitalist language what takes 
place is that many mothers substantially “invested” in their children without experiencing any 
future “return on their investment” (Mihaela, fifty-five-year-old, architect). Moreover, while 
investing so much emotionally and intellectually, they do not get to enjoy their families close by, 
neither their communities and networks of support and belong in an unbalanced equation of work 
and reward, efforts and benefits. 
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Section C: “Sacrificing everything just to see my daughter educated and in line with her 
peers”  
 
Some of the Romanian mothers were quite aware that it was particularly the university 
education that their children pursued that made them desirable as immigrants in Canada: “I think 
my two daughters were qualified for immigration to Canada because they had good matching 
diplomas: one has a BA diploma with an English Major and Romanian Minor, and the other one 
in Economics. Their university education was state-budgeted, and we didn’t have to pay tuition 
(the young one even had scholarships)” (Simona, fifty-seven years old, nurse).  Whereas during 
communism free education was perceived as something “natural,” and an opportunity that 
everyone deserves, in the transition period to capitalism with every service starting to cost money, 
one of my interviewers described receiving free education as a matter of “luck.” “She was lucky: 
she followed high-school, university, nursing degree free-of-charge” (Gabriela, fifty-seven, 
teacher). 
Nevertheless, higher education in public and state-budgeted institutions is perceived not only 
as being free-of-charge, but also as being of higher quality: “My son enrolled in engineering school 
where he even managed to obtain scholarships. At public universities, the lectures are rigorous and 
involving, not like in private universities where there is too much entertainment, too little work, and 
not enough seriousness” (Florica, fifty-nine, retired accountant). Despite government funding of 
education, Romanian parents talked abundantly about their own efforts and financial burdens in 
providing for their children during their university years, shedding light on the multiple investments 
necessary in order to obtain a degree: “For us it was so painful to see all our children leave. We 
struggled so much for them to pursue an education. We were giving them monthly family 
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allowances which strained our finances. One child graduated from aerospace engineering, but he 
could not find any job in Romania afterwards” (Simona, sixty-two, retired teacher). 
Nevertheless, mothers were relatively aware of how critical their waged work contribution 
was to their children’s education beyond the household engendered investment in the process of 
social reproduction. For example, in my interviews they talked a lot of  how it was them and their 
work that succeeded in the transition whereas men “got lost” in the painful process. Furthermore, 
they are aware how the skills they helped nurture in their children ended up assuring the mobility 
of their children and their immigration to Canada.  
In their book Mothering for Schooling (2005) Dorothy Smith and Alison I. Griffith argue that 
mothers engage in innumerable, hidden, seemingly mundane tasks like getting children ready for 
school, helping with homework which has profound effects on social reproduction and the 
production of middle-class positions. The authors analyze how women’s middle-class position and 
their time availability for school-related types of work reproduces inter-generationally their 
economic status and, with it, the inequalities in the available educational opportunities. While 
education has been classically seen as a recipe for reducing inequalities between generations, the 
scholars argues that there are other factors external to it that affects outcomes such as women’s 
reproductive work and the disposability of their time for extra-curricular and school-related 
activities.  
However, while their emphasis is on the amount of unpaid work that North-American 
housewives contribute and that ends up reproducing inequalities in educational opportunities and 
perpetuating global class structures, my analysis is rather centered on how Romanian women’s 
work in a transition economy enables the creation of highly skilled subjects within a neoliberal 
market and their mobility as highly skilled migrants. Whereas the two scholars looked particularly 
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at the middle-class North-American women’s educational supplementary work in organizing 
family routines and schedules in order to prepare children for the school schedule, my focus is an 
extension of the literature of the two scholars since it shows that such work is not contained within 
one’s national sovereign boundaries. It is on this rupture that I focus my inquiry, highlighting a 
preparation of subjects whose immigration halts the development of aspects of a transition 
economy that make a country competitive on a global level. Nevertheless, although their main 
focus was on explaining how class inequalities become reproduced, the authors also described how 
the social reproductive work done by women contributed to their children’s opportunities for social 
mobility albeit not integrated in migration frameworks. 
Despite such accounts, Canadian immigration systems keep on framing women’s 
reproductive work as of lesser importance and value than highly trained and educated skills (Hodge 
2006). The process is parallel to how impossible it is to separate social reproductive work from 
intellectual work and the absorption of highly skilled savvy migrants without a reproduction of their 
daily bodily needs. Through such programs, Canadian government benefits from economic 
inequalities worldwide, while causing a deepening of their marginalization and the devaluation of 
their domestic work.  
Nevertheless, Romanian mothers are still very keen on their children’s acquiring a university 
education, and they are willing to sacrifice for such an outcome. Or rather their lives at the forefront 
of “transition economies” are organized in such a manner that they have no other choice but to 
assume this work for the education and social reproduction of their children despite the high cost to 
themselves and their own well-being and comfort. “I don’t regret having sacrificed so much of the 
family’s income for my girl’s education. I would have sacrificed everything just to see my daughter 
educated and in line with her peers” (Florica, fifty-nine, retired accountant).   
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Romanian mothers spoke of how they fostered in their children motivation and enthusiasm 
for acquiring a university degree, all the while instilling an acceptance of not having any benefits 
solidly secured and assured once they graduated. It was similarly surprising to see how they made 
sense of different and contradictory worldviews: on the one hand, they were trying to nurture the 
educational aspirations in children for uncertain and improbable outcomes, while, on the other hand, 
they themselves had once been motivated and raised by the socialist state and assured of government 
guaranteed advantages, such as stable employment, secure housing, etc.  
Access to higher education in Eastern European communist countries would not necessarily 
assure employment opportunities, secure housing, and healthcare coverage as these benefits were 
already and in advance freely, publicly, and collectively state offered and secured. The transition to 
neoliberal market changed such premises, and getting higher education was considered fundamental 
for accessing more employment opportunities, career mobility and secure housing. Many of the 
aspirations for a university education were embedded in family relations, and gender was a key 
element in creating such expectations.  Next to the mothers’ concrete investments and contributions 
(in terms of domestic work, financial assistance, etc.) in making their children highly skilled 
migrants, my interview testimonies also highlight their efforts in stimulating and encouraging their 
children to pursue higher education.  
Taking into consideration that the decision to pursue higher education is made at a relatively 
young age (i.e., when finishing high school), the mothering investments in this process begins quite 
early. In this sense, the social-reproductive work performed by Romanian mothers is a key factor in 
motivating their children to follow higher education pursuits. Nevertheless, in Romania there is a 
generation of parents who never themselves faced the liberal market ideas of competition, 
individualism, and self-sufficiency, and who are now challenged in nurturing these principles in 
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their offspring while themselves never having been subjected to such nurturing when growing up. 
Also, the parents were raised and educated with state-assured advantages, and never felt insecure or 
in danger of not obtaining them. So, they motivate their children for the pursuit of higher education 
taking into consideration that they do not know the outcomes and economic benefits of obtaining it 
(i.e., if their children will have a good stable job, or a house, as they used to have under communism). 
They also seem to be aware that, if their children’s expectations are not met, there is the possibility 
of them migrating abroad. 
The mothers I interviewed are substantially invested in their children’s education, 
regardless of uncertain outcomes and long-term benefits.  They did encourage and motivate their 
children to pursue a higher education, and assumed it was their own fault if, after encouraging their 
children to pursue certain university specializations, the latter could not find job positions in the 
local labour market. “I wish I knew to suggest my son better and more profitable career options. 
He went into Engineering, but he could have been any time a good accountant, and with such a 
job one doesn’t have to leave the country. What can we do?  We were raised, educated in one way, 
and we didn’t know other and better ways to raise our children” (Melania, sixty-five administrative 
staff).  What she was expressing there was anxiety over having supported less profitable career 
options (i.e., engineering) and at the same time frustration with new neoliberal demands that 
required more pragmatic specializations, such as the one of accountant. Similarly, another 
respondent offered the view that: “We didn’t do enough for our children, and for their education. 
We didn’t do more because we didn’t know more, and we were not taught to know more by the 
communist system” (Camelia, fifty-eight, teacher).  
These interviews are about the transition and what it means to be confronted with this 
change as a parent. The Romanian mothers I interviewed experienced personal guilt when they 
 184 
realized that the careers and educational specializations they were suggesting to their children 
made them unemployable, and the only plausible opportunity left for them was migration. “If only 
I were given another chance to raise my kids. I would support them more and would help them 
choose a better career (i.e., economists, etc.). I would pay for more tutorials, help them more, etc. 
It’s good some people leave their shell and venture abroad, but for me this migration isn’t any joy: 
I don’t have my children near me!” (Adina, fifty-five, teacher). In this sense, the Romanian women 
noticed that their children were part of a social community that was still needed in the context of 
the diminishing of the communist welfare system and the onset of new capitalist rules.  
The social-economic lack of perspectives of young graduates was again articulated as being 
a result of the pedagogical actions of the mothers including their ignorance or not knowing enough 
in the field of education. Moreover, the lack of employment possibilities was understood as their 
own fault and particularly a mother’s fault: “I regret that she went to Canada. Instead of talking 
live to each other, we’re now talking on the phone, and we miss each other. We stay a lot on the 
phone, on the Internet. I wish I encouraged her to follow other careers. As a mother I could have 
done more for her” (Ana, fifty-eight, statistician). In this context, migration is seen as a result of a 
maternal erroneous or deficient pedagogical knowledge. “There weren’t so many programs in child 
education when I raised my child; there wasn’t this freedom, nor the Internet. If they were 
available, she would not be there [in Canada]” (Gabriela, fifty-seven-year-old, teacher). 
In the above testimonies, Romanian mothers never blamed their governments, nor 
Romania’s transition market for the lack of employment possibilities or good working conditions 
for their university graduated children. While there was a unanimous proclivity for parents’ self-
blame and self-guilt, it was harder to accept and believe it, considering the context of the shortages 
of the transition and the rest of their other statements regarding economic hardships. Nevertheless, 
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it is surprising how individualized and personalized the failure to find adequate employment was, 
and how little responsibility was put on the shoulders of the government and neoliberal demands 
to provide such opportunities for all its citizens. The mothering in this case remains in the hands 
of the women, but in very narrowly punctuated way they end up feeling responsible for the failures 
of the state or social actors who are redirecting the resources to projects that may not be viable in 
the long term. The issue was even more striking since the generation of the interviewed Romanian 
mothers was raised with a set of expectations in which the communist state would provide them 
automatically with employment and job opportunities. Now that the switch to a capitalist state had 
happened, all the previous protective functions of the welfare state were no longer in place and the 
only accountable actors in the process were themselves.  
It is also important to notice how, although freedom was one of the elements desired during 
the communist regime, the current possibility of migrating and leaving the country was not 
conceptualized as necessarily “freedom” of mobility. On the contrary, a situation that was once so 
much wanted, ended up leading to something that Romanian mothers mostly disfavoured, that was, 
their children’s leaving them. Additionally, they challenge the concept of freedom if their children 
can experience the freedom to live abroad, but not the freedom to choose to stay in their own home 
country. “We wanted so much this freedom, to go outside the country, to visit abroad, etc. I don’t 
see migration as a positive process, not at all, for this country, for this people and its future. Now 
you’re free to leave your country, but you can’t stay in your country. What kind of freedom is this? 
“ (Simona, sixty-two, retired teacher).  
My chapter engaged with women’s work as an essential element in the creation of the 
highly skilled Romanian immigrants to Canada. By that I mean the multiple efforts that mothers 
invest (in terms of waged and unwaged reproductive work) so that their children are qualified for 
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immigration programs such as the Federal Skilled Worker (FSWP). Since the efforts are indirect, 
and less visible at first sight, they are labelled as invisible. Equally crucial was to report Romanian 
mothers’ own voices and intellectual insights on social reproduction, education, transition and 
migration. By showing their intelligent testimonies, and sharp analysis of reality, they challenge 
the current focus of immigration programs, centred disproportionally on formal university-
legitimated high skills.  
When identifying women’s work, my analysis made a distinction between women’s waged 
(public) and women’s unwaged (domestic, private) work. Nevertheless, my analysis concluded 
that both types of female work contribute to the creation of university educated Romanian 
professionals and their reproduction as highly skilled subjects with the capability to migrate. As it 
relates to women’s waged work, my analysis followed up the work of various international 
political economists who argued that during the transition from communism in Eastern Europe it 
was rather women’s work that ended up being more easily convertible and valued in the capitalist 
market. Despite claims of “emancipation” and empowerment of women, communist policies 
maintained a gender division of labour. Nevertheless, the fact that women dominated the “soft”, 
“easy” communist industries advantaged them at in the switch to a capitalist market and made their 
skills more easily employable while men were massively laid off from their traditionally held 
occupations in the “heavy” industries. Such transformations induced by women’s higher 
employment rates impacted state budgets that were now collecting a lot of taxes from women’s 
waged work. However, the new conditions meant that various welfare support structures (such as 
education, healthcare, etc.) were now funded substantially also by women’s wages. With an 
increasing number of enrolments in education and especially in the education’s most expensive 
category (higher education), and a continuous reliance on state budgets and public finances for 
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their running, more attention should be paid to how such developments rely on women’s work and 
their contributions. The context becomes even more problematic and complicated when statistics 
inform us of massive outward migration rates and surveys share findings about the intentions of 
66 per cent of Romanian university graduates to leave the country.  
However, women’s waged work is just one angle of a two-fold analysis. The other angle 
is given by Romanian women’s unwaged, domestic work.  This work is pivotal in the formation 
of highly skilled immigrants. In this sense, scholarship that lacks a portrayal of women’s domestic 
work does not provide the resources to understand the implications of gender in the context of 
transition economies and neoliberal development. My interviews provide great insight into how 
Romanian women’s domestic work during communism and capitalist transition is pivotal both in 
the movement of migrant professional workers to a well-formed capitalist economy and the further 
development of the latter. They also render evident mothers’ manual, emotional, and intellectual 
work in fostering education and skills in their children.  
Beyond a description of their role in fostering the education of their children that frequently 
come to qualify as highly skilled workers in Canada, I also wanted to show how they deal with the 
process of migration and how they respond to it. In this sense, I found that Romanian mothers 
mostly blame themselves for the migration of their children, revealing in this way how neoliberal 
economic transitions and shortages are individualized instead of being adequately externalized. It 
is through women who take the responsibility for the migration of their children that dramatic 
neoliberal conditions such as, lack of jobs and perspectives, are normalized and naturalized, and it 
is through a transfer of the former communist state supported mechanisms onto the mothers in the 
form of guilt that such ideologies are perpetuated. Similarly, I wanted to underline how the mothers 
themselves are aware of different contradicting and sometimes opposing views (“free” liberal 
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regime vs. unfree, suppressed communist regime; the way they’re raising and socializing their 
children, and for what kind of insecure career opportunities post-graduation vs. the way they were 
raised and socialized and for what kind of stable employment opportunities, etc.). Examining the 
gender relationships that shape the migration to Canada was important with regards to the complex 
relationships that are triggered between different countries and various categories invested in the 
process. Women’s role and reproductive labour is one part of the question. Another part of the 
question is the ways transition states take no responsibility for ensuring employment opportunities, 
and good living standards for university graduates whereas economies of the Global North 
capitalize on these shortcomings for their own development. Shifting the blame, personalizing and 
domesticating the factors of migration diminish the responsibility of the actual state for the well-
being of its citizens. And it is not just the Romanian state, but also the Canadian one, for which 
the Romanian mothers’ self-blaming makes invisible the role of the host state in providing good 
living conditions for its newcomers and migrants. Last but not least, in attracting highly skilled 
professionals from developing countries Canadian migration policies fail to consider the impact 
that their policies might have on the sending countries, especially as they relate to discussions of 
migration and development. In this sense, the loss of skilled workers places the sending countries 
at a disadvantage (Skeldon 2009). The movement of so many professionals from developing 
countries cannot be but a loss to and prejudicial for the growth and development of origin countries 
since it is the engineers, physicians, and computer programmers that are needed. The current 
scholarship shows that it is the state budget of the origin country that pays for the education of 
such professionals who leave for work abroad, and that the issue is not even particularly recent. 
The premise is that the cost of training is indeed supported by the country of origin, but 
little is known about how women’s work is contributing through it (via their wages or their 
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investment in processes of social reproduction. At the same time other scholars argue that, since 
education has become increasingly privatized, its cost is now being covered by the family (Skeldon 
2009). What is important to observe is that the element of the ‘family’ contribution is not equally 
distributed between its members, and, if we are looking at some of the Eastern European states, 
for example, it is also heavily gendered with women’s work contributing more substantially to the 
creation of highly skilled workers. Taking in consideration that the domestic work in households 
as well as the raising of children is still heavy gendered in Romania, and disproportionately done 
by women, their work contributes significantly to the formation of highly skilled immigrants to 
Canada. Additionally, after the transition to the capitalist market, Romanian women’s work 
contributed significantly to the Romanian state budget, assuring indirectly the higher education 
and the specialized skills for the future immigration candidates. Consequently, the formation of 
highly skilled young Romanian professionals who leave the country and migrate to Canada is 
indebted to both the domestic and public work of Romania’s women.  
The interviews with Romanian mothers mainly document women’s domestic work 
contributions in the formation of highly skilled migrants, namely cooking, cleaning, etc., for their 
children while they are pursuing university degrees. At the same time, as already demonstrated, 
the situation points to women’s work as critically forming state budgets and, therefore, 
contributing more to the state’s free provision of higher education. As mentioned before, the 
problem exists when so much of women’s work (public and private) gets invested in developing 
skills and specializations that end up being capitalized elsewhere by leaving the country for 
Canada. 
In this regard, there is clearly a need for much more analysis of the interaction between 
different actors involved in the process of migration (governments, NGO communities, etc.) and 
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for a change of perspective on migration goals, but also for addressing global economic 
inequalities (North, South; East, West). There is also a need to question programs (such as some 
of the “brain races” migration programs) which capitalize on these global inequalities and deepen 
the devaluation of social reproductive work.  
 Without a doubt, the Romanian case is particularly interesting as it provides an insight into 
the indirect costs and benefits, effects and consequences of migration flows as well as links to 
different countries and demographic categories. What is particularly interesting about Romania is 
how significant the gender component is in such migration stories. When so much of the work is 
gendered (due to the disproportionate input of women into processes of social reproduction), then 
the Canadian model of migration entails layers of oppression and disadvantage. For example, 
welfare systems in the Eastern European countries that were supposed to help and benefit the local 
citizens end up contributing to the accumulation of capital in the North and West. Similarly, skills, 
talents, capacities are formed at the expense of women’s work (as they contribute to the state 
budgets with disproportionate roles in social reproduction) and without them benefitting from their 
input. In this scenario, economically privileged nations end up reinforcing their already achieved 
advantage and status by deepening the marginalization of already marginalized countries. Gender 
becomes a determinant of the migration flow, with greater demand for skilled labour in developed 
countries, assuring a continuous nurturing and tending of those needs in the developing countries. 
This unfairness and injustice definitely contribute further to women’s subordination and exploits 
gender division of labour. With that in mind, it would be good to find possibilities for transnational 
feminist responses and solutions to such problems.  
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Chapter Five: Feminist Critiques of Proposed Solutions to Counter-Balance the Highly 
Skilled Migration Movement. Possibilities for Transnational Feminist Solidarity 
 
It is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to recognize, 
accept, and celebrate those differences. 
                                                            (Audre Lorde 1994:52) 
 
While in the previous chapters I have highlighted the harmful effects that certain migration 
schemes have for women’s rights and developing countries, in this section I am describing how 
some of the solutions and recommendations (i.e. remittances, policies of return and re-engagement, 
etc.) suggested by the literature in the field to counter-balance the departure of highly-skilled 
migrants do not end up having a meaningful long-lasting impact, nor do they restore the justice to 
the communities left behind. Due to these failures, I am also looking at possibilities of highly-
skilled migration policy reforms and reviews, through a gender focus. Furthermore, I am mapping 
the possibilities for transnational feminist alliances and grassroots ground work for raising 
awareness and building resistance regarding some of the negative outcomes of such migrations 
and the failure of the current measures to offset it. Possibilities of policy reforms and feminist 
activism are highlighted as a means of undoing this type of gender unbalance and injustice as well 
as to address the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries.  
My own journey as a Federal Skilled Worker in Canada is one that informs and shapes this 
project. I was raised and educated in Romania mostly through Romanian women’s paid and unpaid 
social reproductive work. In this dissertation, I have demonstrated how some of the production 
and reproduction of the neoliberal economy of Canada relies indirectly on women’s work, much 
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of it through international migration. Such processes happen in a context of transition insecure 
economies that end up co-constituting such movements, as it is the case of Romania. While I 
cannot draw a causal connection between Canada’s economic advancement and the social 
reproduction and the public work of Romanian women, it is vital that we recognize that the 
connection is there even if it does not map easily and linearly on Canada’s development of both 
the body politic and also its economy. Most of the mothers I interviewed highlighted exactly these 
connections in arguing that the neoliberal development of countries such as Canada is subsidized 
by developing transition countries, in an equation that deepens global inequalities in the world. 
They also acknowledge the conditions of precarious economies and lack of fulfilling opportunities 
as a push-and-pull factor of migration. Nevertheless, women’s labour and their affective, social, 
creative investments in the formation of crucial capacities and talents are not marginal. Many of 
the mothers’ discourses orient us to problematize easy answers to questions of development and 
social reproduction even when one thinks of their knowledge as ideologically informed and shaped 
by the structures within which they find themselves including the household. For them, there is a 
clear connection between the work they do, the children they raise and the professionals they 
participate in constituting: the highly skilled migrants to Canada who end up growing the economy 
of Canada. For them, their labour not only serves Romania but also the development and growth 
of already developed Western countries such as Canada. It is a negative cumulative effect that does 
not reduce global regional disparities and only deepens the precarious economic status of the origin 
countries. Furthermore, I wanted to show how the costs of social reproduction in neoliberal 
economies have transferred more work on women’s shoulders inside and outside Canada’s border. 
For example, while Canadian privileged women entered workforce, the childcare work that they 
had been doing as housewives was shifted to the work of live-in caregiver migrants. It also 
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translated into an increased absorption and selection of highly skilled migrants, trained at other 
countries’ expense and through other women’s work investments, as in the case of Romania. 
Nevertheless, despite the race of developed governments to collect particularly skills and talents 
through their immigration policies, I have shown how the discourses that divide skills and brains 
cannot be understood outside the discourses about bodies, care and the social reproductive work 
of women. My own biography is deeply marked by these migration processes, thereby informing 
my interest in this project. From this point of identification, I showed how migration programs, 
which focus on brain gains and acquisition of talents, rely on patriarchal divisions of labour and 
gender hierarchy, and are always subsidized through the work performed elsewhere. In this 
gendered hierarchy, minds are considered superior, and of higher value than bodies just as, 
women’s work, largely associated with the social reproduction of the said minds, is not equally 
prioritized and valued. I wanted to show that such divisions are unrealistic and sexist, because as 
feminist scholarship points out, such segregation is problematic, and it serves to perpetuate the 
exploitation and oppression of women who come to be identified with their bodies. It benefits 
gendered male subjects who are identified with their minds. Minds and bodies coexist, processes 
of production and reproduction are equally interdependent, and the Romanian highly skilled 
migration to Canada is an example of it.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, in the 1990s and 2000s a new neoliberal 
idea was put forward which suggested that economies particularly need a knowledge-based 
workforce in order to reach new levels of growth and development (Boeri, Brücker, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2012). The capacity to train either such a young workforce or to encourage its migration 
was seen as essential to ensure one country’s performance as a viable economic, social and political 
power internationally. It was at this point in economic history that governments of developed 
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countries such as Canada, United States and Australia entered a global brain race and focused on 
immigration programs that stimulated and attracted young, and highly-educated professional 
migrants. The assumption was that it was particularly migrants with such training and knowledge 
that would bring their new countries to a new level of development and performance (Parrenas 
2001; Piperno 2007; Sassen 1998; Walby 2009). However, at the same time the said economies 
entered a neoliberal phase of development when, in the name of efficiency and cost-saving, crucial 
welfare services are cut (Parrenas 2001; Esping Andersen 1997). Feminists have noticed that 
whenever state assured public welfare services are dismantled, it is private families that are 
required to cover that need, formerly provided by the state, and within the said families, it is 
actually women’s work which is called for to meet that need (Arat-Koc 1999). In “Whose Social 
Reproduction? Transnational Motherhood and Challenges to Feminist Political Economy”, Sedef 
Arat-Koc shows exactly these linkages between the accumulation of capital and new rates of profit 
and growth of the Global North, on one hand, and its own social-reproduction that is done by 
immigrant nannies in Canada, on the other hand. The immigrant nannies’ work in Canada mediates 
this capital accumulation through a process of undervaluation of their work as it is cheaply paid 
for and is subject to a lot of scrutiny and surveillance. Nevertheless, such work should be highly 
valued as it replaces the usual state welfare function to provide for its citizens the necessary care 
(including childcare) within its sovereign boundaries. However, the unfolding of neoliberal 
economies relies increasingly on transnational women’s work outside their country’s borders, as 
is also the case for Romania and its highly skilled migration to Canada.  
Of course, in the competitive global search for brainpower, the assumption that countries 
which already have a lot of resources will be in the position to attract and gain the most valuable 
and beneficial skills is implicit. Therefore, “the global quest for talent will be won by countries 
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that are already prosperous which will widen the economic gaps that spur migration” (Kupstch 
and Fong 2006: 1). In this sense, the countries that are considered already developed and 
competitive will attract migrants with the most talented and competitive set of skills which will 
lead to another cycle of growth and development. While I have already shown how such brain 
races place the social reproductive work that is mostly associated with women in a deprioritized 
and less valued position, it is equally important to notice how this set of highly valued and 
beneficial skills are extracted from countries that are less developed and that actually need these 
skills the most to overcome the problems of the developing phase. If already developed countries 
manage to attract talents and skills and absorb them from poor and developing countries, the 
economic gap perpetuates itself: the already developed countries experience new outcomes of 
growth and development and the developing countries, in the absence of this highly skilled 
workforce, fail to record any advancement and face just more stagnation and underdevelopment 
(Parrenas 2001; Piperno, 2007; Laurie 2008; Skeldon 2009).  
Talking about “global cities”, Saskia Sassen argues that globalization, trade and neoliberal 
development enabled a geographic expansion of the economic activities that transformed some of 
the cities of the global North into an agglomeration of headquarters of highly specialized service 
firms, such as accounting, legal services, public relations, programming, telecommunications, etc., 
whereas manufacturing and industry gets particularly produced and territorialized in the global 
South (Sassen 2005).  Similarly, we can argue that, while the absorption and retention of highly 
skilled migration happens in the developed cities of the North and West, the production of this 
workforce, through women’s labour, occurs in the South and East. Nevertheless, in the equation 
of costs vs. benefits in the production and utilization of this workforce, it is the latter countries that 
mostly bear the burden and brunt of it, as it is the case of Romania.  
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There is a substantial scholarship that considers the highly skilled knowledge migration 
from one economy to another as a net loss of contributions and investments by one state to the 
advantage of another state that harvests the profit by deploying these skills within their economy 
(Bhagwati and Hamada 1973; Bundred and Levitt 2000). However, there are not too many studies 
that engage systematically with how women’s paid and unpaid work from developing transition 
countries feeds into these cycles of uneven development.  It is with this idea in mind that I 
proceeded with this project.   
Writing on the brain drain phenomenon, Docquier and Rapoport (2004) estimate that 
overall migration rates increased at a much higher rate for the highly trained specialists. The two 
North American countries of migration, the US and Canada together, represented as much as 70 
percent of the receiving of skilled immigrants (Docquier and Rapoport 2004). 
The source locations of the skilled immigrants are indeed the developing countries. For 
example, one study of 55 developing countries provided evidence that a third of them lost more 
than 15 per cent of their tertiary educated populations through migration (Lowell et al, 2004). 
“Extreme examples include countries such as Turkey and Morocco that already lost 40 per cent of 
their highly skilled force while in the Caribbean economies it is approximated that a half of all the 
tertiary educated adults have already left” (Findlay 2006: 70). Furthermore, according to Hanson 
(2010: 4364), the proportion of the highly skilled in the migrant population to North America is 
the predominant one. In this sense, North America attracts only 35 per cent of immigrants with a 
primary education, while the rest of the 66 per cent of immigrants have secondary and tertiary 
education. 
Encouraging educational attainment and educational participation has been on the agenda 
of governments long before the brain race migration policies existed. Such interest is automatically 
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justified when one looks at the many advantages and benefits that follow after governments enact 
policies regarding the acquisition of migrants with highly valuable skills. For example, various 
statistics demonstrate that having more education helps individuals get more accessible and better 
employment prospects. A recent OECD examination of the issue demonstrates that, between the 
start of the 2008 and 2010 on an average, joblessness rates bounced from a high 8.8 per cent to 
12.5 per cent for individuals without a secondary education. Interestingly, unemployment rates for 
individuals with higher education stayed much lower, moving by less than 1.5 per cent (from 3.3 
per cent to 4.7 per cent) during the same period (OECD 2012). In the meantime, it is those with 
higher education that keep on receiving higher earnings. It might be banal information, but 
earnings tend to rise in line with one’s level of education. Additionally, rising salary compensation 
levels are paralleled with a progressively higher gap with the individuals who received lower levels 
of training. For instance, in 2008, on average across OECD nations, a man with higher education 
might foresee to gain 58 per cent more than his counterpart without similar training and 
instructions. By 2010, this difference increased to 67 per cent. In this way, in light of the fact that 
societies need extensive amounts of workers with skills and talents, it is likely that the advantages 
for workers of having advanced a higher education will stay solid not simply for the time being, 
but rather over the long haul also. For example, all things considered over the 28 OECD countries, 
in 2012 the monetary benefit of securing a university degree rather than secondary degree, 
excluding the related expenses, is over $160 000 for men and around $110 000 for women (OECD 
2012).  
Nevertheless, the monetary and social returns on public funds that are utilized to help 
individuals acquire higher training are also high as there are various returns in increased income 
tax payments and different savings for every person that is supported in higher instruction. It is 
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estimated that the returns represent on average four times the sum of the public investment from 
the budget (OECD 2012).  
Obviously, the public and private benefits of higher education go beyond perfect financial 
measurements. Above all, larger amounts of training are connected with a longer life expectancy, 
increased voting rates, and more supportive attitudes towards equal rights, gender, racial and ethnic 
justice, etc. In this sense, putting resources into higher education yields great profits both for people 
and societies, as noted in the Education at a Glance document released by OECD in 2012 (OECD 
2012).  
 As mentioned in the OECD analysis, it is interesting to see how the investment gains of 
higher education benefit not just individual people, but the society at large through the extra 
revenues obtained via taxes that the university educated individuals pay once they enter in the 
labour market. In the context of outward migration, it is equally interesting to see how such gains 
of higher education are not spreading their benefits on the society that made those initial 
investments, as it is clearly the case of Romanian migration to Canada.  
 According to the 2012 OECD study, some of the benefits that might improve the society 
at large include earnings, taxes, and larger social contributions as “social transfers” (OECD 2012: 
111). Conceptualized as social transfers are the consumption rates of goods and services that are 
higher if wages increase with acquiring new levels of education. This means that individuals with 
higher levels of education typically consume more goods and services. Furthermore, persons with 
higher earnings typically also contribute more into their pensions which all means that their 
education accomplishments will give rise to a complex set of effects beyond the mere financial 
ones taken into account here.  
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 Nevertheless, if university educated individuals migrate as is the case of Romanian 
migrants to Canada, their departure leaves empty the consequent reward structures for the 
country’s initial investments. Moreover, future social transfers are vanishing from the scheme and 
more critical research must be done to identify when they are about to happen. In countries where 
university educated individuals stay, and obtain low or no tuition fees, these people typically pay 
back public subsidies later in life through progressive tax systems.  
 This is not the case of highly skilled university educated Romanians that leave for Canada. 
The public and private benefits and returns cannot be measured in the same way in their case. For 
example, their educational accomplishments do not lead to local higher earnings that via higher 
taxes might compensate more the public budget for its initial investments.  Similarly, they do not 
attempt to consume more goods and services in their home countries so that they can render their 
local economies more dynamic. Furthermore, they do not contribute to the pension plans and future 
welfare of others, nor they do end up creating a better society with progressive values (longer life 
expectancy, increased voting rates, more supportive attitudes towards equal rights, and gender, 
ethnic and racial justice).  
Some of the literature has unsuccessfully argued that remittances can be quantified as social 
transfers that result from the migration of the highly skilled. Defined as the money sent home by 
migrants, remittances are believed to reduce the level and intensity of poverty in the developing 
countries (World Bank 2013). Nevertheless, leaving aside the continent of Africa, the remittance 
rates sent elsewhere in the developing world has fallen steadily in the past years while there is not 
enough evidence that it might generate long term sustainable development (Mara 2010). 
Additionally, the more long-term the immigration is planned, as it is the case of the Romanian 
immigrants to Canada who plan to stay and become Canadians, the smaller are the remittances 
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(Mara 2010). Needless to say, the remittances are channeled into private families rather than into 
community development or investments, and therefore they escape government regulation and use 
for collective purposes. Since the remittances happen outside the public sphere, they are not 
regulated by the government and cannot be used for purposes such as improving local 
infrastructure or for investments in health and education (Findlay 2006). Since these procedures 
are individualized and personalized as they happen between specific individuals, remittances do 
not address the general and social collective well-being, nor are able to lead to a unified national 
development strategy (de Haas 2007). That is probably one of the reasons why the current 
scholarship labels them as “short term success for long term problems” (Kaneff and Pine 2011: 
27), therefore not enough to balance the loss of skilled workers through migration. While some 
remittances might qualify as part of the equation of reward structures, in this case it is certain that, 
due to their arbitrary and unsystematic nature, they do not adequately compensate for the loss of 
highly educated individuals who immigrate to countries where they would have higher earnings 
potentials. 
When evaluating the gains and losses through migration or education though, many 
analyses assume very stable contexts (Birrell, Dobson, Rapson, Smith 2001). It must be in one of 
these stable contexts where one person’s acquisition of higher education leads to greater job 
prospects and promising wages which automatically and undisturbingly produced social transfers. 
These analogies do not take into consideration “transition” economic contexts or dramatic 
challenges that bring disruption to hypothetical social transfers to a local state budget as well as to 
private families (such as in the case of outward migration). Neither do they pay attention to the 
possible circulation of one’s labour and knowledge power, or to how the two categories can be 
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divided, with one’s knowledge power produced at the expense of one’s country and one’s labour 
extracted in another country as it is the case of the Romanian immigrants to Canada.  
 When mentioning the skills that particularly Eastern European professionals possess, the 
feminist anthropologist Frances Pine makes use of metaphors and considers that “many East 
European households are rich in particular assets but cash poor” (Kaneff and Pine 2011: 8). The 
situation in itself is a bit different from other people’s in poor or developing countries. 
Furthermore, she claims that many of the concrete forms of social security provided by the former 
socialist states- such as free education, housing, healthcare- are the origin of current resources that 
have considerable potential transferable value on the labour market. Some of the examples of such 
skills developed in a former communist setting include the foundation of solid interpersonal 
networks (coming about because of the consumer goods shortages in the communist period), home 
ownership, educational skills/qualifications and good health condition; all are assets in the present 
that distinguish the post-socialist poor from other poor individuals in different developing 
countries. For example, she cites the importance of home ownership in the cities as an asset 
(renting out a room and thus converting housing assets accumulated in the socialist period into an 
income in the present). At the same time, while some of these assets so easily acquired in the 
socialist period are devalued in time (industrial skills, Russian language knowledge), multiple 
others have increased their potential to be converted on the labour market (English language, and 
computer skills). She concludes that it is those economically marginalized Eastern European “new 
poor” holding a variety of non-material assets (educational qualifications, computer, bureaucratic 
skills) who are among the best placed to move out of impoverished positions through migration. 
The fact that they possess such skills and non-material assets makes them more desirable especially 
in countries that have brain power migration policies, such as Canada’s Federal Skilled Worker 
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program. The greater their non-material assets, the higher their migration rate and their loss for the 
country of origin.  
Over all, their departure definitely prompts a diminishing, if not a serious disintegration of 
tax structures and government revenues which are crucial to fund social programs and welfare 
structures. In this sense, the migration of Romanians to Canada seems to fit more and more into 
global patterns where destination countries receive workers who have been raised, educated, 
trained and provided for in their country of origin which bore the costs of that upbringing. In effect, 
the receiving richer countries are benefiting from the investment made by poorer countries in the 
development of their citizens (Berger and Mohr 1975; Castles and Miller 2009: 58, 63-67). 
Regarding the migration of highly skilled workers, and their losses for the country of 
origin, Skeldon gives good examples of how such a departure affects the general well-being of the 
population. “In terms of skilled workers, the agronomists who work to increase agricultural yields 
to improve the nutrition that will combat disease, the water engineers who work to supply safe 
drinking water, the sanitary engineers who build the sewerage systems, the transport engineers 
who improve communications that allow food to be taken from point of supply to where it is 
needed, and so on, are as critical as any skilled doctor in improving the health status of a 
population” (Skeldon 2009: 17). Therefore, the migration of highly skilled workers clearly 
intersects with the right to health, education, and technological development for the people left 
behind. In this form, this kind of mobility represents a transfer of knowledge and skills resources 
from those who do not have them or who have very little of them to those who already have them.  
It is important to notice that one cannot have a migration of the highly skilled for the growth 
and development of one country without having the sending country being marginalized. While 
the migration of highly skilled professionals will add to the growth and competitiveness of the 
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destination country, it will also imply direct costs and losses for the countries of origin. Namely, 
some of these losses are associated with public subsidies to education or losses from forgone tax 
revenues (Mattei and Fondazzione 2009). Or, as another researcher puts it: “states that subsidize 
the educations of many of their citizens would be deprived of the tax contributions that those 
citizens who emigrated would have made to offset the cost of their schooling” (McHale 2007: 27). 
Without a doubt, the loss of skilled migrants negatively affects state budgets of the sending 
countries through a lack of future contributions as well as investments in the infrastructure. These 
lost contributions could have been in part the returns on public investment in the education of the 
now- migrating workers, who, after migration, get to richer and more powerful destination 
countries.  
The movement of professionals from East to West, alongside similar flows of professionals 
from South to North America, means that such migration processes raise important ethical 
questions in terms of equality, fairness and justice. In this sense, it has been already demonstrated 
that the migration of healthcare professionals leads to an erosion of human capital that has a direct 
impact on the provision of welfare and knowledge for the population left behind. Such erosions in 
the provision of welfare and knowledge can be measured in falling health indicators (Stillwell 
2004). Therefore, the migration of health workers can lead to the loss of health know-how, to 
generally poorer health and even higher mortality rates for the people in the country left behind 
(Raghuram 2011). The cost of training is being borne by the poorer countries to the advantage of 
the richer ones, leading to ever-widening gaps in services provided and new inequalities. Without 
a doubt, the new cycles of uneven development and growing gaps contribute to further migration 
and instead of diminishing in time, they end up creating more migration flows. While highly skilled 
and more resourceful professionals depart, they leave behind people with fewer skills and fewer 
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resources. Those who are left behind become targets for receiving assistance and help from a state, 
already eroded in its ability to adequately support the population by the departure of the highly-
skilled professionals.  
In Eastern Europe, the transition to privatization and marketization after the fall of 
communism meant a state withdrawal in assistance and support for the less advantaged categories 
of population. A more general withdrawal of the former communist state support translated into 
serious cuts in social services and benefits. With an aging population, an increase of social 
fragmentation and dismemberment of communities, due to migration, the departure of the highly 
skilled, coupled with state withdrawal from providing social services resulted into a diminishing 
of the standard of living and well-being of the people left behind as well as impoverishment of the 
poor and an intensified vulnerability of the ones already vulnerable (Abella 2006; Papademetriou 
1985; Papademetriou and Martin 1991).  
In this context, the highly skilled professionals should be seen as crucial to achieving basic 
welfare objectives while their departure could seriously jeopardize the provision of decent welfare 
services in the countries of origin (for example, the migration of healthcare professionals impacts 
the quality of healthcare that the citizens receive; the migration of teachers and trainers impacts 
the quality of education that the citizens obtain, etc.)  
Thus, the depletion of the most trained, young and productive skilled force aggravates the 
developing conditions of transition economies. While private individuals and families seek flight 
from their developing conditions and imagine finding a solution through migration, their departure 
also exacerbates the negative economic context they are leaving behind. Depriving communities 
of their most valuable workforce undermines local developing economies which are now exploited 
for the benefit of the industrialized developed nations, in a vicious cycle of accelerated growth, on 
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one side, and aggravated poverty, on the other. These cycles only foster more outward migration, 
in equations of uneven development and dependency that perpetuate themselves (Reichert 1981; 
Rubenstein 1992). The negative feedback mechanisms of outward migration and the deepening of 
inequalities between sending and receiving countries end up reinforcing international economic 
polarizations.  
In looking to pull out and absorb the world’s ‘‘best and brightest’’ (McKenzie, Gibson 
2010), developed countries rarely examine the costs and possible consequences that their policies 
might have on the countries of origin. Indeed, as the migration scholarship points out, the loss of 
the highly skilled workers not only affects growth and development, but it is also prejudicial to the 
health, education, and well-being of the status of populations of origin (Skeldon 2009). 
Furthermore, a pulling out of the highly skilled by destination countries leaves the origin society 
with a majority pool of lower quality, or less experienced skilled (Commander et al., 2004). The 
scenario resembles an inverted U-shaped relationship between migration and wealth, “consistent 
with low-wealth individuals being too poor to afford to migrate and high-wealth individuals having 
an incentive not to leave” (Hanson 2010: 244). Migrants thus tend to be drawn from the middle of 
the wealth distribution, leading to increased inequality (Hanson 2010: 247). It also leads to greater 
gender inequality and gender injustice, as I will further demonstrate. 
What is important to note is how both the state and family contributions to the education 
of highly skilled workers are usually assumed as neutral and equally shared between both the 
citizens of a state and the members of a family. However, the example of the Romanian highly 
skilled professionals teaches us otherwise and shows how such contributions are gendered, with 
women providing much more work for the creation of highly skilled migrants. At the same time, 
while the inputs are gendered, the returns are either insignificant or non-existent. Once the 
 206 
Romanian highly skilled decide to leave, the returns in social transfers are disproportionately too 
low (via remittances) in comparison to initial contributions, or none at all, leaving the primary 
investments with a loss. In this sense, the migration process has both economic and social costs 
and requires would-be migrants to use local resources and women’s work that the poorer countries 
have to offer in exchange for no equal returns. Therefore, migration means a loss to the economy, 
providing other developed countries with “instant adults” reared of the expenses of developing 
nations (Sobel 2009).  
Talking about brain-drain migration, researcher Allan Findlay considers that Australia, for 
example, needs an international migration policy which “embraces not only immigration, but also 
emigration and especially circulation” (Findlay 2006: 144). By emigration and circulation policies, 
the researcher means that the countries which have a sustained record of recruiting the highly 
skilled must provide associated policies that recompense in some form the origin area (even if we 
are not talking about explicit financial compensations). At the same time sending countries should 
envision “return” and “re-engagement” migration policies (Findlay 2006: 150). The premise is in 
this case that there is a lot to gain by just acquiring experience, knowledge, and connections in 
foreign nations as well as the ways in which the expertise, experience, and contacts of the Diaspora 
can be harnessed to benefit highly skilled recruiting countries in a rapidly interconnected world 
(Findlay 2006: 150). Similarly, sending countries should create a good domestic environment to 
attract migrants back or enact government policies aimed at retaining skilled workers so that the 
countries can recover some of the government finances spent on training and education. Of course, 
the best way to create a good domestic environment to retain skilled workers or attract them back 
is an amelioration of the economic conditions and an improvement of livelihoods. As one 
researcher sums it up: “emigration falls as average income rises” (Hanson 2010: 236). In the 
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following section I will discuss why such government measures, despite their good faith and 
intentions, fail to restore the initial equilibrium and a sense of justice to the communities left 
behind.  
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Section A: Feminist Critiques of Policies for Circulation, Return and Re-Engagement 
of Highly Skilled Migrants 
 
  In order to balance the brain drain phenomenon, the current scholarships argues that 
policies of emigration and circulation, respectively return and re-engagement, are necessary 
(Findlay 2006, Hanson 2010). Following this argument, governments of the Global North can 
address the losses and the lack of social transfers that the process of migration develops in sending 
countries, by setting up corrective migration policies of circulation and re-engagement. 
Nevertheless, the set of proposed corrective policies continues to fail to address the costs and 
damages of such phenomena from a gender perspective. The policy measures for return and reward 
gains that are advocated for fail to formulate or incorporate a gender perspective. 
 The current literature argues that it will be beneficial if governments of Global North start 
thinking about policies of emigration as well as immigration (Findlay 2006, Hanson 2010). Taking 
into consideration Canada’s example and the fact that, through its migration policies, the country 
collects highly skilled professionals from developing parts of the world, the government could 
consider enacting policies to compensate for the losses that such absorption initiatives cause in the 
origin countries. With that in mind, if Canada’s immigration system affects the skills base as well 
as the provision of education, healthcare, and technological development in the origin country, 
said immigration policies could be accompanied by investments and parallel transfers of 
expenditures to the educational, healthcare, etc. sectors of the home countries of the immigrants. 
In this respect, Canada’s immigration policies could aim at improving the welfare and well-being 
of the people left behind, and increase the social security and the provision of good nationwide 
public services so that the emigration of “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 2010) would 
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not leave a migrant’s country in safety-net collapse. As problematic as they are, various scholars 
argue that foreign direct investments and development aid could act as a stable reliable insurance 
that protects people from income increasing disparities and economic downturns while 
maintaining the welfare, education, health, and living conditions in the countries of origin of the 
highly skilled migrants. In this way the migration of “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 
2010) would not jeopardize the living conditions and well-being of the populations left behind 
(Basch, Schiller and Blanc: 1994; de Haas: 2007). 
Nevertheless, such policies fail to address women’s greater contribution to the provision 
and funding of the welfare structures as well as women’s greater investments in the formation of 
the highly skilled migrants. In contrast to current migration policies that impoverish countries and 
deepen the inequalities, a responsible immigration policy could not envision reducing the socio-
economic differences between countries without also reducing gender disparities.  
 In their own turn, the scholarship argues, sending countries could be more focused in 
retaining highly skilled migrants and creating better work opportunities for them within their 
countries (Findlay 2006, Hanson 2010). One such option, for example, could consist in increasing 
a minimum wage. This measure alone could drive wages upward for all labour categories. Or, 
similarly, they could reduce working hours in line with business productivity; or encourage 
flexible working options, and so on. If the migration of highly skilled professionals is detrimental 
to developing countries, the assumption is that governments could consider policies that protect 
them from the draining of their best skilled labour. Nevertheless, the same policies are not 
identifying how women’s social reproductive work in the private households is still unpaid, and 
therefore any minimum wage increases would not apply to them. Any minimum wage increase 
would not address, nor decrease the disparities between the private social reproductive work 
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associated with women and the public work associated with men. In this sense, few acclaimed 
benefits of emigration (such as irregular, temporary and unstable individualized remittances) 
cannot overshadow the many long term negative side effects of such movements, namely the 
perpetuation of the developing phase of the economy, and the widening of global inequalities.  
 In addition, the literature argues that sending government countries could develop policies 
of return migration and re-engagement for those who have left in order to recover some of the 
public funds invested in the education of highly skilled professional migrants (Findlay 2006, 
Hanson 2010). While recently there have been some initiatives to attract Romanians living abroad 
back in their origin countries as investors, such as the proposal to match diasporic Romanians’ 
investment money with government funds (Stan 2016), little has been done for the majority of 
Romanian immigrants who do not fit the entrepreneur, business class description of government 
policies, nor have the resources for investments. Of course, one of the best return and re-
engagement methods consists in a nationwide improvement of general livelihoods. Securing and 
improving livelihoods, as well as overcoming social, economic and institutional development 
constraints, could also act as a deterrent of long term outward migration and reduce the income 
disparities between developed and developing countries. Another outcome that might stimulate 
the development of return and re-engagement migration policies is the fact that attracting highly 
skilled migration back would also mean recovering some of the public funds invested in the 
education. This way, holders of the highly skilled capital, who previously enjoyed the benefits of 
the social welfare state in acquiring it, could finally contribute to and share the costs for the 
maintenance of decent livelihoods and the necessary social safety nets for the current population 
in need. Similarly, a government interest in re-engaging its highly skilled professional migrants 
abroad would also act as a way of maintaining a transnational connection and bond, especially 
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since studies already have already shown that the longer the time period of migration, the more 
the migrants get settled and are less involved in preserving transnational and community ties (de 
Haas 2007). Emigrants can be a source of increasing trade, investment, and financial flows, but 
also of transfer of knowledge in the form of new ideas, practices, and technologies (Kapur 2010). 
Furthermore, taking into consideration the high rates of sexism and women’s structural 
marginalization as well as the gender gap, the policies of retention and re-engagement of the 
potential highly skilled migrants could not leave outside a gender equity agenda. Career 
opportunities with parental leaves and affordable child care facilities, for example, are never 
included in return and re-engagement migration policies.  
 However, potential gender-based emigration policies are complex and multifaceted, and 
need more government attention and acknowledgement from both the receiving and sending 
countries. Until they can calculate the gendered investments in the formation of the highly skilled 
migrants, governments need to look into the current devaluation and underpayment of women’s 
work. For example, women’s domestic work contribution and social reproductive work are lacking 
any visibility and recognition in both Canada and Romania.  
In this sense, for example, the historic idea of wages for housework and domestic work has 
been a feminist ideal since the 1970s. Cox and Federici have long argued that, since housework 
and childcare are socially vital, housewives should be paid for their work as any other workers 
(Cox and Federici 1975). Furthermore, when women end up being paid for their household labour, 
the status of the occupation might climb.  Since job status is influenced by wage rates, consequently 
there would be more and more public acceptance and acknowledgement of the fact that what 
women did in the home is important and relevant work. Together with this strategy of assigning 
economic remuneration for women’s domestic work, governments should increase awareness 
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levels of communities and develop educational campaigns for making it everyone’s responsibility 
for doing the care work regardless of gender. Similarly, governments should start enforcing for 
equal opportunity in the workplace and pay equity for everyone. With that in mind, although 
Canada and Romania are signatories of the United Nations Convention for the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) and the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), these 
pledges are still to be lived up to. For example, while in Canada women’s employment rate 
increased significantly in the last two decades, their share of market incomes did not increase 
proportionately. Women in Canada still get lower than average incomes and have 
disproportionately large shares of part-time, low-paid, non-standard and unpaid work (Lahey and 
de Villota 2013). Similarly, in Romania, while the communist government established and 
enforced official state policies of gender equality for more than 40 years, after its fall, the 
promotion of equal opportunities for women was not a priority for subsequent governments. For 
example, communism ensured a stable quota of women in government positions; however, such 
quotas were not in place afterwards, and women’s participation diminished progressively as years 
went by. In 2016 Romanian women constituted only 14 per cent of the Upper House or Senate, 
respectively 20.7 per cent of the Lower House (IPU 2016).    
The migration of the young highly skilled university educated Romanian professionals, 
leaving behind their aging parents, creates a skill vacuum in the sphere of work that is largely 
associated with women, namely the care work. In Romania, it is still assumed that it is the young 
generation’s duty to provide for the care of aging parents.  
Faced with a state that does not provide sufficient facilities for the care of the elderly and 
an ageing demographics, the migration of young highly skilled workers also means an underlying 
care shortage. Since women act as the primary caregivers for the aged, their loss is even greater 
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for the care resources of the origin country while putting more pressure on the women left behind 
to perform more care work. If we assess such processes from a gender perspective, it appears that 
the migration of highly skilled professionals creates both brain and care precariousness and 
vulnerability with respect to the general welfare system. Putting more pressure on welfare 
facilities, migration drains the care resources from countries of origin, leaving local welfare 
systems and private families to deal on their own with the consequences of such departures 
(Piperno 2007).  
The negative effects of the departure of the highly skilled for the people left behind is 
gendered. The departure of highly skilled Romanian migrants to Canada started at a time when all 
the post-socialist Eastern European countries were restructuring their economies and were 
transitioning from a communist government.  Thus, many of the welfare support structures 
disappeared making room for increasing privatization and marketization of social services. 
However, the end of the welfare communist state and of the means of collective care also meant 
more burden put on the family’s shoulders and more dependency on family members. It was in 
these times of Romania’s massive restructuring of the economy and the welfare state that the 
outward migration of highly skilled Romanians happened, intensifying the effects that their 
departure had on the families left behind. The end of the welfare state coupled with massive 
outward migration, and demographic challenges such as a relatively low birth rate and a rapidly 
aging population, meant less social security and increasing, burdening care work on the women 
left behind (Abella 2006, Papademetriou and Martin 1991, Reichert 1981, Rubenstein 1992).  
Consequently, in addition to the inevitable challenges that the departure of immigrants 
places on the families left behind, women are likely to be more negatively affected. First, as the 
Romanian highly skilled migration happens, it will leave the country behind with a shortage of 
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both the knowledge and expertise to address the care needed for the aging women that raised the 
generation of highly skilled migrants. Second, since this migration happens in the middle of 
restructurings of the post-communist welfare state, with fewer and fewer means for social security 
and collective well-being, it meant that the people left behind were increasingly vulnerable and 
particularly the women left behind had to intensify their domestic work and had to perform more 
unpaid care work. Other scholars have already noticed that welfare cuts instituted by neoliberal 
governments are justified by pointing towards an emphasis on self-sufficiency and individual 
responsibility. Nevertheless, in reality, these cuts most often result in an increase of women’s 
domestic unpaid labour (Arat-Koc 1999). This is due to the fact that the ideas of self-sufficiency 
and individual autonomy are overvalued and overestimated: the elderly still require care and 
support, the children still need education, etc. If there is no state budgeted support, nor affordable 
private institutions to provide this care, the burden falls on the shoulders of the women of a 
household.  
In other words, reducing welfare spending means that women, who do the vast majority of 
the private caregiving work in society, need to raise their working hours in the home in order to 
make up for the absence of state funded programs. Furthermore, even though women may be doing 
more caregiving work in the private sphere, their domestic work is less likely to be acknowledged 
or financially rewarded. Since it is not recognized, the end results of welfare cuts are that they 
make women financially more insecure and poorer. Additionally, Romanian migrants that are 
leaving for Canada are the most skilled and educated professionals, depriving their own country 
of their skills and potential contribution to society in maintaining the welfare of the general 
population.  
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In analyzing the effects of migration on both the host and the country of origin, sending 
and receiving countries ought to work to secure a fairer and more balanced exchange. As my 
research points out, very often the migration of highly skilled professionals benefits 
disproportionately one country at the expense of the other. Therefore, the developed countries 
which absorb the highly skilled immigrants should share with the host country and redistribute the 
benefits that result from the migration process. This could be achieved by thinking up and creating 
policies at global and transnational levels, moving beyond a focus on the national level. 
Envisioning a broader picture and a sense of responsibility that goes beyond one’s country could 
help in enabling such policies. Similarly, giving back to the community enables self-esteem, pride, 
and a sense of protection of the global environment and conditions we live in (Edmondson, Carrie 
1999).  It could also produce similar outcomes for the promoters of such policies. Moving from a 
neoliberal competitive “win-lose” algorithm to one that acknowledges our global 
interconnectedness, the better alternative to a “win-win” situation might also be a stimulant for 
such development. Otherwise, if the situation stays the same, the net effect of current immigration 
policies will keep developing countries stagnant and struggling, with people having less access to 
good quality healthcare, education, and infrastructure, while already developed countries reach 
new levels of development, reaping all the benefits.  
 Faced with this imbalance resulting from the current migration system, countries need to 
work more closely with one another in managing the flow of immigrants. Currently, the approach 
is rather decontextualized and detached from the realities on the ground. The process must be more 
personalized and humanized in order to reduce the significant social distance between the states 
managing migration flows. For example, there is a need to highlight the connection between the 
skilled immigrant workers and the people who nurtured and contributed to the development of 
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these skills. As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, in the case of the Romanian migration 
to Canada, it is the Romanian mothers who nurtured and contributed most to the development of 
their children’s skills and talents. Furthermore, there is the need to understand and reduce the 
difference between the people at whose expense are such skills produced and the ones reaping the 
benefits of these skills and talents.  
The isolated, decontextualized and non-relational way in which government policies on 
migration are enacted must be understood in connection with women’s work. Perhaps, making this 
connection has the potential to be a strategy and a mechanism for addressing the formation of 
transnational asymmetries thus sustaining in place the inequalities that already exist among nation-
states. However, in order to comprehend such processes and propose solutions we must fully 
expose the invisibility of Romanian women’s work that together with the Canadian immigrant 
programs produce benefits for the developed neoliberal countries at the expense of developing 
transition countries.  
 While I personally argue for collaborations on policies of migration between countries and 
raising awareness regarding such issues, there are scholars who hold stronger positions in the 
benefits vs. costs debate of migration field. For example, for some scholars, there is the need for 
both reparation and restitution. In this sense, restitution “encompasses financial compensation but 
carries additional meanings of repair, restoration and the righting of ethical wrongs” (Mackintosh 
et al., 2006: 763). They argue for a system in which the advantages of skilled migration for 
destination countries would be appropriately calculated and a corresponding compensation paid to 
the countries which migrants left. Such policies argue for inter-state mutually shared responsibility 
to care for and manage migration.  
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 The Canadian government wants to select “the best and brightest” (McKenzie, Gibson 
2010) from the large pool of migrants aiming to settle in Canada in its move to constitute its power 
as a global actor in the world. Nevertheless, Canada reaps most of the benefits from such selection 
processes, it does so at the expense of developing transition countries. Without appropriate 
compensation for the developing countries, Canada’s absorbing the highly skilled professionals 
from these places can only lead to a perpetuation of inequality and disparity as well as the 
constituting of developing and developed countries on a power matrix that depends on exploitation 
and oppression. While the Western and Northern countries become richer and richer, 
underdeveloped nations become poorer and poorer, producing a continuous cycle that is intensified 
from generation to generation (Parrenas 2001; Piperno 2007; Sassen 1998; Walby 2009). 
In this regard, the massive migration of highly skilled migrants from Romania, adversely 
affects the welfare and social services in country. This is due to the fact that highly skilled migrants 
would, potentially, have had high earnings that, through taxes, could have benefitted the local 
budget. The taxes on these incomes would have been used to fund social services in Romania. 
Thus, what is called for is raising awareness regarding the losses of the Romanian state due to 
migration through investment in the country’s education, healthcare, infrastructure, etc. These 
institutions end up being underfunded due to the massive departure of highly skilled migrants 
leaving the rest of the population with poor public and social services.    
Of course, as the number of public social services decreases, more and more pressure is 
exerted on families who cannot afford to pay for them. Since families cannot afford to pay for 
them, they make up the difference through unpaid labour (Luxton 1997). As mentioned before, 
this unpaid labour is not shared equally among family members, but is disproportionately done by 
the women in the families. This basically means more work and burden for Romanian women to 
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make up for insufficiently funded welfare services. Many of these social services are underfunded 
due to the migration of highly skilled professionals who, if they remained in the country and were 
able to get jobs, would have, through taxes, been the main funders of the state budget. Since they 
leave, fewer public services are made available to families in need, and therefore resulting in a 
bigger burden put on the shoulder of women. Over the long term, an increased burden added to 
women’s domestic work results in fewer opportunities for women, leading to their oppression and 
marginalization in the public sphere. Therefore, the migration of the highly skilled Romanian 
professionals to Canada translates into an increasing oppression for the women left behind as well 
as a decrease in the overall quality of the social services in the country. On a personal level, if 
nothing else, this means that Romanian parents lose to Canada their adult children who might have 
cared for them in their old age and who would have also contributed to improving social services 
and infrastructure through their knowledge and taxes.  
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Section B: Transnational Global Migration Frameworks and Feminist Possibilities for 
Resistance 
 
Since worldwide migration is so spread out, it is interesting to notice how the phenomenon 
lacks any unified, coherent global policies. The fact is even more surprising taking into 
consideration the quick expansion of the process and the high rates of worldwide migration: for 
example, only between 1970 to 2015, the number of global migrants expanded from 82 million to 
approximately 244 million (IOM 2015). However, despite the growing expansion of the 
phenomenon there are no official transnational institutions or international policies to deal with 
states’ reactions to migration. As Alexander Betts points out, there is no United Nations Migration 
Organization and no international migration policies. It translates into sovereign states retaining 
full control in deciding their migration policies (Betts 2011). Nevertheless, the sovereignty of one 
state in decision-making with regard to migration policies impacts on other states. Hence such 
decisions are always international, and their outcomes intersect and interconnect states. Policies 
on migration cannot be taken in isolation, and the effects of one government’s decisions on 
migration spill over the boundaries of other states, challenging the sovereignty premise of the 
countries involved. For example, one state’s policy on highly skilled migration immediately 
constrains the behaviour of various other states.  
However, their relationship is not equal. Alexander Betts states: “migrant-receiving states 
are generally able to determine their own migration policies in accordance with their own interests. 
Powerful migrant-receiving states are able to take the migrants they want and leave the migrants 
they do not want. Migrant-sending states are generally unable to influence the policy choices of 
receiving states. In that sense, in the absence of formal regulation, receiving states are the implicit 
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‘makers’ of migration governance and sending states are ‘takers’ of migration governance” (Betts 
2011: 22). Transnational multilateral regulations are necessary in order to balance the power of the 
states involved in the process of migration: on the one hand, the potential power abuse of the state 
decision maker on migration, and, on the other hand, the possible vulnerability of the state decision 
taker. Furthermore, transnational multilateral frameworks are also needed in order to balance and 
share more fairly the benefits as well as the costs of different types of migration. An equity 
approach to migration might also lead to a maximization of the benefits of international migration, 
followed up by a redistribution of these benefits in ways that made everyone better off (Betts 2011: 
26).   
The reality is that the control over the process of international migration is more in the 
hands of the receiving countries. The issue of highly skilled professionals that flow between rich 
and poor nations tend to be unidirectional, from the poor to the rich. As noticed by other 
researchers, “because high-income countries are able to set global migration policy unilaterally, 
they have little incentive to address sending-country concerns” (Hanson 2010: 231).  
Since the control over the process of international migration is in the hands of the receiving, 
more powerful countries, and since such movements lead to great gender imbalances and gender-
based injustices, transnational feminist responses and alliances from both sending and receiving 
migrant countries are needed.  
 Transnational feminist alliances are needed for women to support one another to counteract 
injustices in migration movements that use women’s work to make up for the welfare cuts of the 
neoliberal economies. It is only through a collective transnational solidarity that they can demand 
fairer migration policies, international acknowledgement of women’s work as subsidizing 
neoliberal economies and more egalitarian redistribution of resources worldwide. For example, 
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they can collaborate in raising awareness regarding the care-giving and domestic work performed 
disproportionately by women. The awareness of the social reproductive work can be followed up 
by transnational advocacy campaigns for a more gender egalitarian redistribution of the care work 
in society and a reduction of women’s burden in the private sphere through supporting the increase 
of collective public services such as day care centres, healthcare centres, care services for the 
elderly, kindergartens, schools, etc.  
Furthermore, a common transnational feminist agenda could consist in again raising 
awareness regarding the unfair international distribution of social costs and benefits in highly 
skilled migration movements. In particular, there should be provision of benefits that match 
previous investments by the sending country.  A gendered fair world would be able to provide the 
appropriate benefits (in terms of adequate healthcare, for example) to the women that previously 
supported such care structures. Therefore, transnational feminist alliances could oppose together 
and work more effectively on projects of migration that reduce the burdening of women’s social 
reproductive work, as shown by the Romanian example.  
Additionally, transnational feminist alliances could inquire into and scrutinize neoliberal 
developments and configurations that heavily rely on forms of gender-based oppression and 
exploitation locally and internationally. Even though the experiences of neoliberalism are “not all 
the same and equal” and the configurations of such practices are “varied and historically specific” 
(Grewal and Kaplan 2005: 10), a joint and combined transnational feminist effort in exploring and 
analyzing these issues is still necessary. Furthermore, they can promote more forcefully together 
the idea of public-collective values and shared responsibility while resisting the idea of 
individualism and individual reliance for one’s basic education, health, and welfare. Although 
some of the processes of neoliberalism are locally constituted, taking in consideration similar 
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processes (i.e., withdrawal of the state and state support) transnational feminist alliances can argue 
together for more state protection and support in its efforts to manage the personal welfare of its 
constituents. 
The spread of globalization and migration flows has multiple and overwhelming 
disadvantages, but also can lead to a few opportunities. The possibility of increased contact and 
communication between different feminist activists and community organizers is one of them. As 
Amanda Keddie points out: “while the global neo-liberal agenda has increased the impoverishment 
and marginalization of many women, it has also created possibilities for pursuing gender justice” 
(Keddie 2010: 139).  Therefore, recent movements between different settings and locations can 
lead more easily to the creation of new spaces for feminist dialogue, involvement and activism. 
 Transnational feminists have now the opportunity to find out or even witness the effects 
of the current neoliberal migration flows (such as brain and care drain from developing countries) 
while organizing for gender justice.  Taking into consideration that one of the neoliberal main 
premises revolves around individualism and individual responsibility, transnational feminists can 
resist it, just by organizing themselves and pressuring together for government social responsibility 
and justice.  In this sense, even a form of solidarity between women and an international organizing 
around common equity agendas is in itself an opposition to the neoliberal regime that makes 
possible the migration of the highly skilled.    
Some of the forms that the neoliberal system manifests itself in, such as the brain drain via 
migration, harms women’s social and economic well-being and livelihood. In Romania’s case, the 
departure of highly skilled migrants to Canada amplified rather than reduced gender inequities 
within the country. In this context, there is a requirement for transnational solidarity and global 
women's activism to counteract and dispute the ways in which neoliberalism reveals itself (i.e., the 
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migration and pulling out of the highly skilled pool of candidates from developed countries without 
any understanding of all the social reproductive care work that went in the formation of those 
talents). Feminist action can also seek to limit the economic powers that create such oppressive 
structures. It is sure that only a mutual comprehension of the highly skilled migration conditions 
and outcomes can prompt a joint coordination for reducing the negative impacts on women of such 
movements and together propose and call out governments for a better process and a more 
democratic framework for development and growth.  
In this sense, networks and coalitions of feminist resistance and solidarity are a must, and 
the more international they are, the more effective and powerful their impact might be. Of course, 
these cross-border movements of feminist solidarity must also bring forward a larger and deeper 
awareness of gender justice within and beyond their countries. In this sense, the collective act of 
feminist resistance must bear in mind that gender equity agendas must be pushed from a national 
to an international agenda, pressuring the governments for accountability and redistribution of 
wealth at both the local and global level. Similarly, they should push for an understanding of 
gender equity concerns and responsibilities at the international level while encouraging and 
pressuring for more dialogues between governments and alliances between civil society 
organizations. Government accountability, protection of equity goals and corrective actions for 
gender based justice must be assumed beyond local state levels. Thus, transnational feminist 
solidarities might be the needed equation and opportunity through which a more inclusive and 
egalitarian international action is promoted. They can also provide a stronger alternative for 
creating awareness about gender-based injustices and women’s marginalization worldwide. In this 
sense, women’s collective activism can promote new possibilities for gender-based justice 
knowledge and practice while demanding collective global responsibility, gender-based fairness 
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and international justice. By highlighting the global neoliberal configurations and processes that 
lead to women’s oppression, they can pressure together for a feminist reform of government 
agendas, new gender-based social policies and pieces of legislation that protect women’s rights. 
Basically, there are new possibilities for pursuing gender equity agendas through a strong 
transnational movement of resistance and action. Only through such movements can the issues of 
inequity arising from global migration processes be reversed as well as women’s economic 
situation and well-being can be improved.  
It is only through transnational feminist alliances and community organizing that 
aspirations of growth and development can be envisioned beyond one country’s border and as 
improving collective transnational well-being. The economic productivity of one country cannot 
be achieved at the expense of women’s rights from a different country or when it results in their 
marginalization and oppression, and there are no better voices to raise that issue than an 
international feminist collective. Conceptualizing gender justice must cross local borders in order 
to envision women’s freedom and autonomy, especially with respect to women’s work, 
particularly women’s social reproductive work. A transnational effective feminist mobilization 
must take in consideration the unequal power relations, between different women in different 
countries, their unequal access to economic resources and the intersection of the various divisive 
factors of age, ethnicity, sexuality and ability.  
Broader contextual frameworks are needed for us to understand Romania’s women 
economic and social location and their increased marginalization and oppression by migration 
processes as well as Canadian women’s position and their possibilities for supporting international 
gender-based justice. While there are a few Romanian NGOs that deal with women’s 
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discrimination such as ANASAF 16  (Ana Society for Feminist Research), an NGO that is 
particularly focused on feminist analyses and theoretical approaches to gender equality and 
A.L.E.G. (Society for Freedom and Gender Equality)17 dedicated particularly to preventing and 
reducing the gender based discrimination and violence, or FILIA18 Center that fights for gender 
equality through activism, advocacy and research, the focus is predominantly on gender violence 
and sexual violence. They are also focused on co-lateral themes to gender and sexual violence such 
as access to justice for victims of discrimination as well as guidelines for preventing women 
entering trafficking rings in international contexts. There are no particularly not for profit 
organizations or feminist movements focused on women’s public or social reproductive work nor 
on women and migration (aside from sexual trafficking). Furthermore, there does not seem to be 
a particularly feminist unifying advocacy movement opposing neoliberalism per se, and  feminist 
NGOs in Romania do not have a strategy of resistance regarding that. However, the women I 
interviewed were very thoughtful about and critical of this situation and aware of the damaging 
effects that neoliberal development and outward migration have for them and their families, their 
communities at large and for their countries. They frequently mentioned that, at national level, all 
the “good” competent skilled people leave, and Romania is left with an aged and unskilled 
population. The perception was that while developed economies have the best of the productive 
working forces from the transition countries, a more complicated and darker story was written for 
the countries left behind. Furthermore, while the governments of the Global North attended to their 
own skill and economic needs through migration programs focused on highly skilled immigrants, 
they failed to tackle the needs of the developing transition countries as well as of the communities 
                                                 
16 ANASAF Ana Society for Feminist Analysis. Link available at: http://www.anasaf.ro/ro/index.html 
17 ALEG Society for Freedom and Gender Equality. Link available at: http://aleg-romania.eu/en 
18 FILIA Centre. Link available at: http://centrulfilia.ro/ 
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and families left behind. Entire cities were seen by my interviewees as complete “nursing homes” 
for the elderly in the absence of the migrant youth and the demographic unbalance that their 
departure determined. The costs were clearly summed up in their collective lives, in terms of not 
having the highly skilled professionals that they needed, but also no or few members of their 
families living close by. However, their departure was merged with tensions and contradictions 
since their staying in the country was also not an option. As one mother summed it up: “if we as 
parents want them to stay in the country, they don’t have opportunities. If they go abroad, we 
remain alone” (Adina, fifty-five, teacher). At the community and family level, immigration is 
perceived as a rupture with the family projections that these families once had. “We thought we 
would have our children close by when we grow old. Nothing can replace that” (Simona, fifty-
seven, nurse). During my fieldwork, I was not offered airbrushed, sanitized versions of these 
family breaks and ruptures through migration. All the disappointments and dissatisfactions were 
openly shared with me, probably in an attempt to also create the need of intimacy and closeness 
with someone that resembled their departed children. Their sometimes painful disclosures were 
not made in order to look for compassion but to create a space of shared vulnerability and also 
shared resistance with persons like my mother and me who have been experiencing the same 
journey. Due to the similarity and parallels between migration journeys, I also felt that, through 
me, they were living and talking to their own children who had left for Canada. For example, if I 
was confirming their sayings, they would many times re-assure me, saying: “My daughter would 
say the same about X, Y, Z topics!” Nevertheless, the distressing topic of migration was also faced 
with rage and fury especially in arguments that blame Canada for taking members of their families 
and for rupturing local communities, costs that were left unaccounted for. When discussing this 
topic, I was surprised to hear mothers talking even about their children being “abducted” by 
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Canada or that they were “held hostage” in a situation of criminality and illegality that only mirrors 
the feelings about their perception of life’s most distressing and traumatic experiences. Situations 
such as the above revealed migration as an appalling macabre event that had victims and 
perpetrators, and that it was fueled by injustice. For such situations, there did not seem to be 
consoling calming alternatives and the fact that sometimes the children who left sometimes visit 
them or that they visited them in their turn could not compensate for the initial injustice. It was in 
the unfolding of such scenes that more connections needed to be made to render visible the impact 
of migration processes on the families and communities left behind. Such projects ought to 
highlight and give voice to the intellectual contributions and reflections of the Romanian mothers, 
a step necessary in any demand for a transnational activist approach.  
While such feminist movements are non-existent in Romania, I can imagine them being 
like the ones feminist scholars Moghadam (1999) and Thayer (2009) mention as spreading in Latin 
America where working women organize and resist together in a solid, strong anti-globalization 
movement. They argue that the emergence of transnational feminist networks is a result of changes 
in global relations (i.e., what has come to be known as globalization) which amplify the ‘universal’ 
reality of gender inequality (Moghadam 1999). Facilitated by four world conferences on women 
(between 1975 and 1995), women's groups have come to recognize that, while local experiences 
of marginalization are important in designing solidarity projects, overall strategies of resistance 
have much in common with each other, thereby necessitating transnational movements that 
challenge these systems of exploitation and oppression. In their desire to oppose the financial 
policies that the supranational institutions such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
imposed on developing countries, women decided that their transnational solidarity was crucial. 
In this way, transnational feminist networks became organizational forms that crossed 
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geographical, political, and cultural boundaries in order to advance a gender justice and resistance 
movement.  
In terms of perspectives on a global justice movement, Moghadam notes that transnational 
feminist networks contribute to a "call for gender justice as well as economic justice, and for an 
alternative macroeconomic framework that takes gender relations seriously as a concept and social 
fact (Moghadam 2005a: 354).”  Despite differences between women across the globe such as 
ethnicity, race, class and sexual orientation, feminists can still organize themselves in order to 
resist their increased work conditions under globalization. For example, one such mobilization was 
that of caregivers in Canada, regarding, first, the abolishing of the “live-in” condition of the 
program through which they arrived in Canada, and, later, the whole termination of a program 
with such a name19. Initiated in 1992 the program had mandatory “live-in” requirements for 
caregivers and made them often vulnerable to physical, emotional, and sexual abuse and 
exploitation by their employer (Hodge 2006). If it were not for the ongoing community outreach, 
feminist grassroots mobilization and the increasing awareness, solidarity and local and 
transnational resistance of the caregivers themselves, such harmful, devaluating and sexist policies 
for the conditions of women would still be in effect. Two of the Canadian grassroots migrant 
organizations that have been involved in these mobilizing efforts are Gabriela Ontario and 
Migrante Canada. Founded in 2012, Gabriela Ontario is organized around the theme of forging 
women’s collective energy and resources together to create better social, economic and political 
conditions for all. Started as a means of creating unity among particularly Filipina live-in 
caregivers women in Canada, their larger agenda also covers asserting women’s rights and 
promoting their welfare in general, as well as effecting a reconsideration of women’s work that is 
                                                 
19 While caregivers can still reach Canada, their processing is done under the Temporary Foreign Worker program 
and subject to scrutiny and regulations.  
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often “too simplified and devalued” (Gabriela Ontario 2017). Migrante-Canada is another 
grassroots migrant organization set up in 2010 to protect the rights and promote the welfare of 
Filipino and Filipina migrants. Similar to Gabriela Ontario, their mission consists in doing a lot of 
education, organization and mobilization of members, family, friends and society at large to create 
better conditions for all migrants in Canada. While the organization does not have a particular 
gender focus, it does include strategies of building solidarities with all migrants of all nationalities 
in Canada as well as anyone who supports social equity and justice, fair wages and work 
recognition and is against any policies that cause widespread poverty and injustice (Migrante 
Canada).  
Other feminists notice that, while globalization affects women dramatically, it also plays a 
significant role in shaping local, regional, and transnational political mobilization (Hawkesworth 
2006; Naples and Desai 2002; Walby 2002a). They argue that although the imbalance of power 
between different types of women workers in different countries are exacerbated by neoliberal 
regimes and globalization, the same processes create continuities that can become the grounds for 
mobilizing transnationally.  For example, the global financial crisis poses similar threats to the 
status of women in different parts of the world, which in turn elicit parallel responses of resistance. 
Furthermore, feminists argue, they can address differences among themselves while 
simultaneously campaigning for justice and equality for all women.  
This optimism about a substantive solidarity among women of different classes, races, 
ethnicities, ages and sexual orientation emerges out of the idea that current structures of work can 
be used as sites for mobilizing resources for effective political campaigns and for building 
transnational solidarity for women (Fonow 2005: 3). 
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When discussing globalization, feminist Sylvia Walby does not see it as a single “unified 
force”, but rather as a formation that is constituted by “diverse global processes” involving flows 
of power and transnational networks of resistance (Walby 2009b: 444). As author Millie Thayer 
puts it, ‘‘globalization may accelerate some forms of domination, but it also facilitates the linking 
and empowering of once-disconnected oppositional forces’’ (Thayer 2009: 8). This outlook 
reveals the contradictions, tensions, and appropriations, as well as the emancipatory possibilities 
that figure in transnational feminist alliances and solidarities. 
In her book Making Transnational Feminism: Rural Women, NGO Activists, and Northern 
Donors in Brazil (2009), Millie Thayer makes use of participant observation and in-depth 
interviews to chart how two women’s organizations in Northeastern Brazil emerged, developed, 
and changed in the context of a globalizing world. The organizations are SOS Corpo (a feminist 
NGO concerned with women’s bodies and health) and Movimento de Mulheres Trabalhadoras 
Rurais (MMTR, a grassroots women’s organization of rural workers). Both of these organizations 
challenge gender injustice and are part of overlapping ‘‘counterpublics’’ (Thayer 2009: 56).  They 
differ though along various axes of inequality. SOS Corpo is composed of urban, middle-class 
feminists and has extensive international linkages, and MMTR is a working-class organization 
from the rural region, associated with the labour movement within Brazil, but largely cut off from 
global ties. Thayer shows how these organizations collaborated and navigated their power 
differences, while also negotiating inequalities and exercising various kinds of leverage in relation 
to various domestic and international social actors. In tracing these relationships, Thayer finds that 
‘‘global flows passed through and between the two movement sites as well as across national 
boundaries” (Thayer 2009: 19). She also suggests possibilities for solidarity across different social 
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locations, without idealizing the situation and while admitting that this does not necessarily undo 
the actual locations. 
Such transnational feminist alliances make visible some of the previously hidden effects of 
gender injustices of neoliberalism and migration and render vocal some of the new challenges that 
feminists now face. Recent migration developments will definitely demand that transnational 
feminists pursue international campaigns for awareness of gender injustice and pressure for global 
equity mandates, creating in this way a more solid movement of resistance and activism.  
 Moreover, collective organizing and feminist solidarity are needed to oppose not only the 
core principles of neoliberalism, but also its mechanisms that produce devastating effects, in terms 
of growing gender inequalities between countries as well as expansion of unequal distribution of 
resources or of the costs and benefits in using them. For example, we already know that women’s 
labour increases when the state withdraws itself from providing the necessary welfare for its 
citizens and that the unwaged labour increases as a consequences of state budget cuts (see Mohanty 
2003). Further drawbacks for many women have been the encouraging of brain drain migration 
policies which draw migrants from developing Eastern European and Southern countries to 
developed countries of North and West. Therefore, while enabling career mobility, such migration 
downloads its costs even more on women due to neoliberal economies cutting their budgets for 
welfare, privatizations, etc.  
The freedom of the movement of the highly skilled professionals should not be stopped. 
However, when such movements happen at the expense of vulnerable and marginalized others 
(such as it is the case of Romanian women and communities) there should be more awareness and 
acknowledgement of the costs of such migration policies for the home country and for increasing 
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global inequalities. Only with that acknowledgement and awareness in mind, will feminist 
solidarities be able to forge connections based on women’s work internationally.  
Focusing on Romania has allowed me to point to the many historically particular and 
geographically uneven injustices that some current global migration poses for women in neoliberal 
context. Based on that, transnational feminist solidarities have the potential to fully recognize the 
way in which neoliberal economies such as Canada rely on Romanian women’s work and 
developing transition countries that contribute in preparing its skilled labour pool. 
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Conclusion 
 
The switch to a neoliberal phase of economy and emphasis on knowledge-based economies 
has increased the global demand for highly skilled workers. In line with the global trends, in 2017 
Canada has increased its quotas for highly skilled migrants for the next three years, and these 
quotas are exceptionally higher than they have ever been (CBC News 2017). My argument is that 
the massive welfare cuts brought by the neoliberal phase of the economy of the Global North 
(Parrenas 2001, Andersen 1997), pushed Canada to look outside its borders for skills and talents 
that it stopped or reduced reproducing and caring for internally: the case of highly skilled 
Romanian migrants to Canada. However, Canada is attracting skills and talents from countries and 
regions that face even more of a destructuring and disruption of public structures, as in the example 
of Eastern European transition post-communist economies. In their turn, faced with a massive 
post-communist transition restructuring of the Romanian economy and drawn by Canada’s 
migration policies, a large number of highly skilled, educated Romanians migrate to Canada. My 
dissertation focuses on one of Canada’s immigration and settlement policies, namely the category 
of the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP), and its impact on women and immigrant families 
in Romania in the 1990s and 2000s at a time when Romania was experiencing a fast transition to 
the capitalist market economy from the post-communist regime. At the beginning of my 
dissertation, I focused on patriarchal segregations of immigration schemes into “brain” and 
“care”/social reproductive categories and showed how Romanian women’s paid and unpaid work 
contributed to the creation of highly skilled workers. In the second part of my work, I pointed out 
that the departure of Romanian migrants happened at a time when post-socialist economies in 
Eastern Europe entered a transition into a capitalism phase. However, this transition translated into 
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a disappearance of welfare support structures and insecure economies, as well as a perpetuation of 
an eternally developing phase for the origin sending countries. The withdrawal of the state and of 
the means of collective care also meant more burden put on the family’s shoulders and more 
dependency on family members. It was in these times of Romania’s restructuring of the economy 
and the welfare state that the outward migration of Romanians happened, intensifying the effects 
that their departure had on the families left behind. In this case, it was women left behind who had 
to provide the necessities for their families in the absence of their migrating adult children; this 
situation translated into an intensification of their domestic responsibilities and burdens. The 
withdrawal of the welfare state coupled with massive outward migration, and demographic 
challenges such as a relatively low birth rate and a rapidly aging population, meant less social 
security for the people left behind. In addition to the inevitable challenges that the departure of 
immigrants placed on the families left behind, I argue, women were likely to be more negatively 
affected. First, this departure was skills and knowledge-driven. It left behind a country that 
experienced a knowledge shortage in terms of not having the best engineers, physicians, and 
technicians to the training of whom women’s work contributed so much and for which contribution 
the women cannot ever benefit directly or indirectly. Second, since this migration happened in the 
middle of restructurings of the post-communist transition welfare state, with fewer and fewer 
means of social security and collective well-being, the people in the origin countries were 
increasingly vulnerable. Further, the women left behind had to intensify their domestic labour and 
had to perform more social reproductive work. To counteract the oppression of women that 
resulted from the migration of highly skilled professionals, as well as patriarchal immigration 
divisions that created worldwide immigration programs focused on “brain races” and parallel care 
shortages, transnational feminist alliances and solidarities are called for as a solution. These are 
 235 
seen as the most effective way to raise awareness and pressure for government international 
responsibility and inter-state justice in the management of highly skilled migration flows as well 
as increase awareness of the negative outcomes of neoliberal development and globalization.  
Researchers have already mentioned that while neoliberal development and 
globalization came with free trade agreements and the flow of economic trades across borders, the 
situation is not the same for the movement of people across countries (Sassen 1998). These latter 
connections are illusive because these economic organizations do not come with changes in 
restrictive immigration policies. Thus, the transnational mobility of capital and relatively border-
free economies are not sustained by paralleled the border-free circulation of people. On the 
contrary, immigration policies and border controls have progressively been restricted, 
renationalizing in this way only the movement of bodies. This lack of symmetry between a 
denationalized capital and a renationalized and restricted movement of persons is not without its 
own logic or benefit, and it is one of the venues for wealth concentration in developed countries 
as well as one of the factors in worldwide inequality. 
 After the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe, Romanian highly skilled 
migration to Canada demonstrates that the onset of privatization, the spread of globalization and 
the beginning of neoliberal economies, accompany a few favorable circumstances for transnational 
movement. However, such migration schemes (like the Canadian Federal Skilled Worker 
Program) create an artificial and unsustainable division between highly skilled knowledge 
producing migrants and not equally valued social reproductive work that makes the realization of 
that knowledge possible. Of course, such divisions are gendered and hierarchical: since through 
their immigration programs governments promote agendas of attracting highly-skilled migrants, 
they also indirectly promote a patriarchal understanding of certain skills and talents as superior by 
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failing to recognize the daily social-reproduction mostly performed by women that such brains 
need in order to exist. If one considers that brains cannot produce competitive knowledge outputs 
without having someone produce the social reproduction of those brains, my case-study on the 
Romanian migration to Canada highlights how women’s work is rendered invisible, and inferior 
in the process, de-prioritized and devalued in migration schemes, while potentially justifying 
women’s low-wages and ongoing marginalization. 
 Furthermore, while the mobility of highly skilled Romanian migrants promises new levels 
of growth and development for the destination countries, it does not assure growth and 
development for the country of origin responsible for their nurturance and education. In fact, this 
mobility is made possible only by their embracing the Canadian neoliberal economy which is 
based on accumulation and control of neoliberal capital that in its turn gives little back to the 
country of origin. Economic growth obtained due to the migration of highly skilled professionals 
is preserved and increased in Canada but not shared with or redistributed back to Romania20. In 
fact, this process contributes to creating an even wider gap between developing and developed 
nations. This means that the accumulation and control of capital in neoliberal Canada resulting 
from the migration of highly skilled Romanians is connected to the disenfranchisement and 
impoverishment of already destitute Romania. This fact points out how the transition to a capitalist 
economy failed to improve the overall life quality of Romanians.  Instead it led only to an increased 
accumulation of, in this case, Canadian capital at the expense of the general welfare of Romanians. 
The growth and development of the Canadian state corresponds with the socio-economic 
marginalization of Romania, and with the oppression of Romanian women.  In this sense, it seems 
that the Canadian capital accumulation and the mobility of selective highly skilled migrants lead 
                                                 
20 By wealth accumulated in Canada, I mean wealth massively unevenly distributed in Canada as well, and largely 
owned by the upper middle classes and the to one percent.  
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to increased socio-economic hardships for Romanians. Furthermore, while the benefits are reaped 
by Canada, the costs of developing highly skilled migrants are borne primarily by the Romanian 
state and secondly by the Romanian families.  
 Upon closer inspection of the education system in Romania, I found that the foundation 
behind the support provided by the state and the family for an individual’s education is actually 
the public and domestic work of women. This is so because, compared to male dominated jobs, 
women’s work underwent a faster transition to the capitalist market in the post-communist age. As 
women’s work transitioned faster to capitalism and became more likely to be used in capitalist 
structures, the taxes on their wages ended up contributing more to the state budget. This new 
development makes women’s work contribution to budgets as critical for transition economies 
(Pasti 2003 Ghoodsee 2005 Gheaus 2008). Thus, many state programs and initiatives were 
substantially funded by the work of women, including, for example, the education system which 
to this day is almost exclusively provided by the state free-of-charge. Furthermore, besides these 
income contributions via taxes, the family pressure for the education of individuals is again 
gendered, due to the disproportionate work of women in the private sphere; by this I mean the 
household work that women perform in order to care for the upbringing of their children including 
the support they need in order to obtain the necessary tertiary education and diploma credentials.  
 Once these persons obtain their education, they are considered desirable migrants by various 
foreign countries such as Canada. Since Canada’s immigration program targets highly skilled 
professionals (i.e., the Federal Skilled Worker program), this means that Romanian women’s work 
both public and private contributes substantially to the development of these migrants. In this way 
the welfare structures (i.e., free-of-charge tertiary education) in Romania are not created to benefit 
the local citizens, but the accumulation of profit in neoliberal Canada. Based on the contribution 
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of women, Romania educates individuals who, once migrated, have their labour extracted in 
Canada. Valuable skills, talents, and capacities, etc., are formed as the result of the hard work of 
women (as they contribute more to state budgets that fund education and as they hold 
disproportionate roles in the social reproduction of their children); however, women essentially 
benefit little from their investment. While not getting something in exchange for what they 
contribute, many Romanian women remain disenfranchised and marginalized in such processes.  
Furthermore, despite their vital role in maintaining the social reproduction and welfare funding of 
the state, these women are basically left with few rewards either for themselves or for the general 
population of the country. Many highly skilled engineers, physicians, IT professionals, etc. end up 
migrating abroad utilizing the skills elsewhere instead of their home country where the population 
is in dire need of their help. As mentioned before, in my opinion the people most negatively 
affected and hit hardest by the process of the Romanian migration to Canada are Romanian women. 
Indirectly, some of the costs of the Romanian migration are laid squarely on their shoulders. This 
burden contributes further to women’s subordination and oppression to the point of us asking 
ourselves what the possibilities for transnational feminist responses and resistances to such 
situations are.  
  In this respect, transnational feminists acknowledge that global forces such as colonialism, 
capitalism, migration, and imperialism end up locating women in unequal oppressive positions 
within larger power structures (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). Their transnational feminist theoretical 
lenses of analysis can be easily applied to global power formations and processes such as global 
capitalism and transnational migration that challenge Romanian women’s rights and general 
assumptions of gender justice. My case-study on the Romanian migration to Canada sheds light 
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on such theoretical investigations, while providing the necessary grounds for transnational 
activism and international feminist awareness.  
  By looking at Romanian women’s work, we can hear and also recognize how it contributes 
to the formation of highly skilled professionals who benefit the growth and development of 
Canada, making Canada a transnationally powerful actor in the interstate system.  This is done at 
the expense of Romanian women’s own welfare and well-being and at the atomization of their 
communities. And while it does have some benefits in terms of remittances, they are infinitely 
little in contrast to the costs of such processes, especially for the women left behind. Transnational 
feminist inquiries can help provide another insight for the inequities brought by the spread of 
liberalism and “democracy” after collapse of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe, and beyond 
the way neoliberalism is envisioned in North America. As I mentioned before, feminist coalitions 
and resistance movements are needed internationally in order to raise awareness regarding the 
gender-based oppressions and marginalization brought about by these processes.  
 Additionally, through women’s work the Romanian state pays for the education of 
individuals, but it does not appear to offer significant benefits to Romania. In this way, the large 
investment in nurturing advanced education and highly skilled knowledge is a process that 
inadvertently undermines the logic for a liberal economy of profit: the post-communist transition 
developing states are creating a knowledgeable and highly skilled young workforce who leave the 
country. It does not mean that they should be forced to stay, but that real alternatives should be 
created to classical outward migration as well as better and gender egalitarian international policies 
being forged so that the brain movement is accompanied by care as well. 
 Such a process warrants that the state-funded university knowledge will not be used to 
transform a developing country into a developed one, but rather to perpetuate its precarious phase. 
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Furthermore, women’s work seems to contribute disproportionately to state structures that, in the 
long run, do not support the security and welfare of its own citizens.  For example, when the state 
budget funds a free-of-charge higher education, that education is used for some young university 
students who will eventually become the pool of future migrants. Then, instead of aiding and 
giving back to their own country, they become the workforce necessary for the preservation and 
development of the already developed neoliberal Canada.  
Although there is a growing literature on migration, there is little recognition of the 
multiple ways in which migrants’ skills are produced and which particular elements foster their 
movement. Little do we know about the contexts in which these abilities are fostered as well as 
who bears the costs of their university education. Usually, it is considered that it is the state and 
families that support the acquisition of such skills (Psacharopoulos 1994, Tilak 1991).  
Nevertheless, Romanian migration to Canada reveals how the formation of the highly skilled that 
makes them eligible migrants is indebted substantially to Romanian women’s private and public 
work.  
The issue is striking since Romania is one of the Eastern European sites where, after the 
1989 communist collapse and years of authoritarian regime, the switch to a liberal market economy 
promised democracy, freedom, human and women’s rights, etc. In this case, the Romanian 
migration to Canada is relevant in pointing out how the spread of democracy, liberalism, 
globalization, and mobility in post-communist Romania resulted in disadvantaging and 
marginalizing women. Similarly, it is an eloquent case study that shows how the well awaited 
process of transition to capitalism created insecure economies and dismantles the Romanian 
families while enforcing new forms of inequality between the East and West. This is the moment 
when transnational feminist alliances and responses are necessary in order to expose the ways in 
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which the spread of “democracy”, “freedom”, and globalization exploit women differently and 
geographically unevenly. It is also a good opportunity for joint efforts of transnational feminist 
resistance to such situations.  
Romanian work contribution should support, first and foremost, the generational benefit of 
Romanian citizens, and less the extraction of labour for economic growth in Canada. Moreover, 
if, at the transition to a capitalist market, public services remain public and free due to a lot of 
women’s work efforts, such a contribution should be at least acknowledged, and it should primarily 
benefit them. Otherwise we will reach an economic exploitation of women, where they are the first 
to be privatized, and made easily profitable and exploitable, and the last ones to receive adequate 
recognition and compensation. In this sense, the idea of working for free comes from a tradition 
of gendered subordination and self-erasure, and can lead to only an even greater gender 
subordination and exploitation.  
Tracing the Romanian migration to Canada has made apparent the many geographical 
unfairnesses and injustices that current globalization and certain highly skilled immigration 
programs pose for women in the transnational frame. Based on that, the potential to fully recognize 
the contribution of Romanian women’s private and public work in fostering the further 
development of already developed countries like Canada remains a solid cause for feminist 
transnational solidarities and alliances. It is only through insisting on a full acknowledgement and 
accountability of Romanian women’s work, we can hope that the current informal conversations 
about Canada’s migration goals and future immigration policies will include not just methods of 
attracting the best of brains and skills worldwide (brains and skills mostly associated with men’s 
work), but also the care and all the input of social reproduction necessary for all these brains to 
exist (care and socially reproductive work mostly associated with women’s work).  
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A series of injustices and dramas that take place globally when transitions to capitalism 
occur and neoliberal premises are set in place, such as the ones that emphasize the knowledge 
production occur to the detriment of women, through an indirect devaluation and marginalization 
of the care work overwhelmingly done by women. First, there is the Eastern European drama of 
transition to democracy and capitalism after fifty years of communism and an authoritarian regime 
where the long-awaited dreams of capitalist prosperity, progress and well-being fail to materialize 
for the majority of the Romanian population. Second, the precarious economic conditions of a 
transition context and the Canadian policies of knowledge migration generated a constant wave of 
young adult highly skilled Romanian migration. Third, there is the drama of neoliberal economies 
such as Canada’s that does not necessarily provide all the support that its labour force needs and 
start importing skills and talents already nurtured and formed by other countries and other women’s 
work. Fourth, there is the contribution of Romanian women and mothers, in particular, to the 
formation of these highly skilled migrants to Canada and, in turn, the consequences of their 
migration for the communities left behind. In this transnational labour relation, women’s and 
particularly mothers’ work is central in managing the survival of their families during the painful 
transition to capitalism as well as ensuring the upbringing of highly skilled young adults. However, 
while they manage to do that, the human costs of their efforts and investments are very high, for 
themselves, for their communities and their countries. In this case, all these families, states, and 
investment of resources made possible the career mobility and migration of these professionals. 
Their families cannot enjoy time with their children and their absence impacts their health and 
well-being. In this sense, all the waged and social reproductive work performed by these women 
in the creation of the young highly skilled migrants to Canada largely remains hidden and 
insufficiently accounted for. Similarly, it remains unaccounted for the way in which neoliberal 
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projects in Canada directly feed off women’s labour in Romania and cannot exist outside the 
different power relations between developing transition economies and advanced and already 
developed countries. A clear manifestation of that is visible in the current immigration plans that 
do not recognize the equal status of care and social reproductive work that predominantly women 
perform. Awareness of these issues is key in undoing these injustices and forging renewed 
transnational feminist solidarities. My dissertation is in this sense part of such a “negative” project 
by exposing both less visible and direct links through which women’s hard work enables growth 
and development in parts of the world that do not include them and that do not acknowledge their 
contribution. While managing to maintain prosperous rates of economic security and well-being 
in different parts of the world, they cannot do that for themselves. My dissertation reveals such 
painful linkages with the hope that it is a necessary step through which fairness can be achieved 
and healing can be reached, in a story that is bigger than my own personal biographical account.  
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Epilogue: “If You Have a Choice, Better to Sleep at Night in Dignity in Your Own 
Country” 
 
As years go by, my own personal story with my community and family in Romania keeps 
on being written and re-written and runs along and is one of my very difficult and strenuous 
integration into Canada. Without being able to finish my PhD dissertation in Canada, let alone 
succeed as a feminist academic or a champion of human rights, the last couple of years have been 
a constant longing for “back home” realities, coupled, not accidentally, with the challenging 
journey of blending in and trying to integrate myself into my new country. The more difficult the 
second component turned out to be, the more intense was the longing and nostalgia for Romania, 
with its familiarities and sense of sharing the same meanings about the world and its priorities. 
One element of the comparison was always compensating for the other, in equations of oppositions 
that I knew how to interpret and deconstruct at a critical level, but that nonetheless were lived as 
more powerful than my own intelectualizations of them.  
One such instance of compensations was when I entered the Canadian job market. Needless 
to say, my parents, and in particular my mother, were again beside me, always eager to help me 
navigate what they kept on calling “the new world”. My mother kept on calling Canada “the new 
world” even after ten years of my migration to Canada, and after a time when the “new” component 
should have probably worn out. Interestingly enough, she had a reason for never removing such a 
label and we will see why.  
As a strategy, together with my mother I thought that, after so many years of teaching and 
since I had a Bachelor of Education from Romania, maybe it would be great to have my credentials 
recognized in Canada, follow my original professional designation and become a teacher in 
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Canada. We went through a lot of effort and mailing back and forth to put all the diplomas and 
grades transcripts with the proper seal, in original format and adequate English translation for the 
review of the Ontario College of Teachers. For their review, I also included the graduate courses 
taken at York University. To my disappointment when the OCT written review arrived by mail, 
out of four years of Bachelor of Arts program, one year of a concurrent Bachelor of Education, 
one year of a Master of Arts, in Romania as well as six years of graduate courses at York 
University, the Toronto District School Board was willing to recognize only two years towards my 
training to be a teacher in Canada. That meant that, if I had chosen that path, I would have had to 
enroll in courses for at least four more years full-time (two years of undergraduate courses 
followed up by an additional two years of a Bachelor of Education). Needless to say, I did not have 
the financial and material resources to engage in such a costly endeavour of yet another four years 
of schooling, on top of the twenty-four years of education done already. I started applying for jobs.  
The lack of credential recognition by Canadian institutions would be improved on by the 
more pragmatic and practical approach of the market. I hoped that if I was hard-working and 
responsible, that would be appreciated on the market, and regardless of accreditations and 
credentials, that would stand out. My first insight was to approach employment from the fields that 
I had already been trained for in Canada itself and by its own education systems such as women’s 
rights. I cannot count the hundreds of emails sent to Charity Village online (a well-known website 
that posts job “opportunities” in the NGO field) on the few occasions where jobs on women’s 
rights were posted.  The applications aimed at the beginning at high level policy development 
positions and project management or analytics, and gradually, in the absence of any call and 
feedback, moved to lower positions such as administration, data entry, or basic office coordination. 
Needless to say, none of them came even close to a single interview call; so, as time flew by I 
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started to apply for different positions, outside the NGO range. Again, my initial aspirations in the 
corporate/business world aimed at matching my experience and education.  Without any calls back 
or email replies, my options again leveled down from the more advanced, more skilled, and better 
financially rewarded positions of project managers, etc. to mere entry level positions that did not 
require much skill or training and with lower wages. After a few months of unemployment, a 
recruiting company found me a temporary contract, paying a minimum wage scale for a market-
based position as a Data Entry Coordinator. The label does sound better than the actual job 
functions which merely implied manual, repetitive work of looking at power point reports and 
checking that the numbers inside them matched the data files they were extracted from. If the 
sequence 24-55-64-77 from the data file matched the same row in the Power Point reports, it meant 
a “good” day at work. Nevertheless, I was not discouraged by the level of de-skilling of the work 
and I was hoping that in time I could be promoted and get to do more interesting and more 
rewarding work. That reward came actually shortly. After six months of numbing data verifications 
work daily for eight hours a day, I got promoted to Associate Program Manager. It felt as if the 
cliché immigrant resilience paid off, and that finally I could make use of some of my skills and 
training now that the job level was more advanced and implied more complex procedures than 
simple data checks.  
Nevertheless, this was also the occasion when I realized that workplaces are less about 
work and skills, putting many hours and proving oneself, and more about personal connections 
and how well one integrates with the environment, and particularly how well one gets along with 
one’s direct manager. My initial manager and I shared a similar immigrant background. She had 
reached Canada more than twenty years ago from Cuba, so that there was a lot of identification 
and mutual understanding between us. She had also graduated from university, spoke three 
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different languages and had worked on two different continents, facts which made her broadly 
knowledgeable in terms of life itself. There were good months of work satisfactions and of 
memories that I still cherish since I know how rarely they happen.  
The career bliss would not last for long, as to my disadvantage, after a year together, my 
Cuban-Canadian manager was promoted to a different department and I was switched to the 
supervision of a different manager whom, I was already warned did not like me. Needless to say, 
in two months, things escalated quickly, and from top employee (according the yearly performance 
review), under the new manager I was considered the least desirable employee and fired. This is 
how I learned about firings in Canada. I was never fired in Romania, but I knew from people’s 
accounts around me that it was a difficult decision to make, with serious allegations at stake to 
determine such a measure. Nevertheless, my original country also had a communist past with a lot 
of protection of the worker. Contrary to my Romanian experience, I discovered that it is very easy 
to get fired in Canada, and one can be fired on no grounds whatsoever. Moreover, it is actually 
advisable and desirable to be fired “without cause” in order to qualify for Employment Insurance. 
One would think why even firing someone without any cause whatsoever, and how fair and unjust 
that would be to this person, but this is not the first situation in Canada that defies logic and justice.  
While I was grateful for the existence of the government support when unemployed, in the 
form of Employment Insurance, it only left me with $200 after I paid my rent and utilities so that 
I felt really pressured to find a job. This is how I reached working in a call centre as a bilingual 
customer service representative for one of the oldest and well-known financial institutions in the 
city. If one thinks one can get an unskilled job easily in a call centre, one should think twice, 
because I got mine through a “connection” who recommended me for the job. A Romanian-
Canadian friend of mine who had been working in the company for many years recommended me 
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for the position and I ended up being offered the job. When I reached the training facility and got 
to know my new colleagues, I realized that all the eight new hires were done through “connections” 
and at friends’ and families’ recommendations who had been already working in the company. 
This made me think about how literally impossible the selection must be for newcomers and 
permanent immigrants who have recently arrived in the country or who randomly apply online, 
outside these networking circles. While the training period of two months was good, hitting the 
call centre floor was painful. The problem was less the customers who were, the majority of them, 
in a distressful situation (running from mildly annoyed to moderate frustration and high anger) but 
the dysfunctional management of the place: very strict, run under tortuous supervision and 
“metrics”, with Service Level Agreements (SLA) impossible to meet (such as picking up the call 
at the first ring, to answering and solving the caller problem’s in under five minutes, answering at 
least ten calls per hour, etc.). Whenever one representative was taking too long to solve a problem 
for a client regarding its complexity, one was lectured by one’s team leader, similarly if one was 
too long on the phone. The scrutiny went as far as getting absurd reprisals for being forty seconds 
more on a break or logging in back to one’s computer thirty seconds later. It was, by far, the most 
depressing and disheartening environment I ever worked in. So, at night I was constantly applying 
for new jobs and changing shifts at work to get interviews done. One of the interviews, with a 
small and new market research company in North York, went pretty well and I got a job offer. The 
positioned secured was more senior, required more skills and training, and it also allowed for more 
freedom and autonomy which felt like a liberation after the months of intense scrutiny, monitoring 
and metrics at the call centre. When I was introduced to the position, it seemed very decent and 
reasonable: a client position that was supposed to service and assist with the delivery of reports 
and data analytics for one main United States client. However, when starting to work in the actual 
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role, the expectations were much higher than the job descriptions indicated and so was the 
workload. This was the moment when I realized that the new company was less a market research 
company on its own and with its own research products, but more of a vendor and outsourcing 
resource for other big market research companies. The vendor condition meant competition with 
other small vendors, and an embrace of the practice of outsourcing: while we were just a handful 
of people in the Toronto office, the bulk of the company of the team was in New Delhi. While the 
company prices were already low to the point that internally we were calling the place “The 
Dollarama of Market Research”, the clients were constantly pressuring us to lower them even more 
while maintaining the quality of products and speed of delivery. Needless to say, the constant 
lowering of prices was making it impossible to achieve the desired outputs, so the frustration and 
dissatisfaction of the client and upper management were always high, blaming either timelines or 
the quality of products. However, for me the real culprit were the actual low prices that made the 
teams overworked and did not secure enough profit for the business owner. The cheap prices were 
also a venue for clients to have disrespectful and demeaning attitudes towards us as vendors, as 
the idea of “cheap” was easily conflated with that of “not valuable” or “not worthy” enough and 
that transferred from the company’s products to the people working there. Raising the issue of 
clients’ abuse with the upper management did not help as they assumed that the clients are the 
ones who are not protected enough and that the internal working teams should be actually pushed 
even more. The discourse turned quickly to accusations of my “caring too much” for the internal 
teams, and “not caring enough” for the client. My suggestions to move beyond such rather 
ineffective oppositional schemes and ask ourselves why this happens and how we can move 
forward from this issue was met with even more hostility from the upper management of the 
company. “Why do you even care?” type of questions quickly turned into threats such as “You 
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have an attitude and we will address this on Monday.” “Addressing the issue” really meant firing; 
so currently I am again unemployed, and on Employment Insurance. As statistical data always 
shows us, we are always part of a larger sample and my story of immigrant deskilling, 
precariousness and blocking of career opportunities reflects more probably the ones of the other 
highly skilled migrants in similar contexts.  
While Canada now has a liberal pro-immigration government, and one that discursively is 
open and celebrates diversity and multiculturalism, at the de facto level, and at the level of career 
opportunity, integration and making the best of one migrant’s skills, it still remains much closed 
and very gate-keeping for the thousands of people that arrive here. So many trained skills and 
talents become a waste in the absence of meaningful credentials recognition as well as anti-
oppressive, non-discriminatory hirings and workers’ protection. When talking to my mother on 
the phone she sometimes tells me how much she pities me and shows compassion for the thousands 
and thousands of other people in the same situation. She also reminds me how my life could have 
taken a different scenario if I remained in Romania. I might have had less resources than I am 
probably able to access now, but more likely I would have turned into a respected teacher in my 
small town and would have “slept in dignity at night”. Thus, the parental lesson and its conclusion 
after noticing the experiences of their daughter abroad: “if you have a choice, better to sleep in 
dignity at night in your own country than to be humiliated and abused abroad.” 
It is fair to say that I have always had the support of my mother and some of my Romanian 
and Canadian friends, many of which are in the same situations, solidarities and agencies with 
other women outside the safe circle of family and friends are probably still possible, albeit not the 
easiest thing to achieve. The increasing gaps in terms of class, race, ethnicity, immigrant status, 
etc., coupled with the neoliberal rhetoric of competition, pose their challenges to feminist 
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solidarities, especially in the environments in which I ended up working. For example, at my last 
workplace I could find more of a sense of identification, understanding and solace in the Latina 
staff who were cleaning our offices at night than in the Canadian born, privileged, upper class 
female Director of Operations.  Part of the male leadership, the female Director of Operations was 
always playing a “tough” card, arguing that the workplace needed more authority and discipline 
and even threatening to bring in other managers who, like her, would “crack the whip”. As feminist 
literature shows us, “tough cards” are always tremendously insecure cards. The leadership position 
probably determined her to over-compensate the “caring” and “softer” traits usually associated 
with women by being an even harsher, tougher and crueler boss.  
Nevertheless, the experience did solidify inside me feelings of alliance and even of kinship 
with other immigrants and female immigrants in Canada who are in the same position as I am or 
in even more vulnerable and precarious situations, like the South-American cleaning staff. When 
I wake up feeling optimist about the world and in upbeat spirit, I dream of organizing migrant 
resistance groups and feminist and anti-racist cooperatives in Canada. In such moments, I envision 
a future with unified struggles, or at least a future of writing so much and so well about these 
injustices that the government and powerful decision-makers will start paying attention to these 
plights. There are also the days when I do not wake up energized by such perspectives of fairness 
and justice, where I surrender to bleaker perspectives over the world and regret even attempting to 
have looked for brighter lights, jobs and life paths. There are moments of shame and guilt, that are 
also lived with a sense of loss, followed up the by ones where I feel I am winning at this neoliberal 
game by just being resilient and determined through all these challenges. And those are the 
moments that make me smile widely and genuinely and keep me going.   
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Appendix A 
 
Summary of the research sample of 25 mothers by assigned name, their occupational or 
educational background, number of their children and when their children left for Canada 
 
1. Adina- 55- teacher- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2001 
2. Camelia- 58- teacher- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 1999 
3. Gabriela- 57- teacher- 3 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2003 
4. Corina- 58- nurse- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 1999 
5. Rodica- 68- retired farmer- 3 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 1996 
6. Liliana- 56- engineer- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2002 
7. Ana- 58- statistician- 3 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 1994 
8. Mariana- 62- nurse- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 2004 
9. Sorana- 55- physician- 2 children- migrated to Canada in 2005 
10. Geanina- 64- retired teacher- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 1998 
11. Mihaela- 55- architect- 2 children- 2 migrated to Canada in 1994 
12. Simona- 62- retired teacher- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2001 
13. Lavinia- 57- teacher- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 1997 
14. Simona- 57- nurse- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2006 
15. Anca- 62- retired teacher- 2 children- 2 migrated to Canada in 1996 and 1999 
16. Vasilica- 57- cook- 3 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2001 
17. Florica- 57- nurse- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 1997 
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18. Mariana- 58- physician- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2004 
19. Liliana- 57- architect- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 2005 
20. Anamaria- 58- brick factory worker- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2007 
21. Lucia- 68- retired statistician- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 1998 
22. Ana- 59- teacher- 2 children- 1 migrated to Canada in 2002 
23. Melania- 65- administrative staff- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 2004 
24. Gabriela- 67- retired nurse- 3 children- 2 migrated to Canada in 2001 and 2005 
25. Florica- 59- retired accountant- 1 child- migrated to Canada in 2006 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Table 1. Title: Number of Permanent Immigrants by Source Country: Romania 
Source 
country 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Romania n/a n/a n/a n/a 2,977 3,851 3,670 3,916 
Source 
country 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Romania 2,976 3,463 4,426 5,588 5,689 5,466 5,755 5,048 
Source 
country 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Romania 4,468 3,834 2,837 2,076 1,922 1,776 1,588 1,512 
         
Source 
country 
2014 2015 
Romania 1,553 1,183 
Source: Statistics Canada 2016 Census Release Topics: Immigration and Citizenship 
 
Table 2a. Title: Labour force survey estimates, Participation rate by sex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b. Title: Labour force survey estimates, Participation rate by immigrant status 
 
Source: Statistics Canada 2017, data extracted 
http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?id=2820087 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Labour force 
characteristics Sex 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Participation 
rate 
Both 
sexes 67 67.4 67.6 67.1 66.9 66.7 66.5 66.5 66.0 65.8 65.7 
Males 72.3 72.5 72.7 71.9 71.6 71.4 71 70.9 70.6 70.6 70.3   
Females 61.9 62.5 62.6 62.4 62.4 62.2 62.1 62.2 61.6 61.2 61.3   
             
             
Participation rate 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total population 67 67.4 67.6 67.1 66.9 66.7 66.5 66.5 66 65.8 65.7 
Landed immigrants 61.7 62.2 62 62.1 62.4 61.9 62.6 62.3 61.6 62.5 63 
Born in Canada 68.7 69.1 69.3 68.6 68.3 68.2 67.8 67.8 67.4 67 66 
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Table 3a. Title: Labour force survey estimate (LFS), Employment rate by immigrant status 
 
Geography = Canada                       
Employment rate                       
Age group = 15 years 
and over 
                      
Immigrant status 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total population 62.8 63.4 63.4 61.5 61.5 61.7 61.7 61.8 61.4 61.3 61.1 
Landed immigrants 57.4 57.9 57.6 55.9 56.3 56.5 57.4 57.3 56.8 57.9 58.3 
Born in Canada 64.5 65.1 65.3 63.2 63.2 63.3 63 63.2 63 62.5 62.2 
Source: Statistics Canada 2017, data extracted from http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a47 
 
 
Table 3b. Labour Force Survey Estimate (LFS), Employment rate by sex 
 
Geography = 
Canada                       
Employment 
rate                       
Age group = 
15 years and 
over                       
Sex 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Both sexes 62.8 63.4 63.4 61.5 61.5 61.7 61.7 61.8 61.4 61.3 61.1 
Males 67.6 67.9 68 65.1 65.3 65.7 65.5 65.6 65.4 65.3 64.9 
Females 58.1 59 59 58 57.9 57.8 57.9 58.1 57.6 57.4 57.5 
Source: Statistics Canada 2017 
 
Table 4. Census Canada 2006 Survey, Employment rate by sex, and ethnic origin 
 
Ethnic origin ( Romanian Age groups (8)Total - Age groups
Geography Canada (01)   20000
Sex (3) Total - Sex   Male   Female
Selected demogr
Employment rate 68.7 73.2 64.5  
Source: Statistics Canada 2008, 2006 Census Findings 
 
Table 5. Title: Male/Female Unemployment Rates by Sex and Country (Romania) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Fem. 
Unempl. 
5.3 5.6 6.3 6.2 7.1 6.3 6.9 6.4 6.1 5.4 4.7 5.8 6.5 6.8 6.4 
Male 
Unempl 
5.5 6.8 7.2 6.9 7.8 7.2 9 7.7 8.2 7.2 6.7 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.6 
Source: Eurostats 2013 
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Table 6. Title: Male-Female Unemployment Romania, Gender Statistics 
 
Source: The World Bank 2013 (data extracted from: http://data.worldbank.org) 
 
Table 7. Title: Tertiary Education Enrolment Rate by Gender, Romania  
 
 
Source: Eurostats 2011 
Table 8: Facts and Figures 2015- Immigration Overview: Permanent Residents-  
Females Percentage 
 
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Canadian 
Experience 
0 0 0 0.9 1.3 2.2 3.4 2.6 8.2 6.6 
Caregiver 3.5 3.4 5.6 6.2 6.5 5.4 4 4.5 9.6 11.6 
Skilled Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 
Skilled Worker 38.4 37.6 38.4 35.1 39.5 33.3 33.3 29.7 23.9 23.9 
Entrepreneur 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Investor 3 2.9 3.9 3.8 4 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.6 1.9 
Self-Employed 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Start-up 
Business 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Provincial 
Nominee 
Program 
4.9 6.6 8.3 11.1 12.3 14.5 15 14 16.6 15.2 
Economic 51.3 51.6 57 57.8 64 59.9 59.4 54.1 61.4 60.2 
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Facts and Figures 2015- Immigration Overview: Permanent Residents- Males  
Percentage 
 
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Canadian 
Experience 
0 0 0 1.1 1.5 2.6 3.9 3 10.1 8.2 
Caregiver 1.9 1.7 2.8 3.6 3.4 3.6 2.9 2.2 3.7 8.3 
Skilled Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.9 
Skilled 
Worker 
46.1 45.3 45.8 41.2 45.7 38.2 37.8 34.7 28.2 27.8 
Entrepreneur 1.4 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Investor 3.4 3.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.1 
Self-
Employed 
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Start-up 
Business 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Provincial 
Nominee 
Program 
5.7 7.8 9.9 13.1 13.7 16.4 16.8 16.9 20.2 17.7 
Economic 58.9 59.5 63.9 64.1 69.3 65.7 65.5 60.6 65.8 65.4 
 
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015 (source available at: 
http://open.canada.ca/data/en/dataset/2fbb56bd-eae7-4582-af7d-
a197d185fc93?_ga=2.18642237.587794557.1501605462-1226141306.1501605462)  
 
 
Table 9: Number of Students in Higher Education in Romania per Year and Form  
of Financing 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration,  
Government of Romania 2014  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 284 
Appendix C 
Glossary of terms 
 
Canadian Experience Class (CEC)- one of Canada’s immigration programs launched in 2008, 
with fluctuating quotas ranging from 2,500 admissions in 2009 to 7,000 in 2012 aimed at attracting 
immigrants who already have Canadian work experience and/or education. As of January 2014, 
the program was incorporated and subsumed within the Canada Express Entry category. 
 
Economic Immigrants Category/Class- Canada’s historic main category of immigration. It 
includes various immigration programs where applicants are selected on the basis of their ability 
to become economically established in Canada. The economic category is used in comparison to 
the non-economic category that cover family reunification and sponsorship class, adoptions, 
humanitarian and compassionate consideration, protected persons, and temporary resident permit 
holders.  
 
Express Entry Program (EEP)- Canada’s main immigration program, launched in January 2014. 
It allows the creation of a pool of candidates who may be eligible to immigrate to Canada 
permanently. From this pool, the applicants will be selected to apply for permanent residence based 
on a comprehensive ranking system and on factors such as skills, education, language ability, work 
experience, etc. Within the Express Entry program and in order to be eligible for it, the applicants 
must apply for one of the following 4 immigration sub-programs: The Federal Skilled Worker 
Program (FSWP), the Federal Skilled Trade Program (FSTP), the Canadian Experience Class 
(CEC), and a certain portion of the Provincial Nominee Program.  
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Federal Entrepreneur Program (FEP)- one of Canada’s smaller immigration programs 
launched in 2014 and living a short life (the program ended in 2015). The program aimed at 
attracting long-time businessmen and investors as a means of investing in Canada and assuring the 
country’s future growth.   
 
Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP)- one of Canada’s larger immigration program that 
was launched in 2002 and continued the initial “Point System” of immigration to the country by 
assessing specific factors, especially as they are related to education, language skills, work 
experience, age, etc. and according to which immigrants can settle as permanent residents. As of 
January 2014, the program was incorporated and subsumed within the Canada Express Entry 
category.  
 
Federal Skilled Trade Program (FSTP)- one of Canada’s smaller immigration program 
launched in 2013, with a quota of 3,000 admissions, aimed at addressing its needs of lower skilled 
migrants. The program was geared for immigrants with qualifications in specific trades or who 
have practical work experience rather than formalized education. As of January 2014, the program 
was incorporated and subsumed within the Canada Express Entry category.  
 
Immigration Investment Program (IIP)- one of Canada’s smaller immigration programs 
launched in 2014 and living a short life (the program ended in 2015). The program aimed at 
attracting long-time businessmen and investors as a means of investing in Canada and assuring the 
country’s future growth.   
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Live-in Caregivers (LIC)- Canadian immigration program until November 2014 and defined by 
Section 2 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations ("IRPR") as "a person who 
resides in and provides child care, senior home support care or care of the disabled without 
supervision in the private household in Canada where the person being cared for resides". 
 
Post-communism/Post-socialism (also spelled “postcommunism” and “postsocialism”)- the 
concepts cover the period of political and economic changes and "transitions" after the fall of 
communist regimes in countries of Eastern Europe and Asia. It is also the period in which new 
governments try to switch to different economies and, in particular, create capitalist markets. 
 
Provincial Nominees (PN)- Canadian immigration program where provinces and territories 
within Canada can nominate and select their own stream of selection of immigrants based on their 
needs 
 
Temporary foreign workers- Canadian immigration program that allows employers to Canada 
to hire foreign nationals to fill temporary labour and skill shortages only when trained Canadian 
citizens or permanent residents are not available to fill in that need.  
 
 
 
 
